Jun 20 2013

The EU should take inspiration from Switzerland in its attempts to increase democratic legitimacy.

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One perceived problem for the democratic legitimacy of the EU is that linguistic diversity across Europe makes it difficult for there to be a viable European democratic community. Joseph Lacey assesses the potential for the EU to take inspiration from multilingual Switzerland in its attempts to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU policy process. He argues that, much like Switzerland, the EU requires a more radical form of democracy to accommodate the diversity that exists between European citizens. He proposes a number of specific measures for improving EU democracy, including the capacity to hold EU-wide referendums, and making the European Commission open to electoral competition via the European Parliament.

For most of its near sixty year existence the EU has accumulated substantial governing powers without receiving much democratic input from citizens. Such observations have sustained decades of debate among academics and the upper echelons of European institutions in which the legitimate basis of the EU’s long-growing influence has been under question. Yet so long as citizens perceived the EU as benign or even as having a generally positive impact on their welfare, these legitimacy concerns only occasionally found resonance in daily national debates.

Credit: Dave Levy (CC BY 2.0)

Enter the financial crisis and the EU is no longer thought to be delivering the goods. Citizens in both debtor and creditor countries are now pointedly asking key questions of legitimacy that strike to the core of the European project: why is the EU deciding who owes what to whom and how national economies should be run? In short, the financial crisis has exposed the EU’s legitimacy gap to the popular mind.

This gap cannot be unseen and, whatever the outcome of the financial crisis, it is reasonable to conjecture that the long-term future of the EU will in part depend upon its ability to improve on its democratic credentials. Though there are many ways in which this might be achieved, I suggest that analysing the Swiss way of doing democracy can be especially helpful in building a roadmap for legitimising the EU.

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Jun 19 2013

The greater market integration of the European Higher Education Area may have unequal benefits across countries and disciplines.

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Pedro Teixeira 80x108Since the late 1990s, European higher education has moved towards greater integration, increasing student mobility and more comparable national systems. The past two decades have also seen a gradual rise in the role of market elements in higher education. Pedro Teixeira finds that this greater integration may be leading to a greater concentration of funding across certain countries and academic disciplines. He writes that an EU that is increasingly concerned with global relevance may now be more willing to concentrate resources in a smaller number of elite institutions.

European Higher education is facing a time of significant change that has changed its identity and the political expectations regarding its societal roles. As in other areas of public intervention, the traditional public ethos of higher education systems and institutions has been questioned and eroded, with the political discourse giving growing visibility to the role of markets, competition, privatization, and efficiency in higher education. European governments have been more willing to introduce market elements into the public sector and this has been increasingly felt in higher education in aspects such as greater competition for funding, students and staff, and the development of private higher education in several parts of Europe.

These developments have been enhanced by the winds of change that have been gathering pace in recent years at the European supra-national level. Major policy developments have been promoted by the well-known Sorbonne (1998) and Bologna Declarations (1999), which have aimed at fostering greater integration in European higher education, through increased mobility and comparability of national systems. This process was increasingly shaped by the Lisbon targets (to be replaced by Horizon 2020) and by the view that higher education is central to Europe’s economic and social goals. Hence, the development of a more integrated higher education area was progressively moulded by economic forces and motivations and geared towards the emergence of an integrated higher education market.

Image copyright: © LSE / Nigel Stead

Image copyright: © LSE / Nigel Stead

Although higher education in Europe has traditionally been strongly dominated by public provision and government regulation, recent developments have changed this scenario in recent decades, and all around the globe, private higher education has been experiencing a notable growth. Private institutions still play a small role in many European systems and its emergence is taking place against a background of large and consolidated public sectors and that will certainly influence its profile. Market-focus and privatization has also been playing an increasing role in funding mechanisms and funding sources for higher education. After several decades of expansion, societies and governments are less willing to put additional public resources into Europe’s higher education system due to a variety of trends, such as the rising cost of higher education; financial austerity; and a changing view about the role of the state and the nature of public services.

