May 16 2012

The end of an era? Not really. A Post-mortem of the Greek elections

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Posted in: Balkan, EU, Europe

By Dr Eirini Karamouzi  & Dr Dionysios Chourchoulis

On 6th May 2012, the Greek nation punished its political establishment for the country’s financial, economic and political meltdown. The election’s result put an end to the dominance of the two major parties, New Democracy and PASOK, which had been taking turns at governing for the past three decades.  Indeed, both parties together barely scraped in about 32 per cent of the vote, a catastrophic result when compared to their usual 80 per cent. Indicative of the fragmentation in political support, the elections on Sunday produced, for the first time in the country’s recent political history, a Parliament comprising seven different political parties ranging from Marxist-Leninists to neo-Nazis. As a result, it appears almost impossible for a viable coalition to emerge from the elections with a clear majority and implement the necessary structural reforms to overcome the current crisis.

The end of the two party system

At a first glance, the elections can be interpreted positively, as a trigger for change. After 38 years, the two-party system appears to have come to an end. Prompted by painful austerity measures and intensifying recession, the two main political parties have lost their capacity to maintain the votes-for-jobs system, and guided by fear, rage and disappointment, voters have decided to withdrawn their support. Greeks have condemned both parties for having been unable to pursue a coherent and prudent economic policy in accordance with the European norm.

This may well be a window of opportunity for political change, and perhaps sound alarming bells to Europe regarding the futility of the strategy of recovery exclusively through austerity. However, the good news for Greece ends here. Even if Europe does decide to change its current obsession with austerity, it is certain that real change will demand long and arduous decisions, and not only a few cleverly drafted clauses added to a EU treaty. The history of European integration shows that the Union is not ‘an ill disposed animal but certainly a slow-moving one’, to quote former President of the European Commission Roy Jenkins.

Mixed Signals

In the meantime, Athens may miss the European bus, as the Greek political elite appears incapable of rising to the challenges the country faces. Even today, in the face of complete impasse and impending national disaster, Greek leaders are yet to hammer out a blueprint to reboot the country’s economy. Instead, the election campaign was centered around the infamous Memorandum that divided the parties along the pro and anti-austerity camps, but it did not focus on the real question, i.e. whether the Greeks are determined to remain in the Eurozone or not. In particular, the two main parties fought to present themselves as who could deliver the ‘softest’ version of austerity; the rest fought over who can deliver a more credible and faster cancellation of the debt, without leaving the euro – which is obviously an utopia.

To make matters worse, the big winner of the elections, the coalition of the radical left – SYRIZA – which won the unprecedented 16.78 per cent of the vote playing on young voters’ frustration, introduced a populist rhetoric beset with ill-conceived, unrealistic slogans of the past. The head of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, claimed that the “expression of the public’s will has rendered the memorandum null and has chosen as its first alternative a left-wing government to cancel the loan agreements”.  Far from helping the country, this rhetoric will threaten Greece’s latest bailout package from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, if it hasn’t already done so.

The analysis of the electoral result would be incomplete if the 35 per cent of abstention is not considered. It is questionable whether the majority of the Greeks were angry at the memorandum per se, or largely at its selective implementation and mismanagement followed by the former governments, mainly PASOK. In an attempt to condemn the current political handling, many Greeks underestimate the catastrophic consequences of the alternative route, namely declaring default and returning to the national currency, the drachma and are drawn to opportunistic papering-over of difficulties policy.

No wonder that the press – albeit falsely – tends to portray Tsipras as the new Andreas Papandreou of the early 1980s who initially did not formulate a clear policy on European integration, and hinted behind a rhetorically robust nationalistic thesis. Again, SYRIZA thinks that Greece’s current situation is a foretaste of what will happen in the rest of Europe. There is a widespread belief that the electoral turnout will scare the European Union into easing its fiscal demands on Greece and even sending some generous aid package. This argument is a form of diplomatic and economic brinkmanship: it is feeble in its own right and building a whole strategy around such hypothetical premises can only prove catastrophic for the country.  Unfortunately, Tsipras (and others, like the leader of the populist right-wing party Independent Greeks, Panos Kammenos) are encouraged towards such illusionary attitudes based on a Greek paradox, i.e. that eight out of ten Greeks want to stay in the euro but are not willing to continue to support tough EU-IMF austerity measures. In some ways, Lord Mandelson is right to say that ‘Greece is author of its own misfortune’.

