The recent general election gave the UK Parliament a strong and clear popular mandate for delivering Brexit. Annette Bongardt and Francisco Torres emphasise that with more than 85 per cent of the vote on a clear Brexit platform (Conservatives, Labour, UKIP) – promising to respect the Brexit referendum result – not only the new government but indeed almost the entire new Parliament have a clear Brexit mandate. Most MPs were elected on a Brexit or even hard-Brexit platform. They argue that Remainers and EU politicians shouldn’t question it as it would undermine the democratic process and the cohesion and sustainability of the EU alike.
On June the 8th most of the MPs were elected on a Brexit or an even hard-Brexit platform. In that sense, Theresa May achieved her aims to the extent that this election confirmed both the referendum and the Article 50 notification bill (voted in by a large majority in both houses). This is a significant change in so far as MPs who were elected in 2015, that is, before the June 2016 referendum, had not been candidates on such a platform, while this time they ran on their party’s manifestos.
Of course, there can be no denial that Theresa May miscalculated her bet to substantially increase the number of Conservative MPs and thereby her grip on the Tory party. May and almost everybody else (even in the Labour party) underestimated Jeremy Corbyn’s success in the election campaign.
Yet it is puzzling that many analyses of the election results prefer to completely focus on the Labour party’s electoral success (although the party got 56 fewer seats than the Conservatives) and on May’s failed gamble, deriving implications for Brexit that we think are ill-founded.
Image by @toryfibs, (Twitter), licenced under Public Domain.
Our four basic conclusions from the election outcome are as follows:
1) Theresa May and her hard-Brexit platform clearly won the elections
Under Theresa May, the Tories’ vote share actually increased by 5.5 per cent, that is, from 36.9 per cent to 42.4per cent. To put the result into perspective, it equals the achievement by Margaret Thatcher (albeit twice) in the 1980s. Whereas she may have failed to increase the number of Tory MPs, she clearly won the popular vote: in the election, 42.4 per cent of the UK electorate supported her hard Brexit stance including the idea of “better no deal than a bad deal”.
42.4 per cent of the UK electorate supported her hard Brexit stance including the idea of “better no deal than a bad deal”
In fact, in terms of the voting share, Theresa May has not been matched either by any of the other European leaders in recent legislative elections. Just to mention the electoral results for the legislatures of a few other European leaders and/or parties in government: Angela Merkel’s CDU and CSU combined were under 42% of the vote in 2013; Emmanuel Macron’s ‘En Marche’ seems to be around 32% of the vote in June 2017; Italy’s coalition of the Partito Democratico with other smaller parties obtained below 30% since 2013; Mariano Rajoy’s Partido Popular got 33% in 2016; António Costa’s Partido Socialista obtained 32.3% in 2015; Alexis Tsipras’s Syriza got 35.5% in 2015.
2) Jeremy Corbyn was the second winner of the elections, on a clear Brexit platform
The elections meant that Corbyn’s pro-Brexit stance in the Labour party won. Corbyn’s position in the previous parliament with regard to triggering Article 50 was confirmed. As a result, the internal opposition (so called Blairites) will have difficulties trying to change his line as Corbyn obtained a voting outcome for Labour 10% above what the party had obtained under the leadership of Ed Miliband and Gordon Brown and even 5% more than Tony Blair in 2005.
Corbyn’s pro-Brexit stance in the Labour party won
It seems a fair observation that May did Corbyn a big favour by not discussing Brexit (and the economy). This allowed him to avoid tensions in his party and embark on his preferred topics such as the NHS, the elderly, the cost of tuition, public transport, etc. It was a strategic mistake by the Prime Minister. Corbyn, who had constantly been under attack particularly by the media and by part of his own party, was also able to appeal to the young voters and mobilise them, a bit like Bernie Sanders in the US or Mélanchon in France. Although perhaps more the result of a protest vote in favour of an economically old-fashioned but more humane type of politician, it was also a personal victory.
3) Anti-Brexit platforms led by Nicola Sturgeon and Tim Farrow were defeated in these elections
The share of the vote of the parties that were against Brexit went down. The Scottish National Party (SNP), opposing Brexit, went significantly down from 4.7 per cent to 3.1 per cent of the vote and lost 13 MPs to the Tories running on Theresa May’s hard-Brexit platform. It is by all accounts remarkable how Nicola Sturgeon, the Scottish First Minister, by far the biggest loser of this election, could say after her SNP loosing both voting share and seats, that the election was a big defeat for Theresa May and for Brexit.
The Liberal Democrats, who had aimed at getting the vote of part of the referendum’s 48 per cent remain vote, also went down to 7.36 per cent of the vote. Their pledge to hold a second EU referendum did not resonate with voters. It is therefore surprising that their leader, Tim Farrow (who resigned in the meantime), and their former leader, Nick Clegg, who failed to regain a seat in Parliament, saw the party’s share go down and rather talk about a big defeat for Theresa May’s Brexit stance. But that is party politics: candidates tend to say that in one-way or the other they won the election.
4) The UK Parliament now has a clear and strong popular mandate for Brexit
With more than 85% of the vote on a clear Brexit platform, promising to respect the Brexit referendum result, the new government and the entire new Parliament have a clear Brexit mandate. The election seems to show clearly that a good part of the ‘Remainers’ are now supporting Brexit. About 44% of voters supported hard Brexit. Another 40% voted for a clear Brexit (Jeremy Corbyn’s stance was clear on that: in the official party line, voting the Article 50 bill and during the campaign). Labour does not discuss what type of Brexit it wants, but so far has avoided any mention of staying in the single market even if that was possible – in fact, it voted against tentative amendments or has not defended even remaining in the Customs Union. Labour only pledges “tariff-free access to the EU market”, which can be read as a free trade agreement.
These results come on top of:
- the European Union Referendum Act 2015, which was passed by 544-53 votes on its second reading in the Commons and approved by the House of Lords;
- the result of the referendum in favour of Brexit;
- the triggering of Article 50 with the support of an overwhelming majority of MPs in parliament at the end of March 2017 (even an amendment to the Article 50 bill by the House of Lords, proposing that the government should commit to staying in the single market, was defeated by 299 votes to 136 – the Labour party did not support it on the grounds that it would mean acting “as if the referendum hadn’t happened”.
That notwithstanding, many anti-Brexit (not necessarily pro-European) observers circle in on May’s failed gamble to interpret the election results as popular support for a softer Brexit (whatever that means) or even for remain, subverting the popular mandate. Also, some EU leaders and politicians and even members of the European Commission, without any mandate from colleagues in the other EU27 to do so (as such a position requires unanimity) hint at the fact that the UK can stop exiting and remain in the EU, thereby undermining the position of the EU chief negotiator. That seems to us, on the one hand, a subversion of the democratic process that led to the country’s decision to exit the EU and on the other a (not very wise) invitation for any EU country to try to extract short-term dividends at the expense of the common good and the sustainability of the European project. Were there no lessons learnt from the rise of populism?
This post represents the views of the authors and not those of the Brexit blog or the LSE.
Annette Bongardt and Francisco Torres are Senior Visiting Fellows in European Political Economy at LSE European Institute.
A really excellent article, one of the few that understands that the issue is not Leave or Remain per se, but democracy itself.
