During the UK general election campaign, especially in the first week of May 2010, the fortunes of Greece figured prominently in British new bulletins. The huge street demonstrations against austerity measures in Athens seemed to figure as possible portents of things to come post-election when British austerity measures would need to kick in, and may have helped trigger a late swing back of 2-3 per cent of voters back to supporting Labour on election day itself. Here Alexandros Nafpliotis considers some parallels with the 1970 general election in Britain and Greece’s then predicament of being governed by a military junta.
‘If a member of a club breaks the rules for a limited period, the other members may tolerate it but if he is in persistent violation of the rules, the time must come when the club can no longer accept the situation. My government, with great reluctance, has come to the conclusion that this is the situation we are faced with now’. (George Thompson, Britain’s chief delegate to the Council of Europe, 11 December 1969). The occasion for Thompson’s censure is a timetable presented by a Greek minister, which has failed to persuade European allies of the intentions of the Greek government.
Western European governments are toughening their stance vis-à-vis Greece, which is now forced to look for support in other areas of the globe. The Greek prime minister, who has also taken over the post of minister of foreign affairs, is struggling to take the country out of the ‘vulnerable international position’ it is in, and which does not leave it much room for manoeuvre. In his effort to achieve this the PM encounters strong reactions from members of his government, who disagree with his initiatives in trying to mitigate foreign critics through pursuing a conciliatory line.
Meanwhile, Britain just went through a crucial election, which has reinstated the Conservatives to the leadership of the country after a long period of Labour dominance. It is considered certain that the Tories’ return to power will impact considerably on London’s relations with Brussels and other major European capitals. The Tory leader has assumed the responsibility of dramatically changing the UK’s profile, competing with the charismatic Labour leader from five years ago.
All of the above refer to the situation in Athens and London not in 2010 but exactly 40 years ago. The third anniversary of the 21 April coup d’etat that brought the Greek Colonels to power was overshadowed by the feeling of isolation that the regime was increasingly experiencing. This was mainly a consequence of Greece’s walkout from the Council of Europe, when it realised that expulsion was imminent the previous December. George Papadopoulos (prime minister, minister of defence, and also minister of foreign affairs) launched the regime’s ‘opening into the East’, in order to enhance the international standing of Greece, which had taken some serious blows. The hardliners of the junta reacted to Papadopoulos’ concentration of powers, and to his handling of the situation in Cyprus. Meanwhile in Britain in the summer of 1970, Edward Heath unexpectedly became UK premier, as he led the Conservatives to one of the biggest electoral surprises in British history, and set Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) as his primary goal.
The Tories’ return to power created great expectations on the part of the Greek junta, mainly because of the lack of a left wing within the Conservative party and the great interest that the Tories traditionally show for matters of defence and security. The newspaper Nea Politia (the mouthpiece of the regime), immediately pointed out the importance of the electoral outcome, claiming that the British election results ‘show that the swing towards the left in Europe is being halted’ and that these developments ‘vindicate the 1967 Revolution and show that the Greek officers who launched it were the first to understand the message of [the] times’.
This was followed by positive statements by British officials that contributed to an amelioration of relations. London, under tremendous pressure formed by its financial difficulties and US insistence, decided that it was necessary to have a ‘good working relationship’ with the Greek military regime that would allow Britain to actively promote trade (including arms sales) between the two countries.
The tension that was created in the Mediterranean in September 1970, strengthened Greece’s position, as it underlined the country’s significance for the Atlantic Alliance. Events then seemed to justify the British argument in favour of working closely with Athens and avoiding at all costs discussing the ‘Greek issue’ in NATO forums. A meeting took place at Geoffrey Rippon’s office at the end of the month that is quite indicative of the Heath government’s intentions and epitomised British policy towards the Colonels under the Conservatives. It provided a perfect illustration of the priorities of Whitehall, its position on a series of sensitive issues, and, finally, marked a watershed with regard to Anglo-Greek relations in some respects.