Greece, ‘author of its own misfortune’?

Since the restoration of democracy in 1974, the Greek political elite has encouraged a culture of easy money and prosperity for all with the state apparatus as its main provider. This policy was initially important to consolidate the newly emerged democracy and was partly justified by the ascendancy of a ‘leftist’ mentality that wanted to restore the rights of those who had been persecuted since the end of the civil war in 1949. The 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, however, saw the dominance of such policies solely for electoral gains rendering the Greek public ‘un enfant gâté’. But, after Greece’s admission to the EMU in 2001 and the successful organization of the Olympic Games in 2004, the country lost its sense of direction. The political system and large segments of the population took for granted the beneficial European economic climate that masked the damaging effects of long term loan-induced consumerism and political populism. It was only when the money went dry that the true magnitude of such practices hit home.

In 1979, when Constantinos Karamanlis, former Prime Minister of Greece and main architect of Greece’s entry into the EEC, was signing the Treaty of Accession to the European Community, he emphasised that “the adaptation of Greece to the European structures will need not only a radical restructuring of our economy but also a change in our mentality’. How true this is today.

Eirini Karamouzi is Pinto Post-Doctoral Fellow at LSE IDEAS for the 2011-2012 academic year. Dionysios Chourchoulis is a book translator at Patakis Publications.

Posted by: Posted on May 16, 2012 by LSE IDEAS  

May 9 2012

The New Islamists: Pluralism and Minorities?

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Posted in: Africa, Civil Society, democracy, Egypt, elections, Human rights, Islam, Islamism and the Arab Spring Series, Jordan, Middle East, Tunisia, Uncategorized

In his analysis of Islamist governance on pluralism and minorities Fawaz A. Gerges concludes this special series of posts commissioned by LSE IDEAS exploring Islamism and the Arab Spring. The series also includes articles on the history of political Islam, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

By Fawaz A. Gerges

A big divide has emerged between liberal-minded groups and religious-based activists after the Islamists gained parliamentary majorities in the polls in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, a divide that risks undermining transition from authoritarianism to pluralism. Wary of the Islamists’ surge, liberals, leftists, and women argue that while Islamist leaders sound moderate, they harbour a conservative religious agenda, an agenda that might roll back human rights and individual freedoms. Particularly alarming to critics is the Islamists’ desire to impose their own rigid interpretation of morality in the public sphere.

Since gaining majorities in these countries’ parliaments, mainstream Islamist groups have been forced to outline their stances on a wide range of issues, especially with regards to Islamic law, personal freedoms, women and minority rights, and tourism. Liberal-minded activists assert that the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda Party, Morocco’s Justice and Development Party, and the Salafists exhibit illiberal tendencies and are intolerant of the rights of minorities, particularly women.

Toleration and Pluralism?

Islamists’ worldview and evolution differ from one group and one country to another. Most mainstream Islamists of the Tunisian Ennahda party and the Egyptian Brotherhood variety accept the concept of citizenship and the will of the people, as opposed to the sovereignty of God, as the foundation of legitimate authority. Most do not talk about establishing Islamic-based governments as stipulated by the original manifestos of these groups and instead, they call for al-dawla al-madaniya, or a civil state. Even the Old Guard among the Muslim Brothers no longer advocate building an Islamic state. They substitute “civil” for “Islamic” in an effort to avoid using the term “secular.” The concept of secularism has negative connotations among Arabs in general, not just Islamists, because of its historical association with colonialism and Westernization.

Similarly, the theocratic model in Iran has failed to fulfill the aspirations of many Islamists, thus reinforcing the shift in discourse from “Islamic” to “civil”, though they are yet to flesh out what they mean by a “civil” state. Khairat al-Shater’s pledge to introduce sharia law if elected president of Egypt raises serious concerns about his commitment to civil institutions and individual liberties.

