While commentators have often sought to explain Brexit as a form of resistance to globalisation, Jan Eichhorn argues we should treat such conclusions with caution since there are many factors at play when it comes to people’s political choices. He highlights that attempts to link Brexit to particular social classes or age groups underplays much of the division within these groups over the EU, but that identification with Englishness offers one of the best clues to understanding voting behaviour during the referendum.
Many newspapers have linked the Brexit decision to people characterised as the “losers of globalisation” who supposedly saw the referendum as their opportunity to rebel. This narrative is present in different political orientations and media outlets, ranging from the Financial Times to the Guardian or the Washington Post. The issue is also linked to class, with The Telegraph, for example, proclaiming that “Middle class liberals were the only social group to emphatically back Remain”. These stories leave us with a feeling that the so-called “Brexiteer” is a clearly defined person, who felt they needed to rebel against the status quo because of a (perceived) personal position of disadvantage.
Figure 1: Brexit vote by socio-occupational class (BES 2016) – only voters included
And indeed, we do see differences in support for Brexit based on social position. As figure 1 illustrates (showing data from the British Election Study collected shortly after the referendum), people in lower socio-occupational classes had a greater tendency to support leaving the EU (61 and 64 per cent respectively in the two lowest groups) compared to those in the highest socio-occupational groups (41 to 50 per cent respectively). However, the transition by social class is rather gradual – and not always linear. Higher intermediary middle class categories are split roughly evenly over Brexit, for example. Average differences between the lowest and most other socio-occupational class groups are only about 10 to 14 percentage points (with only one exception: higher professional occupations).
While one’s personal economic position is related to Brexit attitudes, we are far from seeing a country divided into distinct groups of social classes, where the advantaged wholeheartedly embrace the openness of the EU and the disadvantaged reject it outright. The figures actually paint a very different picture. Nearly half of those in higher middle class positions also support the UK exiting the EU. While percentages are lower than in some other groups, it suggests that divides run deeply through all groups of the population. It appears to be a matter of degree, not type. Indeed, other researchers have warned about over-simplification and the identification of a singular type of “Brexiteer”, based on social class alone.
Figure 2: Brexit vote by age (BES 2016) – only voters included
The relationship between age and Brexit attitudes, for example, is much stronger than that of social class (see figure 2) and, importantly, education has been shown to be strongly related to a person’s views about whether the UK should leave or remain. However, even such comparisons do not allow for perfect typologies. Did “the old” as a group cause Brexit? Those aged 66 or above were most likely to vote for it (around 60 per cent), but even amongst them four in ten opposed leaving the EU. And while most young people wanted to remain, around 30 per cent still opted for Brexit. So caution is most apt. When discussing demographic differences, we should talk about relative differences and tendencies, but avoid painting simplistic pictures that identify singular, homogenous groups for blame, when those groups do not actually exist in such a distinctive form.
When trying to understand the motivations of people, we also need to go beyond the material, physical characteristics we usually consider when differentiating groups. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain why, for example, regions in the South of England that are rather wealthy also voted for Brexit, contrary to the often claimed narrative about Brexit being a problem of an apparently poorer North. Questions of identity, for example, matter as well, and substantially so, as figure 3 reveals.
Figure 3: Identification with Englishness and Britishness by Brexit attitudes (BES 2016) – only voters in England included
People in England who feel strongly attached to their English national identity are much more likely to support Brexit than those who do not. Of those who chose the highest value for English identity on a 7-point scale, over 70 per cent voted to leave the UK. Conversely, over 80 per cent amongst those who only emphasise their Englishness slightly (2 on a 7-point scale) voted to remain. National identity mattered strongly in this referendum, but is rarely talked about to the same extent as questions of class or even age, although the divide is much more dramatic and cuts across different socio-economic groups in the population.
But even here, we have to remain careful not to jump to over-simplistic conclusions. Identities are complex and it appears that Britishness, while slightly related to views on Brexit, was much less important in differentiating between groups than English identity was, confirming other research that a particular aspect of the Brexit decision had to do with perceptions of Englishness specifically – which is rarely addressed.
Socio-demographic factors relate to a person’s likelihood of supporting Brexit, but without considering a broader spectrum of attitudinal concerns, such as identity, we will not be able to develop a genuine understanding of Brexit. The considerations presented here should act as a cautionary reminder that we should be vigilant in avoiding the mistake of taking on extensive, typologising narratives about political decisions. We should challenge explanations that misrepresent attitudinal tendencies in some groups of the population as the identification of particular groups that should be blamed as a whole for decisions that we might not be comfortable with and that challenge ideas of open societies.
Instead of singling out distinctive groups based on a few demographic characteristics, we should instead try to understand the interplay of the various tangible and intangible factors that may affect the views of people across different groups of the population. Simplistic typologies may create plausible stories, but instead of providing starting points for solutions, they are likely to further the construction of artificial dividing lines that we may bring into existence ourselves. We all, as readers, researchers, and members of societies should there take this on as a task in our daily lives: to challenge those explanations that might just be too comforting and easy to be accurate.