There are some very good points here, but I don’t think one can go as far as to say that Parliament has a clear and strong mandate for Brexit, and certainly not a strong and clear mandate for a so-called ‘hard Brexit’. Firstly, many people voted Conservative or Labour mainly for other reasons, such as support or opposition for austerity (the latter being key among the young), or such as the NHS or national security, not because they necessarily approved of the parties’ Brexit stance. Secondly, many Remainers voted tactically for Labour on the basis that they were not advocating such an extreme version of Brexit as the Tories, and were the non-Tory party most likely to win in their constituency. Largely as a result, pro-Remain constituencies such as Canterbury and Kensington North saw huge swings from Conservative to Labour (9% and 11% respectively; Canterbury had elected a Conservative MP at every general election since 1918). A recent Yougov poll found a slight majority (54%) of the UK public favoring either Remain or a ‘soft Brexit’. https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/06/15/majority-favour-pushing-brexit-many-are-tempted-so/
Thank you for the very helpful comments. Yes, of course as you say there are nuances on how people voted (for other reasons than Brexit, tactically to avoid the probability of a less preferred type of Brexit, etc.). Our point is just that contrary to the previous parliament (and to other comments, which in our view centre too much on the fact that Theresa May failed her bet to increase the number of Tory MPs) this new parliament has now a clear and indeed much stronger mandate for Brexit.
That is because the two main parties, Tories and Labour (with over 82% of the vote share), ran on clear pro-Brexit manifestos. The Conservatives ran even on a hard Brexit and “better no deal than a bad deal” platform and increased their share of the vote significantly. The Labour party’s stance was clearly pro-Brexit (recall that already voting the Article 50 bill the Labour party did not support proposed amendments to commit to staying in the single market on the grounds that it would mean acting “as if the referendum hadn’t happened”). Voters who strongly opposed Brexit could have voted for instance for the Liberal Democrats or the SNP but the share of the vote of those parties went down. In that sense, Theresa May achieved her aims to the extent that this election confirmed both the EU referendum results and the Article 50 notification bill (voted by a large majority in both houses).
In fact, there have now been four major democratic votes for Brexit in the UK that cannot be ignored: 1) the European Union Referendum Act 2015 (544-53 votes); 2) the in-out referendum (52-48 per cent); 3) the Article 50 bill (overwhelming majority of MPs); and 4) this election (about 84 per cent share of the vote).
The 85% pro-Brexit figure is as logical as saying “people who voted for Brexit in order to get 350M per week for the NHS or because we don’t get on with the French provide a clear mandate for Brexit”. The Lib Dems failed to capitalise on the 48.1% Remain vote because of the perception that they are too small to win. Remainers therefore voted for the party most likely to unseat the Hard Brexit Tories.
Again, I agree with much of this, though I would seek to distinguish a ‘mandate’ (in your sense) from ‘popular opinion being in favour of Brexit’ (which cannot perhaps be inferred from the general election result due to the presence of so many other important issues, the foremost among them being austerity). The YouGov poll I linked to above also suggests a majority (60%) of the UK public are in favour of going ahead with Brexit, but this figure includes 26% (of the total) who voted against Brexit originally and only believe in going ahead with it because they believe the result of the original referendum must be respected. If popular opinion changes significantly, the latter group might reconsider. Perhaps misleadingly, one of the headline results of the YouGov poll is that 52% of the public believe the negotiating objectives articulated by Theresa May in January would be ‘good for the country’, but this begs the question of whether May’s objectives are in fact achievable, in view of the EU27’s rather uncompromising and ‘maximalist’ initial negotiating position, particularly on issues such as ECJ jurisdiction and the financial settlement. One final comment: in the unlikely event that a UK government opted to try to reverse the Article 50 decision, perhaps as a result of an overwhelming change in UK public opinion and/or a second referendum, the EU27 would be highly likely to offer significantly worse terms than the UK had before 2016, as Guy Verhofstadt and others recently said; in such a situation, the UK government would be in a weak position and would probably be obliged to accept these terms. In view of the political and economic uncertainty that would have been caused in the meantime, such re-joining would in my view be highly unlikely to incentivise recalcitrance or additional demands in other member states.
Thank you, again. We also think that it would not make sense to reconsider. It would not be good for the UK (even for Remainers) to ignore the will of the people and the parliament to leave the EU. The UK would also be in a very weak position in the EU if it tried to reverse Brexit – most obviously, its special conditions would disappear. Its credibility would be severely undermined. Within the country people could feel betrayed and the political consequences could be dire. In the EU, a much weakened UK is likely to even more pursue a strategy of vetoes and opt outs that had already become incompatible with a good functioning of the EU.
At this point, the UK, which has major reservations and many opt-outs and does not wish to participate in an ever-closer union, should leave the EU so that the Eurozone (which is the EU’s political core) and the EU can function and deliver.
If the UK wanted to stay close to the EU it could opt for some Swiss-type relation with the EU. That is probably much better for everybody than the UK being inside with one foot out.
P.S. my apologies; my ‘60%’ in the YouGov poll above should have been ‘70%’.
Oh the joys of first past the post.
The Brits are forced to vote tactically, often for representatives they really do not want in dire circumstances – nicknamed ‘holding your nose’, since choices stink.
If the UK electoral system used a PR-type system where the electorate could put a cross against a party they felt represented them, many of the points in this piece would be correct. Instead we are forced into a system that tends to coalesce around two parties in order to get the largest incumbent out, often voting for candidates we really don’t want but who are ‘less bad’, or more often not voting for smaller parties who are unable to gain traction, ‘leaving us with a ‘wasted vote’.
I would argue that the UK has a weak, outmoded democratic process that has been at the base of much of the conflict and confusion we all see now. Many voters do not feel represented to a very significant and real extent.
https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk.
The reading taken here suggests that
• Voters elect a representative or party that represents their views
• Voters had a clue about what Brexit really means – Curtice (2016, 2017) suggests that this is not the case
• The Labour party’s stance on Brexit is clear – it’s not.
The issue of Brexit is largely a political problem foisted on an electorate. Prior to 2015, the UK electorate were not that interested in the EU (Economist, April 2017?). This is, as Juncker noted in his acceptance speech of A50, a catfight that got out of control in the Conservative party.
I believe it is quite wrong to say that the UK electorate were not that interested in the EU prior to 2015. UKIP gained 12.6% of the vote in the 2015 general election, and many on the right and left have for several years felt deeply uneasy about the UK’s EU membership, partly because of opposition to ‘ever-closer union’ and also partly due to more recent concerns over migration and its impact on wages (e.g. Corbyn on the left) or social cohesion (e.g. May on the right). Of those who felt uneasy on the issue, most probably thought they would never be given a say on it. The referendum revealed very great strength of feeling on both sides; I cannot believe these feelings did not exist prior to Cameron’s calling the referendum. For comparison, the Norwegian electorate have always been deeply divided on the issue of EU membership and in 1972 this brought down a government (albeit a Labour one).
This comment raises a very interesting question: should countries whose electorate is deeply divided on the issue of EU membership and on the objective of an ever-closer union remain in the EU?
We think not. They should rather establish agreements like Norway’s or Switzerland’s. At present the UK is a member of the EU but it does not participate in two of its most important areas of integration: the Euro and Schengen. It only participates in the Single Market but dislikes being subject to its regulations, which ensure that the market works in the first place. What is the point to remain a EU member in these conditions?
Besides, each time there is a treaty revision in the EU the solution turns out to be suboptimal, not least because of the UK’s red lines. The result has been insufficient integration and a popular backlash in many EU countries and also in the UK. The situation is not sustainable. The EU needs to move forward with increased political integration to deal with a host of urgent transnational issues. The UK may want to have a distinct approach to problems and should be free to try it out.