British policy-maker decided that ‘co-operation with Greece in the military field was particularly important if we were to maintain a good working relationship with the Greek Government’ and it was stated that ‘HMG’s recent agreement to the supply of frigates should prove helpful in this connexion’. The new spirit in relations was further proven by Palamas’ (Greek alternate minister of foreign affairs) visit to the British capital and Sir Denis Greenhill’s (permanent under-secretary of state for foreign affairs) statement that his country wished to do ‘as much business as possible with Greece’, as well as by the Palamas –Douglas-Home meeting in New York in October. Despite some fluctuation in relations between the two countries (chiefly to do with difficulties bequeathed by Wilson), the Heath government made clear its will to establish warmer relations, by drawing a distinction between its policy and that of its predecessor, and by using cooperation in the military field as the catalyst.
That events in Britain in 1970 were a milestone in Anglo-Greek relations also reflected a strong cynicism and realpolitik with which London and the Foreign Office regarded the political situation in Greece. The following year, the British ambassador in Athen, Sir Robin Hooper sent a report back to the FCO commenting:
‘I do not see Greece returning to a democratic system of government as understood in Western European countries for many years and evolution even to a form of guided democracy such as the colonels have in the past seemed to envisage is evidently going to be slow and uncertain’.
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*Alexandros Nafpliotis holds a PhD in International History from the London School of Economics and is currently writing a book on Britain and the Greek Colonels, 1967-1974.
Dear Mr Wilson,
Thank you for your comment on my blog entry.
Let me set the record straight.
I am not arguing here that Britain’s influence in Greece was preponderant at the time of the Greek Colonels’ regime- far from it. In fact, a careful reading of the text above would persuade you of the opposite. As it is written in the text:
‘London, under tremendous pressure formed by its financial difficulties and US insistence, decided that it was necessary to have a “good working relationship” with the Greek military regime that would allow Britain to actively promote trade (including arms sales) between the two countries.’
It was exactly because Britain was lagging behind the US and Germany in financial terms, and because of London’s willingness to prove its subordination to Washington’s interests (as well as because of the fear of Soviet encroachment in the Mediterranean), that Whitehall decided to overlook human rights abuses and condone an authoritarian regime.
However, to say that ‘Britain’s overall clout in Greece was extremely limited even when compared to that of Germany, France, Italy and Spain’ is, I think, going a bit too far. Britain’s acquired status as a ‘traditional ally’ had enabled it to exert its influence on Greek events on various occasions including creating precedents for intervention (the Metaxas dictatorship, 1936-41, and the years immediately after WWII, for instance). Moreover, Britain’s traditional presence in the Mediterranean in conjunction with its involvement in organisations such as NATO and (from 1973) EEC and its ‘special relationship’ with one of the superpowers of the period, lead to the conclusion that Britain was (or at least was perceived in Athens as) a power which could play a not negligible role in Greek affairs (within the context of the Cold War this time). What is more, the original article refers to a period where the British relative share in the Greek market (around 10%) was only surpassed by the German one, with exports to Britain gaining 30% in 1970-1.
As a result, to say that ‘Britain’s role in influencing the Greek Colonels was extremely limited, virtually insignificant compared to the influence of other medium and larger powers’ seems to be far from the truth. Surely, the Greeks never stopped trading with the Germans and gave a variety of large public contracts to the French, but trade relations with socialist Italy and, especially, Franco’s Spain were rather dull. More importantly, the British were more than interested in providing arms (excluding some small items) to Greece, and actively promoted sales of frigates and, after an initial numbness, even tanks to the military regime in Athens.
One of the main tenets of my book on Britain and the Colonels is that official British foreknowledge and involvement in the 1967 Colonels’ coup cannot be substantiated. I strongly believe that the main responsibility for the establishment of the dictatorship of the Colonels (as well as for the current financial and situation in Greece) is with Greeks. However, one should not ignore the policy pursued especially by countries such as Britain and the US, once the regime was put in place. Whitehall made a choice in condoning the Colonels, granting them recognition in numerous instances, trading with them, and even promoting their cause in international organisations, like the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Economic Community. These are undisputed facts which are further analysed in my forthcoming book.
Furthermore, Britain, despite its financial weaknesses and security-related inefficiencies, could still have taken a different path in its policy vis-à-vis the Greek junta; the question of recognition of the regime, that of visits to Greece, and the British stance in regional organisations, could have taken a different turn if Whitehall had decided to do so- see, for instance, the volte face re naval visits that occurred when Wilson came back in office in 1974.