The insights drawn from past experiences of European integration suggest that the effects of market integration are complex and that the benefits may be unequally distributed. Moreover, the analysis of other processes of economic integration in Europe indicates that the peculiarities of a sector play an important role in steering the effects regarding the convergence and divergence, and the concentration and dispersion of activities. In the case of higher education, the current picture is somewhat blurred, but some trends suggest that the fears of concentration are real. This is especially significant in the areas that we tend to associate with the prestige and reputation such as research activities, with the allocation of the most competitive funding being concentrated in a small number of countries and institutions.

Figure One – Per cent of total European Research Council grants by country 2010 

Texeira Fig 1

Source: ERC 

Note: Northern Countries – Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Ireland Southern – Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece
Central and Eastern – Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Romania

We can gain insights on this concentration by examining grants awarded by the generous and highly competitive European Research Council, that are awarded in a competitive basis to scholars either in an early stage of their careers or in a more advanced stage for a period of 5 years. Figure One above shows the distribution of research grants over the last 5 years by countries and groups of countries. The data indicate that some countries are clearly far more represented in these grants than others. The UK is clearly the leading country, followed by Germany and France. Size of the country and of the higher education and research system does not seems to be decisive criteria, with some smaller countries capturing a significant share of grants, notably The Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Israel. Some parts of Europe show a much lower aptitude to compete for those attractive grants, such as those in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. Even the Northern countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Ireland) show a less than impressive performance.

Moreover, the distribution across disciplines is also creating further inequalities, with some areas being privileged due to their societal or political prominence (usually the so-called STEM subjects – Science, Technology, Engineering and Medicine). Although some factors may be hindering a rapid process of integration and concentration (especially those referring to the mobility of individuals, especially staff), the signs are also towards a greater mobility of students and staff, especially in choices more strongly related to research-intensive programs and activities.

Like in other dimensions of the European integration, we are dealing with a complex process that raises significant perplexities and fears among national and institutional actors that may hinder further the drive towards greater integration. Some of the major fears refer to the potential concentration effects that may be promoted by further integration and competition. Although Europe has traditionally had a more egalitarian approach towards higher education, there have been multiple signs of change in recent years. Many European governments have shown a willingness to promote multi-level differentiation across national systems regarding aspects such as institutional missions, allocation of funds, or regulatory frameworks.

This is taking place against a background of wider and deeper global changes that may influence European developments, notably through the race towards building world-class institutions (in which funding is concentrated) and the national competition for positioning their institutions in major rankings and league-tables. A European Union increasingly concerned with global relevance may be therefore more willing to concentrate resources in a few elite institutions and in using market regulation to sustain those political intentions.

However, this may create important tensions across Europe. This is likely to cut across countries, regions, sectors and disciplines, since not all of them will be winners and some will tend to be better placed than others to seize the opportunities created by the emerging European higher education and research areas. Like in other dimensions of the European Union, it is yet to be seen how these tensions will be dealt with and to what extent they may create fragmentation and segmentation across Europe. The challenge seems to be how to balance integration, international competitiveness and internal cohesion.

This article is based on the LSE Europe in Question Paper No. 56, ‘The Tortuous Ways of the Market: Looking at the European Integration of Higher Education from an Economic Perspective’. 

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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.

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About the author 

Pedro Teixeira 80x108Pedro Teixeira – University of Porto
Pedro Teixeira is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics at the University of Porto and Director of the Centre of Research on Higher Education Policy. His research interests focus on the economics of higher education, notably on markets and privatisation, and the development of human capital as a research program. His forthcoming co-edited book (with Christine Musselin) is Reforming Higher Education: Public Policy Design and Implementation (Springer, 2014).

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Jun 19 2013

The problems faced by Greece’s public sector are such that the sudden closure of ERT may have been the least bad option.

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Kevin-Featherstone-80x108Last week, with almost no warning, the Greek government closed the national broadcaster, ERT, putting over 2,700 jobs at risk. Kevin Featherstone argues that while the way the announcement was made raised justifiable concerns, the central objective should be broadly welcomed. The case typifies the problems in achieving serious public sector reform: indeed, it may be the only way to unblock such an agenda. 