Nevertheless, after their impressive performance in Egypt’s parliamentary elections, leaders of the Brotherhood’s newly-formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) publicly stressed their commitment to pluralism and to the protection of individual rights. They made it exceptionally clear that they are willing to accommodate different and diverse people into the constitution drafting process.

Two senior leaders, Mohamed Morsi and Essam el-Arian, pledged to form a national unity government with other parties. Addressing assertions often made by their secular opponents, FJP leaders insist they “would hand over power if we lose” because the public mood will no longer tolerate dictatorship. El-Arian pledged that the FJP will not change the Egyptian constitution to make all legislation comply with sharia law.

Shater’s views on sharia versus those of Essam el-Arian suggest internal tensions and contradictions within the Brotherhood on this question. In contrast to Ennahda, the Muslim Brothers have not resolved this dichotomy and inconsistency partly because of the influence that conservatives still exercise within the movement, as well as the rigidity of their programs. Instead of seizing the moment and showing confidence and leadership, Shater and the Old Guard, have squandered precious good will and alienated a broad spectrum of public opinion. By repeatedly violating their pledges, they risk losing public trust, which can be fatal to their cause.

Ennahda in Tunisia is more consistent and unequivocal about respect for individual freedoms and its willingness to relinquish power if defeated at the ballot box. The party announced that sharia should not be the source for all laws, and that the new constitution should simply acknowledge that Islam is the state religion, as the old constitution did. Ennahda’s decision is designed to promote national unity, suggesting a shift toward pragmatism and moderation.

After it gained a majority in the Tunisian parliament at the end of 2011, Ennahda established a broad-based unity coalition to oversee transition to pluralism. In contrast to the Brotherhood, which has fielded its own candidate for president, Ennahda supported Moncef Marzouki, a liberal human rights activist, as president as part of the power-sharing deal.

Said Ferjani, a rising leader within Ennahda, noted that history will judge his generation of Islamists not on its ability to gain power but rather on what it did with that power:

In this golden opportunity, I am not interested in control. I am interested in delivering the best charismatic system, a charismatic, democratic system. This is my dream.

Although there is heated debate among Islamists and their liberal and leftist rivals over the formation of new constitutions, the Tunisian constitution will reflect a spirit of pluralism and toleration.  Islamists have a vested interest in the institutionalization of the political process that will protect them against the whims of autocratic military rulers. As Ennahda’s leader Rachid Ghannnouchi put it in an interview in 2011: “Rulers benefit from violence more than their opponents do.”

Various Islamist leaders stress their commitment to building institutions and safeguarding individual freedoms and minorities, and the rule of law. Ennahda has made it clear that it will protect Tunisia’s small Jewish minority, which faces considerable pressure from small conservative elements in society. Ennahda’s senior leadership rejected calls from extremists (and even from Israel) that Tunisian Jews should leave the country.

In Egypt, the debate on minority rights is still unfolding and is revealing a less progressive stance adopted by the Brotherhood. The party announced that while it would not oppose Christians or women standing for president, it would support a Muslim male for the position. Far from being deterred by such illiberal statements, female candidates, such as a famous Egyptian anchor woman Bothaina Kamel, have thrown their hats in the presidential ring.

Islamists’ worldview and evolution differ from one group and one Arab country to another. Most mainstream Islamists of the Tunisian Ennahda party and the Egyptian Brotherhood variety accept the concept of citizenship and the will of the people, as opposed to the sovereignty of God, as the foundation of legitimate authority.

Minorities and Morality in the Public Sphere

For many women, the main issue lies in the degree of equality they will enjoy in society in the post-authoritarian political system. On the whole, Islamists, particularly the Salafists and the Muslim Brothers, remain prisoners of regressive dogmas on women. Conservative Islamists deploy scriptural interpretations selectively and claim that women and religious minorities cannot be fully equal before the law, and so cannot hold the office of president or even magistrate. This anti-democratic position is contested by pragmatists and younger, progressive Islamists, and there are important variations and differences among Islamists in various countries.