I agree with your assessment that the UK’s membership of the EU was problematic both for the EU27 (because of its opposition to the closer political integration) and for many in the UK (in that UK public opinion was split on whether the UK should be a member at all). If the Article 50 negotiations conclude with a (relatively amicable) agreement, then Brexit may have some advantages for both sides in the long run; the EU27 will be free to pursue closer fiscal and political integration and thereby safeguard the future of the single currency; the UK will be able to repatriate a certain amount of decision-making power. I am concerned however that there is a very real risk that the Article 50 negotiations may break down amid acrimony, due to intransigence on both sides; if this were to happen, the consequences for both parties could be grave – a hard border in Ireland, 3 million EU citizens and 1.5 million Britons (in the EU27) without very much security, trade ties falling off a cliff-edge, and damage to the foreign-policy standing and foreign relations of both parties. Judging from publicly available information, the negotiating positions of both sides seem to me to be unreasonable or ‘maximalist’; both parties seem too willing to risk a ‘no-deal’ outcome and appear to underestimate both its chance and its negative effects on themselves. The European Council’s negotiating directives call for the European Court of Justice to be the final guarantor of the rights of EU27 citizens in the UK; even the Labour Party would not accept this, according to Shadow Brexit Secretary Sir Keir Starmer QC. Both sides have likewise articulated unrealistic positions on the financial settlement. I hope that good sense will prevail and a sensible compromise will be reached on both issues; and that afterwards, a mutually beneficial trading relationship may be negotiated. Finally, it should be noted that both the Swiss and Norwegian models have their problems: Norway must incorporate a large amount of EU legislation into Norwegian law with limited say over its framing (leading the Norwegian government to identify a democratic deficit in a recent report), whereas Switzerland voted narrowly to restrict freedom of movement in a 2014 referendum, leading to its ejection by the EU from the ErasmusPlus student exchange scheme and the prestigious Horizon2020 research funding initiative. Although the ECJ has no direct legislative authority in Switzerland, Swiss courts must adopt significant amounts of EU law in order to avoid the violation of any of the over 120 bilateral EU-Swiss agreements (which are all linked together by a guillotine clause) – this is a matter of concern to many EU and Swiss politicians and jurists. Switzerland could not follow through with plans to join the EFTA, desired by politicians on both sides, because of a negative referendum result, which the President of the (Swiss) Federal Council Rene Felber, described as ‘a grave rupture between the Federal authorities and the people’. Opposition to ECJ jurisdiction and opposition to freedom of movement were reportedly major factors in the negative result. Some of these issues are discussed in more detail here: http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2012/outsiders-inside-swiss-and-norwegian-lessons-uk
Democracy in the UK is not perfect, but it is a great deal closer to perfect than that which exists in the EU. Unelected EU officials, distant from the demos, are insulated from the ups and downs of democracy. They have in the past ignored votes that contradict their perspective. It is great that these authors see a value in the democracy we have, rather than selectively slating it and the voters when it goes the ‘wrong’ way.
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Yes, we also think that it would not be good for the UK (even for Remainers) to ignore and try to bypass the confirmed and reconfirmed will of the people and the parliament to leave the EU.
The argument that 85% voted for Brexit is utterly ficticious. Many people I know voted tactically against the Tories for the next most likely party to win the seat (including Labour) – PRECISELY to force a rethink of Hard Brexit…even a reverse of Brexit.
As we already said in our first reply above, there are of course nuances on how people voted (for other reasons than Brexit, or tactically to try to avoid a less preferred type of Brexit, etc.). Our point is that – as opposed to the previous parliament (and contrary to other comments, which in our view centre too much on the fact that Theresa May failed her bet to increase the number of Tory MPs) – this new parliament does have a clear and indeed much stronger mandate for Brexit.
You say that people might have voted Labour against the Tories. Yet, on the one hand, the Conservatives increased their vote share substantially while, on the other hand, Labour under Jeremy Corbyn ran on a clear pro-Brexit manifesto. Labour did not advocate staying in the Single Market or even the Customs Union either but only talked about gaining tariff free access to the EU market. Voters who opposed Brexit had alternatives such as the Liberal Democrats or the SNP but still those parties’ share of the vote decreased.
One might also reflect on the fact that there was very little debate about Brexit in these so-called Brexit elections. Does that not convey a certain acceptance of the fact (Brexit) on the part of the electorate?
Remainers did not vote Lib Dem because they considered it very often as a wasted vote. While the Conservative manifesto was clearly pro-Brexit, the Labour party’s stance appeared to remainers as far more nuanced. Recent polls are showing that a majority in the UK would now vote to remain if there was another vote. However due to the division caused by the referendum and recent election, the appetite for another immediate referendum is less clear. In your article you talk about respecting a democratic vote. Many adademics I know believe very strongly that democracy was not adhered to during the referendum due to 1) clearly false promises and information from the Leave side (e.g. 350M for NHS, Turkey about to join EU etc..), 2) the lack of any clear vision (or rather the existence of multiple visions) of Brexit…e.g Hard Brexit, Norway model etc.) 3) The closeness of the vote considering the importance of the decision and 4) the faer tactics used by popular press (e.g. the Mail and Express) to confuse the EU with terrorist migrants (at the heart of the migrant crisis). I actually find it very hard to understand how any academic, with an objective mind, can view the result of this life-changing referendum as a “clear” mandate for anything.
You say ‘Recent polls in the UK are now showing that a majority would vote to remain if there were another Brexit vote’. I could not find any such poll more recently than February. The most recent YouGov poll found that 70% believed the government should implement Brexit. According to this poll, 44% believed the original Brexit vote was the right decision, 45% believed the original Brexit vote was a wrong decision, and 11% did not know. https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/9pum7c5c4j/AnthonyResults_170613_Brexit_W.pdf
http://www.thestar.co.uk/news/we-d-vote-to-remain-if-brexit-vote-was-held-again-say-majority-of-star-readers-1-8605633
Not the most reliable poll perhaps, but interesting because this was a heavy Leave area.
Most of the posts since the General Election on this blog have had a very pro-Brexit bias. This post is yet another example.
This all seems to forget that we are still in a “honeymoon period”, even though the referendum was nearly a year ago. Negotiations have not progressed to such a point that critical issues have been encountered. The intricacies of the Great Repeal Bill process (a whole series of bills, not just one) have not been revealed.
All this will have to be progressed by a government with a wafer-thin majority in the House of Commons, and no majority in the House of Lords (as was revealed by the voting for Article 50 before Easter). Jeremy Corbyn may support the government on specific EU votes (“This is the will of the people”), but the whole process is about to get so complicated that there are any number of potential obstacles ahead.
I think the article shows that the authors do not have a good understanding of British politics. They seem to assume that how people voted was to a large extent determined by their views on Brexit, and that people fully agree with the manifesto of the party for which they vote. In reality people voted the way they did mainly because of traditional tribal loyalties and views on domestic issues. The first past the post system puts pressure on people to decide between the two big parties. Support for the Tories and Labour went up mainly because support for UKIP went down. People did not vote Lib Dem because they have not forgiven them for their role in the coalition government or because the Lib Dems have no chance in their constituency. The SNP won about 60% of the seats in Scotland. Everybody would see that as a great victory, if they had not won a ridiculous 95% of the seats in 2015.
I think the people want a government that will give top priority to the domestic socio-economic issues they care about: jobs, pay, housing, NHS etc. Unfortunately they are not going to get it because if Brexit is going happen, the government is going to have to concentrate on it single-mindedly.
The majority voted for Brexit in the referendum but they did not vote for a poorer weaker economy. Obviously, the Remain campaign tried to warn them, but the Leave campaign rubbished the warnings. It seems most of the Leave voters believed the Leave campaign claims that Brexit would be good for the economy or at least would not do serious harm. Many people think developments since June 2016 have confirmed this optimistic view.
Clearly the majority does not support Remain (however much I may regret it), but the majority does not really support Leave either. The majority view on the EU is more a matter of ignorance, complacence and indifference than of strong support for one side or the other.
In conclusion I would say that the government has a mandate to implement Brexit, but under two conditions:
1) It does not damage the economy,
2) The government is able to give adequate attention to domestic socio-economic problems at the same time.
I and many other people seriously doubt that it is capable of satisfying these conditions.
Thank you for you comment. We think we do understand at least some of the specificities of British politics and the political cycle. Also, we agree that people do vote strategically, they may give more weight to other things than Brexit and they might as well want to leave the EU but maintain the benefits as if they were staying in – but that is simply not possible and inflicts great damage also on the EU. The focus only on UK interests falls short of reality – why should the EU keep negotiating and renegotiating with the UK?
