Martin Hearson

The Enough Food for Everyone If campaign – successor to Make Poverty History – has succeeded in making tax haven secrecy the centrepiece issue of public debate around the G8 summit, which closed yesterday in Enniskillen. It also chalked up a genuine success, in pushing the UK’s overseas territories to join a multilateral initiative to share tax information.

But what emerged from the summit itself (and indeed, what David Cameron proposed ahead of it) was a set of ten ‘principles’, with no concrete commitments beyond endorsement of developments already taking place through the G20 and OECD. “The public argument for a crackdown on tax-dodging has been won but the political battle remains,” said the IF campaign. This outcome is not illogical, because competency on tax most definitely resides with those other organisations, rather than the G8. Indeed, some of the developing countries in the G20 would likely bristle if asked to implement a decision taken by the G8.

Over the past few days, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish the campaigners’ messages from those coming out of the government. This demonstrates a real success on the part of campaigners in shifting the public debate. As Melanie Ward, of development charity ActionAid and the IF campaign, wrote yesterday, “at points it was bizarre watching David Cameron, the UK prime minister, use language that could have been written by those working in development agencies.”

The fight against tax haven secrecy was portrayed as Cameron’s personal mission in much of the media coverage, not least a Guardian interview on the eve of the summit. “The PM appears increasingly isolated in his bid for a tax evasion clampdown as world leaders hold talks at the G8 summit” said Sky News. But the adoption of campaign rhetoric by politicians comes with risks, too. I’ve argued before that in the tax debate, it’s very easy for governments to say one thing in public and do another behind the scenes. The political yield for Cameron from the media portrayal of his global leadership on tax evasion will have been significant, and yet as campaigners have been saying, nothing agreed at the G8 is in itself likely to make a big difference to tax haven secrecy or to developing countries. In particular, there was no commitment to making public registers showing the beneficial ownership of companies, to help track down offshore income.

This puts me in mind of a couple of other headline-grabbing international summits. In 2009, Gordon Brown hosted the London G20 summit in the midst of the financial crisis. That summit has been back in the news because of the allegations of espionage, but there was something interesting in the Guardian’s account of how Brown did achieve a breakthrough:

“The key to Brown’s approach was to build up momentum before the summit behind the stimulus he and the newly elected Barack Obama favoured. The European participants met in February 2009 in Berlin in an attempt to reconcile their internal differences. Brown also travelled further afield to the US, Brazil, Argentina and Chile in the days immediately leading up to the summit to build up a loose coalition behind the stimulus plan.”

It’s not at all clear that the government invested in any similar preparatory work ahead of this G8 summit, despite it being such a difficult area. At a public meeting organised by the IF campaign last month, Treasury Minister David Gauke refused to set out the government’s position on any of the campaign’s proposals. Those favouring conspiracy theories might suggest that the failure to reach agreement could have been built into the strategy: much of the status quo is still intact, but the maximum political benefits from appearing to challenge it have been reaped.

On that crucial test of a register of beneficial ownership, for example, the UK has said it will lead by example, but the example is pretty lukewarm. It relies on Companies House, which admits it is incapable of enforcing existing transparency requirements. Meanwhile the issue of public transparency of the register is kicked into the long grass of a consultation.

Another summit this reminds me of is the last G8 hosted by the UK, at Gleneagles in 2005. The unprecedented Make Poverty History mobilisation called for Tony Blair and Gordon Brown to use the summit to push reforms in three areas: aid, debt and trade. That summit is remembered as a partial success: Bob Geldof famously gave the G8 “10 out of 10 on aid, eight out of 10 on debt,” though he seemed to forget about trade.

On that occasion, Blair and Brown got the media fillip they wanted, lauded as the “Lennon and McCartney” of global development by Bono. And while that summit undoubtedly was a watershed moment on aid, many of the promises later unravelled. In an evaluation published earlier this year, Oxfam concluded that, while “the G8′s $50 billion aid promise acted as a catalyst to significantly boost total aid levels…it is true that it’s not all been good news. The G8′s collective $50 billion promise was missed by around US$20 billion at the 2010 deadline, and European countries remain remarkably off-track for meeting their collective promise to the 0.7% GNI target by 2015.” Time will tell whether the G8 ‘principles’ from Enniskillen will meet the same fate.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.