In a nutshell, of course London should not be ‘blamed for everything that has ever gone wrong in Greece and Cyprus’- that would not be the right reading of events during the turbulent 1960s and 1970s. Greek politicians (as well as Cypriot and Turkish ones in the case of Cyprus), or rather domestic factors, in general, certainly played a dominant role in the lead up to the so-called ‘21st April Revolution’ of 1967 and the events that followed. On the other hand, however, and since the focus of my study is not the dictatorship per see, but its relations with Britain, I think it would be hypocritical to acquit London of any responsibility as far as its policy towards a military dictatorship in a European country (and a member state of NATO and the CoE) is concerned.
Dr Alexandros Nafpliotis
Mr Nafpliotis is flogging a dead horse if he is trying to convince future readers of his book that Britain’s influence in Greece was any greater than that of other medium-sized European players. Although material may be more readily available in English on Britain’s role, the truth is that even if you place Cyprus in the equation, Britain’s overall clout in Greece during the Colonels’ regime was extremely limited even when compared to that of Germany, France, Italy and Spain, and virtually negligible when compared to the overall influence of the United States, where many Greek-Americans, rather than influencing changes in US foreign policy, simply followed the Republican trend of the time, which was to offer support to any government seen as creating a bulwark against possible Soviet expansionism.
Thus, although Mr Nafpliotis’ book-in-progress may interest Britons who had dealings with Greece at the time, let’s get one thing clear from the very beginning — despite the Greek mania to attribute to the Foreign Office powers that even the most optimistic British diplomat could never aspire to, it is clear to any observer of the time that Britain’s role in influencing the Greek Colonels was extremely limited, virtually insignificant compared to the influence of other medium and larger powers, and also ran parallel with the Cold War real politik of the time.
Some British newspapers and magazines may pick up on such a book and topic because of Britain’s slowly evaporating interest in classical Greece and the heroic efforts of that small band of enthusiastic and influential British philhellenes, most of whom have now died or are retired. The reality is not only that Britain now has very little altruistic interest in what happens in Greece (certainly there will never be a repeat of the affection for Greece in Britain that was seen during the war of independence and the Second World War), but that the recent random violence, corruption and poor governance of Greece has put off even the most ardent surviving philhellenes.
I feel confident that egocentric view of the world held by most Greek newspaper editors will ensure that any book on Britain’s relations with the Colonels will be exploited to the full to show how London can be blamed for everything that has ever gone wrong in Greece and Cyprus. The truth however is that Britain’s influence on the Colonels’ regime was less than even Italy’s, and that any book on the Colonels should point out the countries that held real clout; it should also make sure the readers are under no illusions that the Colonels actually had mass support among the Greek working and land-owning peasant class, who felt betrayed by the corrupt, greedy and opportunistic Athenian middle class.
Perhaps a better book, given the current climate, would be an examination of how the corrupt, greedy and opportunistic Greek lower and middle classes have made Greece into a basket-case country and economy that has become the laughing stock not only of Western Europe, but also Eastern Europe. Even poor little Slovakia, which only recently emerged from Communism with one of the lowest per capita incomes in Europe, rightly refused to contribute 1 billion Euros to the bailout of Greece, pointing out that it did not make sense for a poor country with severe social problems to be bailing out a rich country that has been let down by its corrupt, greedy leaders from all walks of life and all political parties.
Perhaps after his book on Britain and the Colonels, Mr Nafpliotis might consider a tome on: “Corruption, greed and opportunism in the Greek psyche: The moral destruction of a European state.”
This is a well-balanced and informative contribution indeed. We look forward to your book as well.
How can it be a well balanced contribution if it doesn’t compare Britain’s role with that of other European and North American states? And most important of all (contrary to the belief of most “it wasn’t my fault, Gov, others are to blame” Greeks), there is no mention of the widespread support for the Colonels’ regime among working class and land-owning peasant class Greeks, sickened by the corruption of the Athenian middle-class. Let’s have some genuine comparisons and then we can talk about “well balanced” … or do you mean by well balanced tanything that lays the blame for Greece’s awful corruption and lack of morals should on the British?