Still, many people in the UK seem to value a repatriation of decisions independently of the price.
Imperfect as it is, democracy is to respect the will of the people and there have now been four major democratic votes for Brexit in a row in the UK that cannot be ignored: 1) the European Union Referendum Act 2015 (544-53 votes); 2) the in-out referendum (52-48 per cent), after the other EU members had conceded additional exceptions and privileges to the UK at the expense of the others (which was rather undemocratic for the citizens of other EU members and rather self-harming from the Union’s point of view); 3) the Article 50 bill (approved by a overwhelming majority of MPs); and now 4) this election where an about 84 per cent share of the vote was for parties whose manifestos assured that Brexit would be respected. Even Labour did not advocate staying in the Single Market or even the Customs Union but only talked about gaining tariff free access to the EU market.
On the other hand, one might ask: should countries whose electorate is deeply divided on the issue of EU membership and on the objective of an ever-closer union remain in the EU? We think not.
After Brexit, the UK should rather establish agreements with the EU, as is the case of Norway or Switzerland or indeed Ukraine, Turkey or Canada. At present the UK is a member of the EU but it does not participate in two of its most important areas of integration: the Euro and Schengen: the UK is the least integrated of all EU member states. It only participates in the Single Market but dislikes being subject to its regulations, which ensure that the market works in the first place. What is the point of remaining a EU member in these conditions?
Besides, each time there is a treaty revision in the EU the solution turns out to be suboptimal, not least because of the UK’s red lines. The outcome has been insufficient integration and a popular backlash in many EU countries and also in the UK.
The situation is not sustainable if there is a constant hold up of decisions in the EU from within. The EU needs to move forward with increased political integration to deal with a host of urgent transnational issues. The UK may wish to have a distinct approach to problems and should be free to try it out.
Not really
The general election was a vote to form a government, not on one policy
Both Conservative and Labour promised have-your-cake-and-eat-it Brexits that give control over EU immigration and free trade almost like we have now. So no change since the referendum.
Yes the referendum, and now the election, provide a mandate to take Brexit forward. But they do not provide a mandate for Brexit itself.
No-one takes a project from idea to implementation without reviewing the project plan
At some point we will know what Brexit means, will know what choice Thetesa May has made between having and eating cake.
Then we can for the first time make an informed decision on Brexit. That referendum on the agreed terms would be quite different from 2016 because there would only be one Brexit on the table, and it could be properly assessed.
Then we can find out what the informed view of the people is on a Brexit plan.
In our view the discussion about Brexit in the UK is excessively focused on the national interest. It hence escapes attention that the EU is there to defend the common good of the Union and the interest of the remaining 27 EU member states (each with its own concerns, such as Ireland or Spain).
When the UK decided to trigger article 50 that meant that the country was to leave the EU altogether. Neither partial membership of the EU nor cherry picking in political domains are on offer. The present negotiation is about disentangling the UK from the EU, not about any deal making. The terms of the UK’s participation in the EU were negotiated before it joined the EC and further fleshed out over time by means of numerous treaty revisions and intergovernmental deals (one may want to recall that those involve all member states and were agreed by unanimity). What is being discussed now before the UK leaves the EU are the divorce terms (settlement of bills, etc.) to sever the existing ties. The UK government represents the country in the negotiation (it got a mandate from parliament to freely negotiate Brexit when parliament approved the Article 50 bill and invoked it) and it seeks to agree the terms of the separation with the EU (on the EU side, there are clear negotiating guidelines, limited to withdrawal negotiations). Since the UK triggered article 50 on 29 March 2017, it sent the clock ticking for concluding the negotiations within two years, whereafter the UK is out of the Union, with or without an agreement on the terms of separation or a new bilateral relation.
The EU has accepted to already start talking about a possible future agreement at a later point in the withdrawal negotiations provided that the talks on the divorce settlement are sufficiently advanced and go well, as to help smoothen the transition. However, any trade or other bilateral agreement can only come into existence once the UK has left the EU (by definition the EU cannot make international agreements with member states). Here, again, it is not only the UK’s preferences that count but so do the ones of the EU and its member states.
Then, once (if) the terms of separation are agreed and implemented, the UK might want to keep a closer trading relation with the EU than on World Trade Organisation terms (the default option). Alternative options, subject to EU approval, come with trade-offs in terms of sovereignty. For instance, it may apply for joining the European Economic Area (like Norway) but that implies that it must respect all the rules that come with EEA membership (among which free movement of people, EU regulation and the ECJ) and contribute to the EU budget. It could also try to have a Swiss-style agreement or to be in the EU Customs Union (like Turkey), in which case it cannot strike any free trade deals with third countries. Or it could go for a Canada-type deep free trade agreement (which required the unanimous ratification by all EU member states).
Of course, there is also the option to re-apply to join the EU at some point. However, it has already been stressed that the UK will not get the special conditions (rebate) and opt outs that made its membership so problematic for the Union.
Thank you for responding.
I agree with you that discussion in the UK has largely ignored what the EU wants. That means that many in the British public have come to believe that the somewhat aspirational Brexits that both main parties have talked about are likely to be available in fact. We shall see. But l think the electorate is in for a shock when the terms are published. How they will react is not clear.
You make the point that the EU cannot conclude a trade agreement until the UK has left. Agreed. But Article 50 says “the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union”. That future framework cannot just say “we’ll sort out trade and freedom of movement later.”. It needs to give a reasonably clear picture of the destination. That in turn would allow a substantive decision to be made by way of a referendum on the terms.
I agree with you that the country cannot just abandon Brexit. Given that we started the process with a referendum only another referendum has the political authority to change course. And now for the first time a poll (Survation) has shown a majority in favour of a referendum. We will find out whether that is the start of a series of such polls or just a one-off.
If the UK voted to stay in the EU, then the Article 50 notification would be unilaterally withdrawn – the balance of legal opinion seems to say that is permitted; anyway the ECJ is not going to expel a country that wishes to stay.
If the UK stayed, then nothing would have changed, as regards opt-outs, rebates &c.
I agree very other comments here that the logical basis of this article is faulty. General elections are not run on single issues, the electorate votes based on a multitude of different local and national issues. If the UK had a proportional representation parliamentary system then it may be possible to infer the conclusions drawn here, though without additional evidence it would be a weak inference.
If the logical basis of this article held true it should be applied to every general election that UKIP stood in based on the platform of ‘hard’ Brexit. If the logic were applied then it would show a massive rejection of Brexit with only 1 MP ever being returned for UKIP. That clearly doesn’t marry with the 52% of the voting electorate who did in the end vote for leaving the EU in the referendum.
Apologies for the typo, should read ‘I agree with other…’
Thank you for the comment. Yes, we agree with the point that elections are not run on single issues and that the electorate votes may be based on a multitude of different local and national issues. However, these elections were called by the PM to strengthen her capacity to deliver Brexit after the UK had chosen by an overwhelming majority in parliament (supported by a referendum) to leave the EU. Therefore, we think that they can also be interpreted as a confirmation of support for Brexit insofar as it was part and parcel of the different party manifestos and campaigns. What we can see is that an 84 per cent share of the vote went for parties whose manifestos assured that Brexit would be respected. Among these, almost 44 per cent of the votes went for parties with hard Brexit and “better no deal than a bad deal” platforms and about 40 per cent of the votes went for Labour, whose stance was to respect the decision of the country to leave the EU. Even Labour did not advocate staying in the Single Market (correctly pointing out that that would mean acting “as if the referendum hadn’t happened”) or even the Customs Union but only talked about gaining tariff free access to the EU market.