Last week’s dramatic decision to close down Greece’s state broadcaster, ERT answers a question Greece’s political leaders – in and out of government – have lacked the will to confront for a generation.  At one level, the move is gesture politics: a sudden, unilateral act intended to impress the Troika (the EU, IMF and the European Central Bank), after the sale of natural gas firm DEPA was messed up.  The audacity of the move provoked the predictable protests – attacking the media gets headlines around the world.  But the protests have a valid point about such a ‘shock and awe’ announcement:  it comes without proper consultation, no parliamentary approval and with no fully-worked out plan.

There is also a very legitimate concern from this initiative about democracy and the importance of public sector broadcasting.  True, over its history, ERT has hardly upheld the highest standards of political independence or of programme quality.  Successive governments have staffed it with their trusted lieutenants.  I also remember ERT TV newsreaders in the 1980s struggling to read from the text of the new ‘tele-prompter’ technology – introduced into Greece years after the rest of Europe – rather than from the paper on their desks.  The newsreaders’ eyes looked transfixed, as if they were no longer allowed to blink, and the viewer was left unsettled as to what these ‘robots’ might say next.

Greek state broadcaster ERT Credit: linmtheu (Creative Commons BY SA)

Greek state broadcaster ERT Credit: linmtheu (Creative Commons BY SA)

But, a market-economy with no public sector broadcaster risks distorting national debate and undermining the ‘public good’.  Ultimately, the argument for ERT is the same as for the UK’s BBC, whatever the differences in quality.  Some of Greece’s private channels today hardly offer reassurance against the risks of cheap, sensational journalism without regard for the public interest or of following their own company bias.

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Jun 18 2013

Turkey’s protests have stirred debate about democracy and the unchecked power of governments that have an electoral mandate.

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Zeynep Kaya 80x108Matthew Whiting 80x108What do the protests of the past two weeks mean for democracy in Turkey? Zeynep N. Kaya and Matthew Whiting argue that they represent the clash between the desire of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayip Erdoğan, for a majoritarian politics with few checks on power, and those who wish for government to consult widely in its decision-making. While the current protests are damaging for Turkish politics in the short-term, in the long-term, they may be beneficial if they cause a shift towards greater engagement with opposition concerns.

There is a tendency to see the Gezi Park protests of the past two weeks in Turkey as representing a clash between the autocratic tendencies of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayip Erdoğan, and a student-led movement intent on protecting Turkish democracy. This is seen as mirroring the divide between an encroaching Islamification of Turkish society and Kemalist defenders of secularism. Yet this characterisation overlooks a broader political dimension to the protests and perhaps they are better understood as a clash over the vision of democracy that should be the basis for the future of politics in Turkey.

On one side of this debate is Erdoğan who is intent on preserving a majoritarian form of politics that allows the democratically-elected ruling party to govern with relatively few checks on their decision-making. On the other side are the anti-government protestors who can be seen as calling for a form of democracy that takes into account as broad a spectrum of opinions and views as possible during decision-making. This is a particularly vital debate for Turkey given the government’s plans to introduce a new constitution next year and the ongoing fragile negotiations with Kurdish radicals and how much their separate identity should be acknowledged within the Turkish state. Seen from this perspective the protests may be beneficial for Turkish democracy in the long-term (depending on the government’s response), even if they are destabilising in the short-term.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdoğan By Senat RP/Polish Senate [CC-BY-SA-3.0-pl], via Wikimedia Commons

The ruling AKP’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – The Truth and Justice Party) early years in office after 2002 offered hope to some observers that they were intent on liberalising Turkish democracy to make it more inclusive. For example, they reined in the power and influence of the military over politics; they promoted the religious and linguistic rights of individuals in the public sphere in line with EU accession requirements; and, more recently, they embarked upon attempts to engage the Kurdish militants of the PKK (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – The Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in negotiations. However, after 11 years in power and with little sign of losing their position as the most electorally popular party (in part due to an ineffectual opposition party fraught with infighting), these reforms now look like an attempt to centralise power in their hands and establish an electoral hegemony. From this perspective granting religious rights is seen as the creeping Islamification of the public realm; negotiations with the PKK are seen as potentially leading to the consolidation of the AKP’s support base in the electorally crucial southeast of Turkey; and constitutional reform is seen as a drive for extending the personal power of Erdoğan. Alongside this has been the marginalisation of dissent through pressure on the media to engage in self-censorship and through the arrest and imprisonment of a relatively large number of journalists.