In Tunisia, Ennahda officials have repeatedly pledged to promote equal opportunities in employment and education for women, as well as freedom to choose or reject Islamic dress. Long before the Arab awakenings, Rachid Ghannouchi, Ennahda’s leader, supported affirmative action to increase women’s participation in Parliament, breaking with the policies of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt.Ennahda has the largest number of women parliamentarians, and supported a quota for women in parliament. According to the tolls, out of the 49 seats won by women, 42 went to Ennahda.

However, Tunisia’s female activists have accused Ennahda of misleading the public and giving “false promises”. This tension became clear after a female member of Ennahda, Souad Abderrahim, challenged a law that protected women who have children outside marriage and called for its abrogation.

“Such a law gives those women a legitimacy that encourages women to do the same thing. We should work on reforming them instead,” said Abderrahim. While raising concerns that Ennahda Party may curtail women’s rights, another member of Ennahda, interior minister Ali Larayedh, noted that “The Party will not change laws related to inheritance and polygamy because these laws are tailored for the Tunisian society.”

These statements have not allayed the fears of women and liberals. Consequently, a number of female activists have formed the “October 24 Front” to defend women’s rights and freedoms through monitoring the performance of Ennahda and other parties and scrutinizing the drafting of the new constitution.

The question of women’s rights in Tunisia has recently become more apparent after a dispute over whether women should be allowed to wear the niqab (full face-covering veil) in universities. After being suppressed and silenced during the Ben Ali regime, Salafists have emerged into public spaces, favouring long beards and veils and demanding the application of sharia laws.

Fearing the loss of individual liberties and going on the offensive, secularists challenged Salafists on the streets and in universities. At times, the war of words between the supporters of the two camps turned into violent clashes. Pressed in the middle of this fierce struggle between secular fundamentalists and Salafi fundamentalists, Ennahda has been paralyzed, unable or unwilling to act decisively and resolve the crisis.

In Egypt, the Salafists, who won 20 per cent of seats in the new parliament, oppose women playing leadership roles in the work place or in the political space. Moreover, they favour regulating women’s dress and imposing Islamic standards of modesty in the public sphere.

While the “blue bra girl” incident and the case of virginity tests suggest that the barrier of fear and taboo is gone, and that women have become more outspoken since the revolution, female representation in the political arena has dwindled. The constitutional committee in Egypt (subsequently disbanded by the court) included no women. In the March 2012 parliamentary elections women won fewer than 10 of the roughly 500 seats. As Iman Bibars, the head of the Association for Development and Enhancement of Women in Egypt, noted:

The revolution gave us a voice and we cannot hide that… But I think the product after the revolution is against women… I was shocked the fundamentalists took over and I did not foresee a male gender constitution.

The predicament of women is no different in other countries where Islamists have made similar gains. In Jordan, the appointment of a new prime minister and a committee to review election laws and make amendments to the Constitution did not fulfill a promise to include the word “gender” in Article 6 of the Constitution. That article would have guaranteed the equality of all Jordanians before the law. In Kuwait, the victory of the Islamist-based opposition in parliamentary elections led to an all-male chamber. The four women who won seats in the 2009 elections lost them in the last round.

In addition to women’s rights, morality issues are hotly debated in Arab countries that have experienced significant change during the Arab revolutions. In Egypt, in particular, where tourism plays an important role in the country’s economy (generating more than 12 per cent of hard foreign currency), alcohol consumption, bikinis and mixed bathing at beaches are being reassessed. As with women’s rights, mainstream Islamists have sent mixed signals to the public about their views on morality issues.

For example, Mohammad Morsi, the leader of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, told the public that ‎his party did not plan to ban alcohol in hotels ‎and at tourist resorts or prevent Egyptians from ‎drinking liquor in their homes. However, other members of the Brotherhood have expressed opposing views.

What should we make of the contradictory statements by Islamists on women’s rights and enforcing a particular morality in the public sphere?

On the one hand, the Salafists, along with conservatives among centrist Islamists, seek to impose a regressive interpretation of morality on society at large. On the other hand, pragmatists are caught in the middle of a fierce debate and are undergoing a huge learning process, as they attempt to reach consensus on controversial questions that touch on their very identity.