About the Author

Martin Hearson is a doctoral researcher in the international relations department of the LSE. He focuses on the political economy of international taxation in developing countries. He blogs at http://martinhearson.wordpress.com.

When the government launched the Help to Buy scheme in the budget back in March, it was couched in the terms ‘aspiration nation’. A cornerstone of which was about helping people achieve ‘that most human of aspirations’: owning a home. It’s not hard to see why the government are focusing on this. In the last decade, homeownership has declined for the first time since records began. That most human of aspirations has started to look wholly unachievable for most hard working families.

They are mostly renting from a private landlord now – there are now nine million people in the private rented sector, which has grown by 69% in the last decade. Renters have to grapple with a market dominated by short tenancies (in some places 6 months is the norm), high rents and big increases (people paying an extra £300 rent this year compared to last), meaning that more than half of renting families can only save £50 or less a month. For families in particular – 1.3 million of them, a third of the sector – the lack of stability and predictability can be a nightmare. 44% of renting families think their children would have a better childhood if they weren’t renting.

Importantly and as we’ve highlighted, renters are looking ever more like the archetypical swing voter – their incomes cluster round the median, they are more likely than any other group to be in full time work, and they are really, really feeling the squeeze. This is a key living standards issue, which is why influential think tanks like the Resolution Foundation are also looking at solutions for generation rent.

What’s the problem then?

So far a lot of the debate has focused on the big deposits required by mortgage lenders. A typical first time buyer deposit went from 5% at the peak of the lending frenzy to an average closer to 20% in the current market. On high overall house prices (current average about £160,000) that would be £32,000 – a big challenge for anyone without wealthy parents and a well paid job. But our analysis shows that overall affordability is the bigger problem. Even if you managed to qualify for a 90% mortgage, the average family (with a 1.5 FTE income) would only be able to afford the average local home in 59% of the country.

The high cost of housing is driven by the shortage of housing – let’s not forget we have historically low interest rates on borrowing, even with first time buyers paying high rates compared to those with more equity in their home.

How does Help to Buy work and who does it help?

Confusingly, Help to Buy comprises of two quite different schemes:

Help to Buy equity loan

Formerly known as FirstBuy, the government gives a 5 year 20% interest free loan to all buyers (previously it was just first time buyers) of new build homes, who then only have to put up a 5% deposit. This means that they only have to borrow 75% of the property’s value through a mortgage. This is aimed to help 74,000 people over three years.

Help to Buy mortgage guarantee

Previously known as NewBuy and only available on new build homes, this allows buyers to take out a 95% mortgage on any home worth up to £600,000, but the government underwrites 15% of the mortgage to take on some of the lender’s risk. This is aimed to help 600,000 people over three years.

Our initial analysis of Help to Buy showed a counter-intuitive logic – that the lower the deposit (i.e. the government’s 95% mortgage indemnity pledge) the more expensive the running costs because you’re borrowing more. As a result, with the 95% mortgages possible through Help to Buy, only in 49% of England would the average 1.5 earner family be able to afford the mortgage on an average home. And only in 12% of England would the lower quartile 1.5 earner family be able to afford the average home. Figures are substantially better for the shared equity element, but this is much smaller in scale.

The wider consequences of Help to Buy

An unprecedented number of commentators have roundly condemned the mortgage guarantee element of the scheme, which – not being linked to new build – will not do enough to stimulate new developments being built. Easy finance into a supply constrained market can only push up house prices, pushing them further out of reach for the millions of lower and middle income households already frozen out of the housing market.

The lack of exit strategy for the scheme is also a worry. When the guarantees dry up and mortgage availability constrains, we could then see a large number of new buyers trapped in negative equity if prices fall from their new peak. Finally, there are currently no provisions to stop the mortgage guarantee being taken up by people buying property to rent out or buy a second home.