1) Theresa May and her hard-Brexit platform clearly won the elections
Voting share is a misleading measure under FPTP. The collapse of the UKIP vote is a hardening in favour of one of the two major parties. That Labour won this contest within the contest is clear enough. Even so if you count the anti-tory/ukip share of the vote it clearly exceeded the Tory vote.
2) Jeremy Corbyn was the second winner of the elections, on a clear Brexit platform
Less clear than you suggest as their priority was to safeguard our interests in the single market leaving our ‘membership’ of that and the customs union open when in favour of pursing a ‘jobs and economy’ agenda ahead of migration control. A ‘Brexit in name only’ would be in concert with Labour policy.
3) Anti-Brexit platforms led by Nicola Sturgeon and Tim Farrow were defeated in these elections
Again under FPTP not what it might seem. In order to take seats from SNP (coloured a little by concerns about a 2nd Independence referendum) scottish tories were espousing a far more pro-EU message than westminster tories. Even so SNP won 3 times as many seats as the Tories. If you’re being consistent then your first argument would mean that SNP won a ‘clear’ mandate. Similarly the fact that the Lib Dems gained more seats should, under your logic, indicate that they were clear winners too!
4) The UK Parliament now has a clear and strong popular mandate for Brexit
That Parliament has a mandate for Brexit is clear. Whether it is strong and/or popular is less clear. The impression is that we’re stuck in some ruts of our own making and that many in Parliament are less driven by their consciences than they are by their political careers. At best the split between those in favour of Brexit at all is pretty even – but the split in favour of a ‘hard’ Brexit – if that is defined as leaving the single market and customs union – is probably less supportive.
To have a mandate, the subject has to have been discussed in detail during the campaign.
It wasn’t. So there is NO MANDATE.
Thank you for the comment. These were to be the Brexit elections. In the event, as far as we could see, the issue was put on the table (constant references by the PM, UKIP, the Lib Dems, and not only) but with the passing of time other issues gained prominence. Across countries elections are fought on the basis of party manifestos, which feature multiple issues, and by voting for different parties people accept their manifestos. Also, as we said above, the non-dominance of Brexit in the campaign might suggest a more general acceptance of the fact, and a wish to move on. After all, the decision to leave the EU had been taken before the election and article 50 invoked.
I disagree with the authors’ argument. 37% of the electorate is not a mandate for anything this destructive and in the General Election, Remainers had no real choice. They had to vote Labour to get rid of Tories. These are the facts. If a referendum was held now, which it should be, you would get your answer.
Thank you for the comment. We are not discussing support for Brexit – the UK took the decision to exit the EU by triggering article 50 (with an overwhelming parliamentary majority) before the election. The UK is now set to leave the EU until the end of March 2019 (BTW, any postponement depends on unanimous agreement by the EU-27). The mandate that this parliament got (with roughly 84% of the vote) is to implement Brexit, to which both the Tories and Labour are committed. Of course, the UK may come to rethink its relation with the EU at some point (there is even a precedent for that – in 1961) and re-apply to join the EU with all of its institutions (the Eurozone, Schengen, Justice and Home Affairs, etc.) or the Single-Market centred and less politically-contentious European Economic Area (Norway, after two negative referendums on EU membership, became part of the EEA). It might do that in a few years time through another referendum on the issue, who knows.
Thanks for the reply but your definition of “mandate” is purely technical not moral, and that, you will see in time, matters a great deal….especially with a hung parliament.
I agree with the point that Article 50 has been invoked and that there will be a Brexit indeed. I agree with the point that Parliament should determine policy, rather than referenda. If Parliament wants to continue with Brexit, so be it. I agree with the point that Brexit was one of the issues of the General Elections of June 8, though it was not the only one, and perhaps for many not the most important one. Formally Parliament has a mandate to deal with the issue, though, given the many issues on the table, and given the confusions on Brexit, one cannot regard the election as a referendum on Brexit itself.
However, your article remains scientifically unwarranted, since it fails to address the issue that the Brexit referendum question was flawed in design. I explained this issue in a former LSE Brexit blog entry: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/05/17/the-brexit-referendum-question-was-flawed-in-its-design/
My criticism on your article is that you present it as a rational story from referendum to Parliamentarian mandate, while in reality what is happening now must be diagnosed as an accidental course of history, in which one happened to take a one-way street because a street sign was flawed.
Many comments to this article referred to the UK electoral system of First Past The Post (FPTP). Quite likely Brexit would never have happened if the UK had had proportional representation (PR) so that UKIP could have become just one of the parties instead of the nightmare of the mainstream parties.
Overall, my observation is that there is a curious miscomprehension in the UK about what democracy actually is. This miscomprehension also exists in the Electoral Reform Society, who claim that Single Transferable Vote (STV) applied to districts would be PR, while it isn’t. See https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2017/06/16/the-bizarre-incomprehension-of-democracy/
If the UK wants to get its act together then a first step would be to stick to the definitions and meanings of the terms used in the discussion.
The idea that UKIP would have been less powerful under P.R. may be problematic. In the 2015 general election under P.R., UKIP would have won 12.6% of Parliamentary seats (as they won 12.6% of the popular vote), and the only stable coalition with an absolute majority of seats would have been Conservative+UKIP+DUP. In this scenario, UKIP would have had a huge amount of power (being theoretically able to bring down the coalition by resigning from it), and would have undoubtedly been able to force a referendum on EU membership. In countries with P.R., at least one small party (such as UKIP) usually ends up with a disproportionate amount of power, if it is part of the ruling coalition.
More importantly, I do not think the (possible) flaw in the referendum question is as important as you suppose. The referendum result yielded the very important information that 52% of those who voted were unhappy with the UK’s membership of the EU. It was for the government (or future governments) to act on this information as they saw fit; technically, the referendum was consultative and not binding. It seems clear to me that, with such a large proportion of the population against membership, there is a strong case for the UK government to cease full membership of the EU proper. In the long run, this should have advantages for the EU27 also, as they will be free to pursue closer fiscal and political integration without these being vetoed by the UK (where a large majority of the electorate, including many Remainers, are opposed to ‘ever closer union’.) What the UK government seeks in place of full membership, whether it be a Norway-style agreement, or a Swiss-style agreement, or a Canada-style agreement, or some combination or compromise between these, is for elected representatives to decide, taking into account both popular opinion and their judgment of the national interest. And the latter, in my opinion, is as it should be, in a representative democracy.
Thank you the comment, with which we agree.
@Bongardt & Torres: I suppose that you mean to say that you agree with David Ellis in his reply to me.
@Ellis: Your reply doesn’t deal with my critique. (a) If UKIP had 12.6% of the seats, there is no reason to assume that it would be in government. In Holland Wilders has a similar percentage but he is regarded as too extreme. In Germany there was a Grand Coalition. (b) You forget the dynamics of PR. Under this system, more parties would pop up, creating more options for coalitions. (c) The design of the referendum question is more important than you suggest. We don’t know what people actually voted for. You give your interpretation, but this is only your interpretation. (d) If you would be so much in favour of representative government, then I do not understand that you accept a referendum as a useful tool for democracy. In my analysis, referenda are rather hopeless. (e) The scientifically warranted summary of the current situation is: “Garbage in, garbage out”. This is the proper message that scientists should inform the people about. It is disinformative to hold that there was a proper referendum and that the mandate for the UK Parliament is other than only official.