For example, the Ennahda Party struggles to walk a fine line between the Salafists and the secularists and to avoid alienating and estranging either camp. In contrast, the Muslim Brothers and the Salafists in Egypt have displayed conflicting messages about their views on morality issues in the public sphere.

Nevertheless, a clear divide has emerged between centrist Islamists and the Salafists, a divide that will deepen and widen as Islamists come to terms with the responsibilities of governance and are forced to clarify their positions. Of all religious-based groups, Ennahada has exhibited the most progressive stance on women’s rights and the role of morality in the public sphere, even though it has refrained from publicly confronting the Salafists. Its leaders prefer to unite all Tunisians and set an example for neighboring Arab states. Mustapha Ben Jaafar, Speaker of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly and leader of Ettakatol (a centre-left party), was appointed in charge of the commission to draft the constitution.

The Brotherhood has been slower than its Tunisian counterpart in fully embracing the equality of all citizens before the law regardless of sex, religion, and ethnicity. This nuance may be explained by the different historical experiences of Egyptian and Tunisian Islamists, as well as the influence that the Old Guard like al-Badi and even Shater, previously seen as a pragmatist, still exercises within the 86-year old Brotherhood.  Moreover, the enveloping context of political instability in Egypt, versus relative stability in Tunisia, has created a polarizing atmosphere that prevents Egyptian Islamists from seriously engaging with these issues.

As can be seen, mainstream Islamists are finding their voice and way awkwardly and evasively. They are learning by trial and error. In particular, the Brotherhood has already alienated most of the political groups from the left to the right. Lacking imagination, time and again, the Old Guard has proved to be its own worst enemy, forcing decisions on rank-and-file and demanding absolute loyalty. Conservatives are testing the limits of their newfound power, falling into the trap of blind political ambition. Overreach might cost the Brotherhood critical public support and deepen the divide within the organization, as well as between the Muslim Brothers and secular-minded groups.

Fawaz A. Gerges is a Professor of Middle East politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics where directs the Middle East Centre. His most recent book is “The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda” (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Posted by: Posted on May 9, 2012 by David Britain  

May 9 2012

Election Outcomes in Algeria

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Posted in: Africa, Middle East

By Lakhdar Ghettas, a Stonex PhD Coordinator of Maghreb Studies at LSE IDEAS Centre for Diplomacy and Strategy.

On 10thMay the Algerian regime is holding parliamentary elections against a backdrop of a string of strikes, protests, riots, and the spectre of a massive boycott and abstention. In trying to reverse the tide of boycotts the regime exposed its profound anxiety, which was decoded by Algerians as a sign of an acute vulnerability. This unprecedented stand-off between the regime and society is a real nightmare for the secret services (DRS), which hopes to portray the participation in the May elections as a vote of confidence which offers the current regime, amongst other things, legitimacy from abroad The regime’s strategy is for the parliamentary elections to be presented as a popular validation of the political reforms, initiated a year ago. Moreover, it would maintain on track the reforms roadmap (holding local election next autumn, passing a new constitution which would in turn govern the spring 2014 presidential elections). For all those considerations, the success of the May elections is crucial for the regime’s continuity agenda. However, the almost certain high levels of abstention scenario threatens to upset the regime’s self-regeneration strategy. Therefore, three likely outcomes can be identified a week before elections.

The Status-Quo Scenario:

Elections would take place with an acceptable turn-out resembling the recent Tunisian, Moroccan and Egyptian elections. International media correspondents together with the West’s election observers would be present in several carefully selected polling stations to witness that elections were free and fair. A new assembly would be elected in calm, and a new constitution would be drafted during its autumn session, and ratified in early 2013 via a parliamentary vote or referendum. By then the presidential elections race would have started, giving the regime enough time to prepare a replacement for Bouteflika. One strong potential candidate would be former PM Mouloud Hamrouche. Another option would be Ali Benflis, former PM, who ran against Bouteflika in 2004.There, is already an online support campaign for him.