What should the government be doing?

It’s clear that if government wants to get Britain back on track to be a nation of homeowners, it’s going to have to focus some serious effort on building homes that are affordable to people in low and middle income groups across the country, and invest money directly in building more homes  – as mooted by the CBI. Otherwise, this is certainly not the second coming of Thatcher’s Right to Buy revolution.

The government will also have to consider how the help it gives at least goes to the ‘right’ people. My hope is that government will introduce a new legal mechanism to keep these subsidised homes with owner occupiers – presumably by beefing up the law on restrictive covenants, so that enforceable restrictions can travel forward with the deeds for the home. Finally, if we finally get building the homes we need to build, and this is to offer promise to a generation of first time buyers, government will need to think how it really helps a wide range of people compete in the market.

Key to this is ongoing affordability, which current initiatives have failed to address. Our analysis suggests that shared ownership or different ways of reducing mortgage amounts through more creative equity schemes are more likely to bring ownership back in reach of the kind of people who benefited from Right to Buy. A more politically astute housing policy for the 2015 general election will have to meet that challenge.

Shelter has launched a campaign and published a report today regarding the difficulties many face in owning their own homes.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.

About the Authors

Robbie de Santos leads Shelter’s policy work on private renting and mortgage issues. Over the last few years he has developed Shelter’s policy proposals to improve the private rented sector, including the Stable Rental Contract and action to rid the sector of rogue landlords. He is currently working on a major project looking at housing options for the squeezed middle. Outside of work Robbie is a food blogger, cyclist and active in neighbourhood planning in Hackney.

Toby Lloyd has worked in housing policy across the public, private and voluntary sectors for ten years, and joined Shelter as Head of Policy in 2011. Previously he led Navigant Consulting’s policy and strategy division, where he advised local and national government and the private sector on housing, planning and regeneration. He has been a senior policy manager for the Greater London Authority, a project manager for the London Rebuilding Society, and taught financial history at LSE. In his spare time he is part of the Hackney Cohousing Project, a community led scheme seeking to develop fifteen homes in a mixed tenure, multi-generational neighbourhood.

This month saw the publication of yet another report on the social mobility crisis in postgraduate studies, this time from the liberal thinktank Centre Forum. The report echoes a chorus of other organisations calling for a fairer funding system for postgraduate studies, including the NUS, the Policy Connect HE Commission, and the 1994 Group. Indeed, as the report by the Policy Connect Commission points out, postgraduate study is increasingly seen as the ‘new frontier in widening participation’ to higher education, with the former social mobility tsar Alan Milburn calling it a potential ‘social mobility time bomb’.

There are good reasons for these alarming statements. First, there are significant wage gains associated with doing a postgraduate degree compared to doing an undergraduate degree. As Lindley and Machin point out in the CentreForum report, the wage gap between postgraduate degree holders and first degree only degree holders increased from 7% in 1996 to 14% by 2010. Elsewhere they state that across the whole education spectrum, graduates with a postgraduate degree have seen the biggest wage gains in the past two decades. Second, a postgraduate degree is increasingly seen as a requirement for employment in a number of sought-after professions, such as law, engineering, and biotechnology, as well as journalism, accountancy and academia.

Despite the increasing value of postgraduate degrees, there is no loan system equivalent to that for undergraduate students available to postgraduate students. While a very small number of students are able to access funding from Research Councils and other grant bodies, such funding is not available to the vast majority of potential postgraduate students. This situation strongly favours those students from well-off backgrounds, whose parents can help to meet the cost of their degree. For those unable to meet the costs, the lack of affordable postgraduate student loans has led to a worrying trend of postgraduate students resorting to potentially disastrous measures such as credit cards, overdrafts and personal loans to fund their studies. Others work part-time jobs alongside their degree programmes to fund their studies, but these students face uncertainty and an increased risk of dropping out if they lose their jobs or encounter other financial difficulties during their studies. There is therefore a clear need for a system of funding that enables all students who can benefit from postgraduate studies to do so regardless of their financial means.