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Note: Data reference: Fieldhouse, E., J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, C. van der Eijk, J. Mellon and C. Prosser (2015) British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 9. DOI: 10.15127/1.293723. This text was originally published by the think tank d|part as part of the project “Situation Room: What does the Open Society Mean to Europeans?” and also appeared at our sister site, LSE Brexit. The article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics.
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Jan Eichhorn – d|part / University of Edinburgh
Jan Eichhorn is the research director of d|part and oversees the work on the Situation Room project. He also teaches Social Policy at the University of Edinburgh. Twitter: @eichhorn_jan
I voted leave because I wanted my vote at election time to matter. At the moment it doesn’t matter how we vote which ever party wins has to find a way to implement an EU agenda even it if is against the wishes of the electorate. That is not what my grandparents went to war for.
My second reason for voting leave was security & defense. I thought we were being pushed into a security union that wouldn’t even have the stomach to defend us from foreign aggression & we would find ourselves defending other peoples interests with British lives while they merely talk the talk when it comes to our & our dependents security.
I really couldn’t care less if the pound isn’t worth as much as it once was or I will need a visa to holiday in Spain or Portugal. I don’t want Corbyn to win an election but I will defend peoples rights to vote for an idiot if they want to.
You’ve given two reasons and you’re entitled to your choice, but it does have to be said that neither of them are very good ones.
1. Almost all of the major decisions that affect the UK are still made in the UK, not Brussels. The EU budget accounts for just 1% of GDP (all our other spending commitments are decided in the UK), every major foreign policy decision is made in the UK, justice and home affairs is almost all determined in the UK, and so on. It’s always been part of the Eurosceptic agenda to claim that the EU makes all the decisions (and Westminster is just a “rubber stamp shop”) but that is absolutely untrue. It is really depressing when we see so many Leave voters making this kind of statement as it shows we never really explained to voters what the EU does and doesn’t do. If you think EU membership means “it doesn’t really matter” who you vote for in a UK election then you must believe the EU has a whole raft of powers it doesn’t actually have in reality and that’s very worrying.
2. The “we’re being forced into an EU army” line is also a favourite of Eurosceptic campaigners, but there has never been any way that the UK could have been forced into such a thing even if politicians in Europe elsewhere wanted to create one. Again it’s worrying to see people have voted to Leave to avoid a problem that never existed in the first place.
3. As a final point, the two reasons you’ve mentioned for voting leave are not grounded in reality, but the consequences you’re dismissing (the pound falling, needing a visa to travel, UK citizens losing their rights to live and work in Europe) are things that absolutely do matter to millions of people. The pound falling led to inflation pushing up the cost of food and reducing everyone’s living standards. We don’t know what the final rules on living and working in the EU will be, but if they’re as restrictive as it’s looking so far then that’s going to affect potentially millions of people’s lives: people potentially losing jobs, families being disrupted, or simply major inconvenience when people need to do business/travel abroad. All of those things matter an awful awful lot more than myths about an all powerful EU creating EU armies and all the rest of it.
And you’re not alone in your feelings. Unfortunately a great many people in the UK have become obsessed with these Eurosceptic narratives and philosophical debates about “control” and “sovereignty” (none of which matter at all to 99% of people, whereas the negative consequences actually do matter to millions of us).
I wonder if there’s a way of measuring romanticism against pragmatism and plotting that against voting attitudes? This is the nearest I’ve seen to such a study.
As a pragmatist I voted remain. For me nationhood, currency, laws etc. are mere tools. They are important tools, and I want to see the best tool used for the task allocated to it. The question ‘Do you want government from Brussels or London?’ invites the response ‘Which would serve us best?’ even ignoring, as Hank P points out, the fact we’re a long way from the question being meaningful in any case.
I notice this divide in many debates that I have. Someone asked me about whether I could be happy with regulations on vacuum cleaners and canal speed limits being set by the EU, but my response – as long as they’re reasonable regulations – means that I missed the point of the question as much as the questioner missed the point of my assertions in bothering to ask it.
Hank P may correct Joe Thorpe above but, given the facts, will it sway Mr. Thorpe in the slightest? I doubt it. The reasons many voted leave are not factually-based. Facts are merely decorative, almost a distraction. Leavers voted for a principle, and the challenging of assertions used to back up that principle – however successful – will not undermine the principle itself. Even the argument ‘No one voted to leave to be worse off’ misses the point of the hardcore leavers for whom their principle of national autonomy makes financial loss a price worth paying.
What makes the referendum a mistake was that it was not conducted honestly on emotive turf by the leavers, but dishonestly with promises of national rebirth largely focused upon economic benefits. Certainly some – given their belief in the nation – may also believe the UK has a unique something to offer the world, such as the assertion I heard on a Radio 4 interview that British agriculture would thrive with Brexit given British farmers are the best in the world. It’s an argument that may play well in the home counties, but I doubt it’s a pragmatic negotiating position in Washington or Beijing.