(a) If we had had P.R. in 2015 and UKIP were not in government, then no stable coalition would be possible (assuming the same parties and the same shares of the popular vote, which I admit is a big assumption). UKIP is significantly less extreme than Geert Wilders’ PVV, particularly with regard to Islam, in my opinion. (b) I agree that the UK would almost certainly have more parties under P.R., but given that the 2015 referendum revealed 52% against full EU membership, it is reasonable to suppose that at times, the UK would be governed by a coalition in favour of ending full EU membership. This would create ‘instability’ in the UK’s membership of the EU which in the long run is not in the best interests of either the EU27 or the UK. All this assumes that UK public opinion on the EU is reasonably independent of whether we have a P.R. system or a D.R. system – an assumption I believe justified. (c) The referendum question provided no information about what the UK public wanted in place of full EU membership, but it provided very concrete information about what it a majority did *not* want – namely, a continuation of full EU membership. As I said before, the UK government and Parliament can (and should) take into account subsequent opinion polls concerning Single Market membership and other issues, in deciding the form of the future relationship they should seek with the EU. (d) Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that 80% of the UK population were deeply opposed to full membership of the EU. Presumably a referendum revealing such a figure, could and should be a tool for the government to take into account, when shaping future policy?
P.S. my apologies for the typo; ‘2015’ should have been ‘2016’, of course.
Thanks, Thomas. Yes, we had replied to David’s second reply to you. We didn’t discuss the referendum, the electoral system, RP, etc. We may come up with a second blog more on the substance of the EU-UK relationship.
At Thomas: There are no “confusions” about Brexit. There is, however, a diehard group of remainers who have no intention whatever of accepting the result of the referendum. The Cameron government called and held the referendum. It took advice on the wording of the referendum. All along the issue was to either get out of the EU or the stay in the EU. The concern of Leavers was sovereignty and immigration to a large degree. The matter was decided per referendum. Parliament put its seal on the result. Thomas claims to know more about parliamentary democracy in the UK than both the Cameron and May governments and the HoC? No Thomas, your scientific prognostications do not override the train of decisions made by the UK government, Parliament and the UK electorate. The issue was crystal clear: Stay in or get out! The people voted OUT!
What is so difficult to understand about such a clear-cut decision? It is not as if it is an experiment in political governance. Not only has it been tried before, a sovereign nations-state, but the UK has had years of experience being a sovereign and self-governing country. Indeed, it joins a majority of nation-states and nations-states in the world as self-governing sovereign countries. Your science does not trump the UK government and the UK electorate. It was voted on as it was, legally and above board. Besides, there are millions of academics around the world to offer a scientific opinion on how referendums should be run. It would be most un-democratic to allow academics to override the decisions made by democratic governments and to override the results of referendums/elections, even if the academics could agree on the wording of referendums in question and the information and manifestos provided in election campaigns.
Sorry, Thomas, that is a big NO!
There is a clear fallacy in the original article and the authors’ subsequent comments. The fallacy is surprisingly widespread. It is that we decided to leave the EU and now only the form of Brexit remains to be determined. That misunderstands the concept “decision in principle”. It is not how decisions are made. Instead, we need to compare concrete options.
I decide to move house: there is so much l dislike about my flat: too small, too noisy, too this, too that. I can easily imagine something better. I look around. It turns out that there is no flat that l can afford and that l prefer to the one l have. The authors – and Leave campaigners – tell me that that does not matter. I have decided to move so the only question is where to. They tell me l must choose the least bad of the options and pay the considerable costs of moving in order to go somewhere l like less.
Of course, in real life we are all more sensible. My decision to move house is provisional. Once l have looked at the properties available l can make a real choice: move to this one, or stay in my present home.
In 2016 Leave had no plan. Every voter had to imagine for themselves what Brexit meant. At some point the Government will agree the terms of Brexit and they will determine to a great extent what Brexit is like. Then we should have the decision whether to go forward with the one best actually available Brexit or to Remain in the EU.
A completely false analogy, Michael. The UK is not moving house. The UK is also not moving one inch or even one centimetre further away from Europe. The analogy to use is this: you own a house over which you have ceded control as to who will come and stay with you, what the rules are,etc.,etc. due to you having become a member of a Co-op. You and other eligible residents in your home have voted to get out of the Cooperative.
You must not let your obsession with how bad you think EU membership is blind you to the point that l am making: that it is only when you have a concrete alternative that you can make a final decision.
Your use of emotive rhetoric is tather throwing sand in peoples’ eyes.
So let’s think it through in your example. In your case you have made the decision to leave the co-op. You look at the options for what that means: go without the services provided by the co-op (eg the right to stay in other houses that are members of the co-op), undertake at your own expense functions that the co-op provides collectively and so on. You come up with a package that you negotiate with the co-op for how you will manage the change in relations. You also look more widely: how could you obtain elsewhere what you currently obtain through the co-op. Then, and only then when you have a concrete alternative can you sensibly make a decision whether to stay in the co-op or leave it.
This point is true of all decisions. I decide to go to the cinema. When l get there, the films l’d like to see are sold out, the films with places l do not wish to see. I go and do something else. You would tell me l had to see a film because that decision had been taken. It does not work as a way of making decisions.
The world is your oyster, Michael. No need to be a member of a Co-op which forbids its members to deal with non-members directly. Why can you not allow people to stay in your house if you are not a member of this particular Co-op? Indeed, why can you not stay at others people’s places because you are not a member of this particular Co-op? Your argument makes no sense. On the other hand, a Co-op which operates as a stand-over gang is to be given a wide berth if you want to mind your own business in your own home. It is not emotive to say that for a country to be sovereign and independent is nothing out of the ordinary. If this and succeeding governments follow on from the Brexit referendum and decisions made by this government and Parliament, the only option is to function as an independent sovereign country, the UK. Why is that so difficult?
There is a government, a huge bureaucracy, Parliament, politicians and political parties, a very experienced and able body politic in the UK. If the UK cannot function as a sovereign nations-state, nobody in the world can function as such. The concrete alternative is simply to let the government do its work. If the government does not satisfy, there will be another election. Do you fear the duty and responsibility of being a functioning citizen in a democratic nation-state? The complaints people have about this or that government can be dealt with in the most democratic way possible. By being part of a body of citizens in a democratic entity. The EU can never furnish a democratic government, only a technocratic dictatorship or something similar.
You confuse a process argument with a substantive argument.
My point is: you cannot make a final decision until you know in concrete terms what your choices are. Any decision you make before you know what it means is only provisional.
All the points that you make against EU membership count for nothing until you know what the alternative is. Talk about being a sovereign nation state (which the UK currently is) are empty rhetoric until you know what the particular version of sovereignty that you choose will bring and cost. Once that is known, then you can make your substantive case balancing the pros and cons of the different options.
Michael, there are two problems with your argument in my opinion. Firstly, there are and were concrete alternatives to full membership which other states had already agreed with the EU, and which UK voters were able to consider before the 2016 referendum. In order of decreasing closeness of association, these states were Norway, Switzerland and Canada. The relations of these three states with the EU did form part of the informed discussion before the referendum. Many Leave voters assumed that one of these options (or perhaps a compromise between two of them) would be available to the UK after leaving; this in my opinion was a fair assumption, barring very punitive behavior indeed from the EU27. Secondly, your argument appears to overlook the point that there is another party to the discussion: namely, the EU. Would it be fair to subject the EU27 to a prolonged period of uncertainty while a deeply divided UK electorate pondered all the options (including full membership) for several years? I think not.
David, you make my point for me. Yes, there were different Brexit options on the table. Different voters voted for the one they liked. Some liked the Norway option, but would prefer Remain to the Canada option. Some liked the Canada option, but would prefer Remain to the Norway option. Some preferred all options to Remain. Until we know what Brexit means, we cannot tell whether there is a majority for the one particular Brexit we would have over Remain. Hence the need for a referendum on the terms.
Was it fair on the EU for the Leave campaign as a deliberate tactical ploy not to put forward a single proposition? No, but l think the unfairness to the UK electorate was a grosser harm. We now have just under two years to negotiate with the EU. That will include all the Brexit options. Why would it be unfair for us also to consider whether to Remain? Would the EU, if we said in December 2018 that we preferred to Remain, call that an unfair decision? Would they expel us? You will have picked up on the string of EU figures who say that the door is open to us.