Thus far, much of the discussion around a postgraduate funding system has been stifled by worries that it would lead to upfront costs for the government and would thus be fiscally impossible during a time of austerity. However, new research from IPPR shows that this need not be so. The final report of IPPR’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education, released 10 June, shows that it is possible to create a postgraduate funding system without significant upfront cost to the state, provided that the loans are paid back at a lower threshold than the current undergraduate loans.

The report’s suggested loan system, which was modelled by London Economics and based on the postgraduate loan system originally proposed by Tim Leunig, would see all students enrolled on a taught masters course as eligible to borrow £10,000 to cover the cost of their tuition fees. They would repay this at a rate of 9 per cent on any earnings between £15,000 and £21,000, with all other features of the loan system, such as the write-off period and interest rates, being the same as the current undergraduate loans. Because loan repayments would be made at a lower threshold than for undergraduate loans, the vast majority of graduates would repay the full cost of the loan. The RAB charge to the government (i.e. the amount of loan funding projected to be written off) would be just 6.9 per cent, with a long-term additional cost of only £41 million to the government.

Such a loan system would remove one of the main barriers that prevents less well-off students from studying a masters degree, namely access to finance. However, a few limitations would need to be recognised and dealt with.

First, although the overall cost to the government of introducing a postgraduate loan is very low, the government would have to borrow money in order to fund the loans, just as it has had to borrow money for the undergraduate loan system. This would add around £646 million to public sector net debt, but it would not count towards the deficit. Second, because the availability of loans would be likely to increase the number of students wishing to pursue postgraduate studies, the government would need to find a way to regulate the number of students receiving postgraduate loans. Such regulations would need to be crafted in a way that didn’t prevent the poorest students from entering the system. Third, in order to prevent universities from inflating the cost of their courses in response to the increased supply of finance for students, the government may need to regulate fees for postgraduate courses.

These challenges are similar to the challenges facing the undergraduate funding system, so it should be feasible to implement equivalent regulations – such as student number controls and fee caps – to a postgraduate funding system. Implementing a postgraduate loan system, despite these challenges, would be well worth it because doing so would unlock the potential for postgraduate study to expand opportunity, while mitigating its potential to reproduce patterns of privilege and disadvantage.

Postgraduate study serves as a gatekeeper to some of the most sought-after jobs in our economy, and it plays a key role in bringing workers up the wage ladder. Universities are places where those who go on to hold leading positions in our political and economic life are educated and socialised, and our higher education funding system plays a key role in ensuring that our future elites are as diverse and representative of the society around them as possible. For these reasons, the introduction of a postgraduate loan system is crucial not just because it improves social mobility and fairness. As Alan Milburn makes clear, it is also a ‘necessity for our economy and wider society’.

In recent decades, we have made some welcome improvements in widening participation to undergraduate studies. But those gains risk being lost unless we also establish a fairer student funding system at the postgraduate level.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.

About the Author

Annika Olsen is a Researcher at IPPR. Before joining IPPR in February 2012, Annika worked in the Faroese Section of the Danish embassy in London. She holds an MPhil with distinction in modern society and global transformations from the University of Cambridge, and a first-class BA in politics and sociology from the University of Sussex.

Karen Rowlingson

The UK economy went off the rails in 2008 with a massive increase in unemployment, particularly for younger people. But the social security system did its job, to some extent, enabling many to avoid the worst consequences of recession. Various welfare reforms introduced or enacted since then, however, will now mean that the poorest will see their incomes hit the hardest. The train is about to crash unless we abandon the reforms and re-build a system which provides effective social security for all.