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Jun 18 2013

The role of women in post-conflict societies remains an unfinished project.

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Some feminist authors have argued that peace settlements have the potential to perpetuate gender inequality by privileging communal unity over the rights of women. Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister assess this perspective in the case of Northern Ireland. They find that while the 1998 Good Friday Agreement contained provisions for gender equality, it was primarily framed around national identity. This may explain why significantly fewer women in Northern Ireland are supportive of devolution than men.

Institutional design is generally seen as the most viable approach to resolving communal divisions in post-conflict societies. In principle, this approach enables communities with conflicting ethnic or religious identities to overcome longstanding antagonisms. New institutions provide an opportunity to create a political discourse based on mutual accommodation rather than conflict and division.

How do women fare under such arrangements? Feminist scholars have pointed to the role of peace settlements in perpetuating gender inequality. They argue that power-sharing political arrangements sacrifice women’s claims for equality in the interests of communal unity. Such arrangements can also encourage ethno-national groups to further perpetuate their own sexist ideologies.

Northern Ireland Assembly, Credit: Lofty (CC BY 2.0)

National liberation movements run the risk of subordinating the social struggle to the national one. Women and feminists are silenced both by the ‘masculinisation’ of the peace process and by the desire by men to re-establish their pre-war prerogatives of domination. Most peace agreements are negotiated exclusively by men and they often reinforce male privilege at the expense of gender equality. Even women who were active participants in the national struggle are ill-served by such negotiations.

Our research on public opinion following the 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement largely confirms these expectations. The Agreement was ratified by 71 per cent of citizens, formally ending almost thirty years of violence. For the first time, representatives from both religious communities came together to endorse an elite-driven political accommodation designed to recognise their differing traditions.

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Jun 17 2013

The latest agreement on the governance of the Schengen border control regime simply revamps old rules and changes little on the ground.

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Ruben-Zaiotti-80x108Concerned by growing migratory pressures on Europe’s external borders, some EU member states have called for a revision of the rules regarding the imposition of national border controls within the EU. Ruben Zaiotti examines the recent agreement on the governance of the Schengen border control regime, which aims to clarify how these controls might operate. He argues that the agreement is a political one that gives relatively vague solutions to what are complex problems, and that the next crisis over Schengen is only a matter of time.

After a tortuous two year gestation, the European Union’s troika (European Parliament/Council/Commission) has agreed upon a package of proposals aimed at rendering Europe’s Schengen border control regime more effective and predictable. The push for reform came in the aftermath of the row between France and Italy over the handling of migrants crossing the Mediterranean in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring.  The main issue arising from this affair was the need to clarify (and possibly expand) the nebulous rules about the re-imposition of national border controls in cases of “serious threat to public policy or internal security”. While this seems to be just a technical matter, questions such as ‘For how many days can a member state re-impose border controls?’, ‘Under what conditions?’, ‘How and when should EU institutions be informed?’ are actually more intriguing than they might seem at first sight.

Credit: MPD01605 (Creative Commons BY SA)

Credit: MPD01605 (Creative Commons BY SA)

Forget for a moment the technocratic language in which the current debate about the Schengen governance package has been couched (an art the EU is very good at). If we scratch the surface we can see that at the core this matter is eminently political. The issue here is the ongoing power struggle among the EU triumvirate over the distribution of competences within the Schengen regime. In other words: who is in charge? How else should we read then the posturing, maneuvering, arm twisting that has characterized the Schengen reform saga in the last two years? (Emblematic here is the EP’s ‘nuclear option’ of boycotting the negotiations over the justice and home affairs agenda if the Council did not withdraw the ‘outrageous’ decision to purge the parliament from the Schengen evaluation process).

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