My main argument is that with such a high percentage of the UK electorate against full EU membership, full EU membership for the UK is in the long run not a good option either for the UK or for the EU27; I believe that in fact any of the alternatives proposed (Norway, Switzerland, Canada or some compromise between two of them) would in the long run come closer to satisfying the aggregate preferences of UK citizens, and also perhaps of EU27 citizens, than full EU membership for the UK – provided the UK does not crash out of the EU27 without any deal on the Article 50 negotiations. The most serious problem with full UK membership in my opinion is that a large number (roughly half of voters) are members of a supranational confederation against their will – further, a confederation pledged to ‘ever closer union’, which even many Remainers oppose. If the UK were to remain a full member, its opposition to ever-closer union would continue to obstruct the wishes of other member states (who desire closer political and fiscal integration to safeguard the future of the single currency); one side or the other would eventually have to cave in. You are right that some EU figures would welcome a UK return, but others would not. In the short term, a UK return would no doubt make things easier for both parties, but in the long run it might be worse. We have seen that UK membership is not as ‘stable’ as the membership of other states, and this in itself is a problem. You also appear to forget that the Article 50 negotiations will not settle the form that the UK’s future relationship with the EU will take, so a referendum on the terms of the Article 50 withdrawal treaty will not in any case confirm that the eventual form of Brexit will command a majority of public support over Remain. In the long run the UK may be able to find a relationship with the EU which suits both parties better than either full membership, or any of the options currently used by Canada, Switzerland or Norway. If this proves impossible and public opinion shifts strongly towards Remain, then the UK might reapply for full membership, but in my opinion this should be reliant on a large margin (say 60% to 40% at least), both to ensure that the UK’s membership is more ‘stable’ and also to avoid the risk of dragging a very large minority into ‘ever close union’ (perhaps ultimately culminating in a US-style federal state) very much against their will.
David
Thank you for replying
The referendum showed the country divided half and half. So your arguments about continued EU membership leaving many unhappy apply also to Brexit. You might like also to factor in more the generational gradient in support for Remain/ Brexit
My more general point remains: until we know what Brexit means a decision is provisional. When the electorate gets to choose between two concrete alternatives we will learn what the real support for Brexit & EU is, including your theory about what people want.
You will recall that Article 50(2) says “… the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.” So there needs to be a framework. It would not be much of a framework if it just said “we’ll sort out trade and immigration later”, although l accept that the final trade deal would have to wait.
In my view, if we leave we will be out for decades at least. While l see no real difficulty in changing our mind before Brexit, it would be too humiliating in many peoples’ minds to re-apply for membership after say five years, without special deals, and perhaps the EU wondering whether the House of Lords & FPTP do not mean that the democratic deficit is too big for membership.
The European Council negotiating guidelines for the Article 50 negotiations state ‘The core principles set out above should apply equally to the negotiations on an orderly withdrawal, to any preliminary and preparatory discussions on the framework for a future relationship, and to any form of transitional arrangements.’ It seems that they expect the Article 50 negotiations to consist basically of these three ingredients, i.e. including ‘preliminary and preparatory discussions on the framework for a future relationship’, so it may be too much to hope for that we will have an accurate idea of the form of the final trade agreement (if such is reached) by the end of the Article 50 negotiations. If the first phase of these negotiations concludes amicably, there will probably be a transitional arrangement agreed by the end of the Article 50 negotiations. There are several problems with promising a referendum on the terms of the Article 50 agreement. Firstly, it is not at all clear if by that stage we will have an accurate idea of the final trade deal we would reach with the EU, if we went through with leaving. Secondly, it would incentivise those who wish the UK to stay, to try to engineer an agreement which would discourage the UK from leaving. Thirdly, the ECJ would have the final say on whether Article 50 can indeed be revoked, and they might decide it is not, or they might decide that its revocation is subject to ratification by all 28 member states, and one member state might decline to ratify.
David
I have never understood the Leave argument that having a referendum on the terms incentivises the EU to give us a bad deal so that we stay. People join a club because the other members are nice, not because they make nasty or threatening deals. You over-estimate the ability of the EU to fine-tune a deal so that it is bad enough to make us stay but not so bad as to be harmful if we leave. The Leave proposition is that leaving without a deal would be just fine, so what would it matter if there was a bad deal?
The balance of legal opinion is that an Article 50 notification may be withdrawn unilaterally. As you say, only the ECJ may finally decide. But they would be deciding to expel a member state on a technicality if they found the notification irrevocable. That hardly seems likely. It would be out of line with the basis of the treaties (ever closer union &c) and with the customary law of nations on whether notices to leave treaties may be withdrawn (Vienna convention on the law of treaties).
All l can say is that it would not be much of a framework if it did not give a clear indication of where we were heading on trade and imigration. And it is hard to see how the question of the Irish border can be resolved without knowing what is to be decided on trade.
The generational gradient may not lead to an increase in support for EU membership with time; it may be a similar phenomenon to people becoming more right-wing as they become older.
In my opinion, the EU has a much bigger democratic deficit than the UK at present (especially as it has an unelected executive, the European Commission, and an unelected President, and as MEPs are not subjected to the same degree of media and public scrutiny as national representatives). As for an Upper House, Austria, Germany, Holland, Poland and Ireland also have them.
David
Each new President is nominated by the European Council (elected governments) and formally elected by the European Parliament, for a five-year term. The choice of President reflects party strength in the elected Parliament.
Commissioners are chosen by the elected governments of member states. The European Parliament approves/rejects the Commission as a whole.
The UK government also is not elected. We choose MPs, they choose a government, the Prime Minister chooses ministers from elected MPs and unelected peers.
The problem with the House if Lords is not that there is an upper house but that it is a mix of hereditary and appointed members. The German Bundesrat is made up of the elected leaders of the Länder.
Much of Leave feeling seems to be characterised by nostalgia for a past that never was. Of course, nostalgia is a characteristic of the old. But it is hard to think that young people would feel nostalgia specifically for a pre-EU past as they aged.
Thank you, Michael and others who replied to him. We agree with much in David Ellis’ reply.
We see Michael’s point but by invoking article 50 the UK not only decided to leave the EU, it created legal facts – which condition and narrow down its further options. It does not really matter what type of agreement it thought possible to achieve after settling the divorce terms and leaving. There is no menu to choose from, whatever option there might be in theory needs to find the favour of and be agreed by the remaining 27 member states.
Brexit means British exit from the EU – that’s why we think that the hard /soft Brexit distinction is not helpful. In fact, both Labour and the Conservatives have been defending Brexit. The latter were more explicit: hard Brexit, even a cliff edge; the former remained more ambiguous: no to the single market and to the customs union but tariff- free access to the EU market. Still, the options amount to the same: exiting the EU, including the single market.
We also do not think that it is possible to imagine that people voted to leave the EU but that their intention was to stay in the EU’s internal market (recall that already voting the Article 50 bill the Labour party did not support proposed amendments to commit to staying in the single market on the grounds that it would mean acting “as if the referendum hadn’t happened”). Not only is the single market the core of what the EU does, but British participation in the EU was also pretty much limited to it. That is why leaving the EU from a UK perspective means leaving the single market. What else could the UK want to leave, given that it already opted out or refrained from participating in other European major institutions?
Besides, politically the UK clearly decided to leave the EU (by overwhelming majorities in parliament and even a referendum). Therefore, a U-turn on this would rightly be seen as a betrayal of the will of the people and the UK would face an internal permanent opposition (non-acceptance) of EU membership. Any government would again be hostage to Eurosceptic political fractions, making in turn (even more than in the past) the EU hostage to the UK’s particular national interests until its destruction.
Taking up your example, after formally invoking article 50 TEU (the exit clause from the European Union), reality is that the UK has already renounced its flat – after which it is no longer in its hands to unilaterally go back on the decision.