The problem with this scenario is that it can only be true in the virtual sphere the regime had created to run the state of affairs in Algeria. There is a segment of society which the regime seems to have forgotten or at least underestimated in its dynamism. That segment is the unemployed who have witnessed the regime pour billions to the striking active force in the form of pay raises and generous loans in order to buy social peace. Buying social peace has so far been counter-productive for the regime in that it only encouraged other sectors to exert more pressure on the government and ask for more material gains from a regime they increasingly perceive as very weak and desperate.  For a year now that segment of society, which has felt for years it had no significant leverage on the regime, now sees in the May elections a rare opportunity to punish the regime and inflict maximum damage on it by not only abstaining but also trying  to disrupt the elections. A plethora of videos on Youtube and Facebook document acts of vandalism against election campaign boards, several candidates rallies have been disrupted, ministers chased away, etc. It is their leverage. Acts of self-immolations have been fuelling anger. Last week alone three acts took place in Tiaret, Laghouat and Jijel. The fatal self-immolation act of Rachak Hamza, 25, triggered riotswhich results in the burning down of the FLN party offices, attacks on a police station and other government buildings.  It is unlikely that the status-quo scenario will hold. All it can do is buy the regime some more time until the next local elections in autumn, when we will witness a re-run of the whole episode. Judging by the Jijel riots last week violence might break out in several towns on Election Day, which might prompt the regime to change tactics in an attempt to re-generate itself.

The Regime-Regeneration Scenario:

Plan A- Cancel the Elections

The regime has made its intentions clear in the substance and style in which the reforms were introduced: real change is out of the question and that it is adamant to keep hold of power and resist any power-sharing with society. Fully mindful of the Great Arab Intifada climate, the changed regional environment and ongoing daily protests the DRS would nonetheless, force its agenda and secure another stamp-rubber parliament by means of the same old tricks it masters well. Indeed all the regime needs is respectful turn-out. The DRS would test the waters in the immediate days following elections and gauge the streets’ pulse. This scenario believes there would be massive protests country-wide which would turn into riots. Should unrest reach, say 20% of the magnitude of the January 2011 riots, and spread in time and space over a week, then the army would intervene, cancel election, and promise that real reforms would be implemented over summer following which fresh parliamentary elections coupled with local ones would be held in autumn. Then it would wait and take the streets’ pulse again.

Plan B- Oust Bouteflika

Should Plan A fail to restore order while respected figures emerge to lead the protests and articulate political demands for genuine reform, the DRS might then oust Bouteflika either through anticipated presidential elections or by invoking article 88 in the Constitution; which calls for snap elections in two months, in case of the incumbent president’s inability to attend to his duties.  The DRS would orchestrate a huge PR campaign to portray the Algerian army as siding with the people just as the Tunisian and Egyptian armies did. Both plans would ensure a re-generation of the regime, in that only the civilian face of the regime would be change but not the regime itself.

The Peaceful Radical Change Scenario

Elect a Constituent Assembly:

Should both Plans A and B fail and protests led by credible figures manage to maintain momentum and the situation starts to slip out of the hands of the DRS, the army might concede to opening dialogue with the real opposition. There is already consensus on the general framework of transition buy a number of movements such as the Initiative for Democratic Change in Algeria or Dr. Benbitour’s roadmap.

Both initiatives call, in essence, for the creation of a transitional council (formed by respected figures, inside and outside the state’s structures, known for their integrity and probity) whose mandate would be, among others, the appointment of a transitional government. The transitional government would oversee the preparation of the election of a constituent assembly, which would in turn draft a new constitution and hold a referendum to pass it. Presidential and legislative elections would be then held following which new institutions would be established.