The IFS has confirmed that the current downturn is the longest and deepest slump in a century and while the better-off were hit hardest by the recession initially (due to falls in earnings), the impact of the recession is now set to hit the poorest hardest (due to cuts to the social security system). Figures released by the Office for National Statistics already show that there were nearly a million more people in absolute poverty in 2011/12 compared with 2010/11 and the IFS estimate that there will be over a million more children in poverty by 2020. The main reason why the poorest will be hit hardest in the next few years is that unprecedented changes to the social security system will begin to bite. These reforms include the following:

• Benefits will now be uprated according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) instead of the Retail Price Index (RPI).
• Most working-age benefits and tax credits will be uprated by a maximum of just 1% each year for the next three years (the 1 per cent uprating cap)
• No out-of-work family of working age will receive more than £500 per week in total benefit payments and no single adult household will receive more than £350 (the total benefit cap)
• New Housing Benefit rules will apply to social housing tenants relating to how many bedrooms their benefit payments will cover (the ‘bedroom tax’)
• All existing claimants of incapacity benefits will be reassessed for Employment and Support Allowance under the Work Capability Assessment and Disability Living Allowance (DLA) will be replaced with Personal Independence Payments (PIP).
• Council Tax Benefit will be replaced by localised Council Tax Support schemes.
• Universal Credit will amalgamate several existing means-tested benefits: Income Support (IS), Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit,Working Tax Credit and social fund budgeting loans.

These reforms to the social security system are more fundamental than those introduced in the 1980s by the Conservative government of that time. In particular, the new caps to benefits and the fact that that the value of means tested benefits will be cut relative to inflation will punch massive holes into our already inadequate safety net. Means tested benefits are already far from generous for people of working age. Research by the Minimum Income Standards team at Loughborough University shows that safety net benefits for single people in 2011 gave them only 40 per cent of the income they would need to have an acceptable standard of living. A couple with two children had only 62 per cent of what they would need and a lone parent with one child only 64 per cent.  The percentages for all groups had been declining from 2008 to 2011 but these benefits have, until now at least, been linked to inflation (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Safety net benefits (Income Support/Pension Credit) as a percentage of  Minimum Income Standards (excluding rent, childcare, council tax)

Source: Hirsch, D (2011) A minimum income standard for the UK in 2012

As the figure, above, shows, pensioners have generally fared far better and been protected from the impact of the recession but the Labour party’s proposal to means-test Winter Fuel Allowance suggests that spending on pensioners may soon also come under attack.  The Labour party’s proposal is also interesting in that it strikes at the principle of universalism which has already been breached by the Coalition government’s means testing of Child Benefit. Child Benefit was one of the key bastions of universalism in the British social security system. It survived the 1980s cuts but has now fallen victim of means testing under the Coalition. Universal benefits can be seen as a ‘luxury’ in hard economic times and cutting them may not seem to directly affect the poorest but when the social security system becomes more residualised through means-testing it creates an even greater illusion of ‘us’ in work and ‘them’ on benefits.  Social solidarity is likely to erode further, along with support for the system among the better off.

Basic, means-tested benefits are under attack alongside universal benefits. The social security system is re-labelled ‘welfare’ and those on benefits called ‘shirkers’ and ‘skivers’ in contrast to the ‘workers’ and ‘strivers’. But the ONS figures also show that two-thirds of children in poverty are living in working families. Work clearly isn’t working as a route out of poverty and the tax credit/benefit system is playing a major role in supporting people in work. There is no simple divide between those on benefits/tax credits and those in work.

Can we avoid the train crash that will plunge millions of people, particularly children, into poverty and deprivation in the next few years? Central to this would be to re-build a strong social security system to support people at times when the market economy fails.  But we also need to take a fundamental look at the nature of that market economy. The seeds of the current crisis were sown in the 1980s when labour lost the battle against capital. We need a new settlement between the two and to do this we need to re-establish stronger collective worker representation. We also need a political leadership than can challenge the dominant but highly dysfunctional ideology of neo-liberalism.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.

About the Author

Karen Rowlingson is Professor of Social Policy and Director of CHASM (Centre on Household Assets and Savings Management) at the University of Birmingham.  She has recently co-authored a book on ‘Wealth and the Wealthy: exploring and tackling inequalities between rich and poor’ with Stephen McKay.