But may be another example is more telling: marriage and divorce between A (the UK) and B (the EU).
Imagine that in a marriage A has all kinds of special circumstances (like the rebate), opt-outs (does not share many things with B) and has veto powers on things the spouse can do. That this, A enjoys a kind of part time marriage but obliges B to take it full time. This is already an odd couple and there is certainly a heavy cost for B.
After not participating in many of the things that B envisaged for a common life (one could think of the equivalents to the Euro and Schengen, Justice and Home affairs and many others, in short things that define a Union), A does not see future perspectives and does not wish to participate in an ever-closer union with B. Quite naturally, B feels very sad although it patiently agrees, provided that A at least still participates in the economy of the household (this is what happened in February 2016 with yet new special concessions to the UK, the so-called UK settlement).
Still, after all that, A takes legal action for divorce in order to look for a life with fewer obligations and a better spouse/partner. On top of it A demands to still be in the house, and maintain ‘the best possible deep and special relationship’ with B for his/her own good, etc.
Yet, after some time, when the two members of the couple have started trying dividing up things from their common life, A is not happy with the division (the divorce terms: which is what is under discussion now in Brussels until November 2018) and starts to have doubts if he/she is better off.
However, as you put it in your example, A “looks around”, does not find anything better and decides to go back to B – alleging that it is preferable for her/him to have the previous arrangement and stay with B, possibly with additional concessions from the part of B.
What do you think the response by B will or indeed should be?
Finally, let people look to a Europe united in certain essential endeavours to safeguard the basis of democracy, the sovereign nation-state and European values which can be agreed upon-A platform from which these principles, ways and means and values can be brought to those countries in the rest of the world willing and able to adopt same to fit within the existing systems. European countries, in conjunction with other countries fit to do such work, may even be militarily involved in order to provide secure bases from which to allow European democracy and values to percolate into surrounding societies. This, unlike the current export from the West into third world countries and failed states of invasion on pretexts, carnage, mayhem, lawlessness, increased corruption and exploitation and enslavement.
In Europe, some time in the future, a kind of cooperative structure may be arrived at by democratic and consensual means. It would be an abrogation of our civic duties and responsibilities to allow a union of countries in Europe be effected by means of conquest from without, as by means of a stream of displaced peoples or others encouraged to break borders, as well as from within by whatever means, such as financial/monetary and legislative-regulative methods of enforcement and the formation of a growing cluster love-in, paid by the people directly (VAT) or through loading the nation-states with debt, akin to a growing cancer within which is hired and directed to undermine, weaken and sabotage the democratic nation-states.
Can we have proper paragraphs? Something in the software is wrong on this site.
That is not of course the answer B will give. B, having overall the stronger hand will now be in a good position to offer A the following options:
a) you come back under same conditions as before because we appreciate something went wrong and you did not really mean it
b) you may come back, but without the special conditions or only a few of those (or none)
c) you decided to leave and I accept it but you will leave mostly on my conditions – and by the way – I get to keep the frying pan
A will now have to consider: Is it worth it? What is my gain? Do I hate B so much that I and my children will be prepared to suffer the consequences? Or – if I just dislike B – could we negotiate a deal where we agree to disagree but continue living together if not loving each other?
If A decides that option c) is the only one acceptable, the discussion about the children and pets will start: who gets to see them and when. Those will be just some of the issue that will cause many problems and make the relationship worse and worse. It will not only involve the parents and children, but also grandparents, stepmothers, uncles and so on. War, anybody?
This country’s politicians seem to be steering towards option c) because some conservative dinosaurs put us in that place. We need to ask each of the dinosaurs: pourquoi? And if they say “sovereignty” ask them to spell out what that means and also what exactly the benefits are for us and crucially, what the benefits are for them – because in the latter you will find the answer for Brexit. Hello Sun?
Thank you for your response.
The weight of legal opinion seems to be that the Article 50 notification is unilaterally revocable. And of course there have been several EU figures saying that the door to continued membership is open. So the Article 50 notice creates new facts; but they can be uncreated.
I agree with you that the Brexit deal will be one acceptable to the EU27. I doubt that they will say that we can have our trade cake and eat our immigration control cake too. And here l disagree with you when you say that people could not have voted to leave the EU but stay in the single market. Of course in a formal sense you are right. But it is clear from both the assertions made during the referendum campaign about the good deal that we would get from the EU and opinion polls on what people want and what they think we will get that people did vote to stay in the internal market as regards trade. As regards movement of people, not. Of course, for the EU the four freedoms are indivisible. But the electorate were promised that that rule would be waived for the UK. And the election campaign also reassured Leave voters that trade would not be affected because of the deep trade deal we would get. We will see what deal we actually get, but l should be surprised if it bears any resemblance to the deal people have been told to expect and for which there is a mandate
Hence my basic point that once we know what Brexit means we can have the real referendum, an informed choice between concrete options.
A Remain decision expressed through a referendum would not be a betrayal of the will of the people as the same people would have expressed a new will.
If l launch divorce proceedings, then until the decree comes through l am free to change my mind on further reflection of what life as a carefree bachelor would be like and stay married. Of course, my wife could decide to divorce me; but the EU treaties have no expulsion provision.
Compare this: “The Scottish National Party (SNP), opposing Brexit, went significantly down from 4.7 per cent to 3.1 per cent of the vote and lost 13 MPs to the Tories running on Theresa May’s hard-Brexit platform.”
To this: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/09/ruth-davidson-planning-scottish-tory-breakaway-challenges-theresa/
And there you have it as far as the scholarship of the article. There are many other places with arguments stretched so thin as to give a single molecule dimension.
Presume somebody has already mentioned this: a “referendum” is defined as something requested by the people. It is not something imposed by government. So please stop calling it a referendum.
It was only called because the conservative party have been bickering about EU membership for years and DC decided to use it as a vote winner.
In both design and execution it was a pathetic excuse for a “referendum”.
To then take the outcome as real is like starting arithmetic on the basis that 2+2 = 5 (or any other number than 4).
If the basis for a decision is so flawed, the outcome needs to be disregarded. Still, if some people think the outcome reflects the real wishes of the electorate, then a proper referendum should be run to prove that fact.
And a FPTP system will NEVER provide a true reflection of what the electorate want. And is not democratic. Which brings me back to the fact that this “referendum” was not a referendum.
I’m sorry, but a 48.1 to 51.9 result doesn’t represent a ‘strong and clear mandate’. In any case, there is no mechanism under our current system for such a vote to provide any kind of binding mandate. The Brexit referendum was, at best, an opinion poll, and, constitionally, is in no way binding. Parliament could, quite legitimately, have noted the result and chosen not to enact article 50. Government in the UK is not run by referendum. We elect representatives to make decisions on our behalf, not for them to pass the buck.
Of course, our weak and self-interested government – now made even weaker by their disastrous showing in the entirely-unnecessary general election, which backfired so spectacularly – wouldn’t risk the wrath of the pro-leave lobby (driven, as they are, by largely anti-immigration racist motives, and always more militant than the pro-remainers), but that is more a reflection of their reluctance to take hard decisions.
In essence, the Brexit poll provided neither a constitutional mandate nor a convincing numerical result. All it did was to legitimise racism and isolationism, and we will be the poorer for it, both economically and culturally.
There is no good mandate for this. The Brexit result is as close to 50/50 as statistical noise would allow. The follow-up general election is no reflection on people’s leave/remain views as both parties were campaigning on a platform of supporting the referendum. People were as likely simply voting for whichever party they felt would get Britain a better leaving deal.
It’s worth noting also that 75% of Labour members now support a second referendum (a.k.a a People’s Vote) – see https://labourlist.org/2018/01/labour-members-poll-over-75-per-cent-of-want-vote-on-brexit-deal-and-to-stay-in-single-market-and-customs-union/