The likelihood of each scenario

The DRS has been actively gauging the planned abstention intentions rate, directly through its traditional means and indirectly through its propaganda papers. While all indications lead to the conclusion that abstention will be massive and that only 10%, at worst, and 20%, at best, would turn out on Election Day, an official poll by the state statistics institute placed turn-out estimates at 50%. Beyond the credibility of the state’s figures, what matters for our analysis here is that 50% is the turn out rate the regime hopes for or rather deems acceptable in order to ensure credibility of the May elections. When we recall that in the last parliamentary elections in 2007 official turn-out was 34%, which did not worry the regime at all, as shown by their lack of interest in rigging the participation rate, we can then get a sense of the DRS’ current concerns. That was 2007 and a lot has happened in Algeria and the Arab world since then.  The regime needs at least 50% this time. If the regime finds itself forced to regenerate itself, cancelling the elections is more likely than ousting Bouteflika. Cancelling election is less troublesome than ousting a president. It is no longer the same world as in 1992 when they ousted President Chadli Bendjedid. A direct coup is therefore out of the question but Plan A, on the other hand, presents some complications.

Plan A complicates things further for the regime. First, from May to Autumn is a very long time in politics. A great deal can happen next summer (frequent power cuts, unrest following poor BAC exam results given the number and length of strikes, etc). Second, cancelling elections would strip credibility from any moves by the regime even if backed by the West, whose support the regime brandishes to Algerians in every occasion. Third, it derails the reforms roadmap in that it delays the adoption of a new constitution offered to Algerians as the coronation of reforms. Fourth, the reforms roadmap did not specify whether the new constitution should be adopted by parliamentary vote or a referendum. So cancelling the elections and holding them with the local ones would entail adopting the new constitution through referendum. The question is then: would the regime run the risk of another mobilising occasion such as a referendum, especially if the local elections were seen as not free and fair? Would the regime even dare to rig the second re-run of elections? And what does all this means for the presidential elections in 2014, for which the May elections are the springboard? These four factors make Plan B (ousting Bouteflika) a lesser evil for the DRS.

But Plan B faces a legal stumbling block. Last April Bouteflika pre-emptively appointed his Minister of Justice Tayeb Belaiz as president of the Constitutional Council; blocking the Article 88 backdoor in anticipation of Plan B,. It was another episode in the regime’s inter-clan power struggle. Nevertheless, it is not a fail-proof measure; in unusual circumstances the DRS and the army can always force their agenda, especially if they present it as a necessary option for transition. But will Algerians accept another theatrical act in the ongoing political circus offered by the regime, or force a more radical change scenario?

The challenge for the advocates of radical change in Algeria is twofold: foil Plans A and B on one hand,  and create conditions for the success of the radical change scenario on the other hand. The January 2011 protests failed to effect change for one main reason: no credible leadership emerged on the ground to lead the protest and transform that momentum into a political dynamism for change. Thus, despite the protests magnitude and geographical expansion and despite the killing of five protesters by police the protests mutated into riots. This mutation facilitated the regime’s task for violence is the only means of dialogue it prefers with society.

The regime has done everything possible to silence dissident civil society.  The latest cases are a one-year sentence against Abdelkader Kherba, and the extradition warrant against Dr.Mourad Dhina, co-founder of the Rachad Movement. Imprisonment, repression, and other coercion techniques have forced activists and politicians into forced exile or silence since 1992. Two decades on, even those who were close to the regime or gave it the benefit of the doubt, have now become convinced of the necessity of real change. This is the case, among many others, of respected figures such as the career diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, former PM Dr. Benbitour, and the former director of the Algerian Central Bank A. Hadj-Nacer. Both Benbitour and Had-Nacer have published heart-breaking biographiesrecently;

in which they catalogue their disillusionment with the current regime and call for radical change before chaos besets Algeria. It is the acts of figures like these joining forces with the real opposition which is denying  the regime its cliché charges of the foreign hand and subversive plots it often brandishes to discredit dissidents.

IF the three scenarios fail then it is feared change will be chaotic as Algerian affairs experts such as Dr. Lahouari Addi at Science Po Lyon, and former high ranking intelligence officer Dr.Chafik Mesbah warned last week.  But retired former commander of the Algerian navy Genarl M’hand Yaala, who has set up the Movement for Citizenship, and called for radical change asserted in an unprecedented talk over Rachad TV, last week, “we will not let Algerians pay another heavy price… we will not allow another Syrian scenario in Algeria.”

Posted by: Posted on May 9, 2012 by LSE IDEAS