The idea of having a referendum on such a subject as EU membership; without full knowledge of the final contract is akin to buying an expensive (or for the matter any) property without appointing a) a solicitor and b) a professional building surveyor.
Those who believe that the UK has great potential to export more to the wider world because the EU is holding us back should look at the top EU countries for 2016 exports to countries outside the EU. The figures are In US dollars are:
1. Germany $1.341 trillion = $16.196 per capita of population
2. France $488.9 billion = $7,294
3 Italy $461.5 billion = $7,617
4 Holland $444.9 billion = $26,045
5 UK $411.5 billion = $6,253
6 Belgium $398.0 billion = $33,450
Our per capita output is the lowest of the top six. But never mind, when we are free everything will be different!
My hunch is that the May government will be still be irrevocably tied to the EU after 2020 using ‘Remainer’ confidence tricks, lies, sabotage and subterfuge to explain away why we cannot control our own money, borders, laws, tariffs, regulation, energy, fishing industry, immigration, foreign policy etc etc and our 35-40 billion£. The EU began as a con or subterfuge, in 1973, called the Common Market and the unelected, unaccountable, political leadership of this secret supra national ‘project’ has lied, cajoled, bullied and harassed even independent nations like Norway and Switzerland, to toe lines and submit to treaties which they were extremely unhappy with. Apart from massive trade deficits with the EU, our most egregious sacrifice arises from the astonishing willingness of our own political class to submit to throwing away virtually all our sovereignty and existing economic ties to an undemocratic and totalitarian mafia located in Brussels. With the hindsight of Brexit, most Brits now understand just how arbitrary, hard line and damaging EU rules have been over the last 50 years on key UK economic and social policy sectors, such as the absurd rules of the Common Agriculture Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy, designed to placate France and protect their ramshackle farmers and their ludicrous labour laws. The decision to cut all economic ties with the worldwide Commonwealth, with whom we conducted over 50% of our trade, seems nowadays like a suicidal act of insanity. But it is remarkable how ‘entitled’ British politicians and the Civil Service have adjusted so rapidly to the vast totalitarian political project of the EU, whilst the majority of the population have refused to be brainwashed. The game will not end well for our European masters who told us we would turn out richer, freer and more democratic.
To pick up on one line, you’ve said that being in the EU means we “can’t control our own money”. As I said above, the EU budget is intended to sit around 1% of GDP. In fact in 2016, depending on how you work it out, our net contribution was a little under 0.5% of UK GDP. It’s difficult to see how someone can read those figures and come to the conclusion that an organisation we pay 0.5% of UK GDP into (net) is “controlling our money” even if we ignore the fact we had an equal say with all other states on how the EU budget is spent in any case. Now I exaggerate to make the point, you could cite other forms of pooled decision-making beyond the EU budget, but really what you’re saying here is so skewed it’s hard to take it seriously.
Which is illustrative of the problem we have in this debate. Most of the arguments you hear for Brexit are, like the one you’ve written here, exceptionally poor ones. A lot of them are simply based on strange half-truths about what the EU is, wild theories about “totalitarian political projects” and other misunderstandings that can be addressed in a few lines of text. But it’s very easy for politicians to pretend the EU is controlling vast amounts of our economy, that some bureaucrats are running everything, that all our laws come from Brussels (so we go on) because we’ve never attempted to show people otherwise. Even correcting these myths seems to attract the accusation of “elitism”. It appears that if enough people believe something which is based on misinformation we’re obliged to say they’re right, even if we know they aren’t.
And where does this principle end? If the electorate demand we invade Mars to save us from Martians, would it be undemocratic to point out there’s no such thing as a Martian? Is it elitist to try and use facts in an argument? I’ve got no idea how we ended up with this particular definition of democracy (or the strange idea that this is a good way to run a society) but I think it’s high time we had a bit of a rethink.
The ‘mafia’ theory of the EU, typified by Barry Jordan’s post above, is best addressed by some simple questions. Who – precisely – is in this gang?
The UK has not only been a member of the EU since 1973, but also one of its major players. Many EU policies against which those who voted Brexit now rail were initiatives spearheaded by the British. No decision has been made in the EU for the past two generations without the UK playing its role in sanctioning that decision. If the EU is the Mafia, then every British PM since 1973 has sat in its inner circle.
To get around this fact – and it is a fact – opponents of the EU, as here, posit an “unelected, unaccountable, political leadership of this secret supra national ‘project’” guilty of such things as having “lied, cajoled, bullied and harassed even independent nations like Norway and Switzerland, to toe lines and submit to treaties”.
These conspiracy theories have been, for the most part, avoided by the leading proponents of Brexit in the political sphere. However, they have happily sat to one side while the more eccentric of their media supporters have repeated it, happy to benefit from the dishonesty. What disturbs me is that this idea is actually able to thrive among often intelligent people when five minutes’ internet research – or three minutes’ rational thinking about how whether such a theory could even be viable – should be enough to quash it.