The G8 is a group of the leading developed economies – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the USA, the UK and, since 1997, Russia. In addition the EU is represented at G8 meetings by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. The G8 has no formal bureaucracy, and its members (other than the EU representatives) take turns in acting as President – the UK has held the Presidency since Jan 1^st and will host the annual meeting of G8 leaders to be held on 17 – 18 June at the Lough Erne Hotel near Enniskillen in Northern Ireland.

G8 meetings are only rarely exciting occasions; usually the demonstrations that invariably accompany them are the most interesting story they produce. However, the last Summit hosted by the UK in July 2005 was the exception to this rule; it began with then prime minister and host Tony Blair arriving late on the back of his triumph in gaining the 2012 Olympics for London, continued with Bono and Bob Geldof ‘Making Poverty History’ and ended with Blair leaving early to preside over the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings. David Cameron will be hoping for rather less excitement this time; certainly there will be less pointless celebrity politics.

The G8 Presidency gives the host government the opportunity to press issues that it thinks important, both at the Summit itself and at the meetings that precede and follow it, meetings such as the ‘Nutrition for Growth’ Conference that took place in London on Saturday 8^th June. For the actual Summit, the UK government has declared three issues to be crucial: advancing trade, ensuring tax compliance and promoting greater corporate transparency. Each is likely to be problematic and may backfire on the government.

On trade, the UK government is keen to advance the idea of an US-EU trade pact, and this is, indeed, something that has quite a lot of traction. Germany is certainly on board, but, as so often on these occasions, the French government may well slow things down. The exception culturelle that France has promoted since the GATT Talks of 1993 is once again in the news. It is designed to protect French ‘cultural goods’ from American competition. Left to their own devices, French movie-goers will go to Iron Man 3 rather than the latest Parisian art-house movie, and therefore, it is argued, the latter need special assistance to combat this unpatriotic behaviour. Given the importance these days of the infotainment industry, this is a serious matter. Add to this the current kerfuffle on internet privacy and the long-running European-US contest over the safety of GMOs (genetically modified organisms) and the prospects for serious progress on trade are not good.

On the other two ‘T’s, tax and transparency, more or less everyone agrees in principle on the importance of greater corporate openness and cracking down on tax avoidance, and everyone agrees that this can be done only by international cooperation. Unfortunately most countries have their own ways of attracting inward investment, many of which involve competitive tax breaks and the like, and if David Cameron pushes this one too hard someone is likely to point out that many of the most egregious tax havens are actually British overseas possessions. Indeed, some continental Europeans regard London as a kind of haven for irresponsible bankers. On transparency, the government intends to push for registers revealing the ultimate ownership of all corporations – not a popular move in the Cayman Islands or Jersey. In any case, it isn’t clear how such a register would be, or could be, policed.

These official aims may not be achieved, but in any event it seems likely that the real action of the summit will be off-stage, and focused on Syria, with a number of issues concerned with that crisis coming to a head. On the one hand, the US and Russian governments have been engaging in intense diplomacy to try to agree on strategies to ensure that the proposed UN/Arab League sponsored Conference on the crisis, now due to be held in Geneva in July, will actually take place. US Secretary of State John Kerry has recently returned from Moscow with the promise that discussions would continue in Northern Ireland, this time between the American and Russian Presidents. On the other hand, the British and French governments are pushing hard for more active steps to arm and support ‘reliable’ members of the Syrian opposition (assuming that such can be identified), and are attempting to pull President Obama away from dealing with Russia towards a more actively anti-Assad stance in the conflict. After all, American ‘redlines’ concerning chemical weapons appear to have been crossed, casualties on both sides continue to rise, the conflict is metastasizing into Lebanon and Iraq and, most worrying of all perhaps, the Assad regime is on the ascendant and thus unlikely to respond to indirect pressure. Surely the US must now throw its weight behind the Free Syrian Army and the ‘official’ opposition to Assad?

In spite of last Thursday’s announcement that the US will supply unspecified quantities of small arms to the official opposition, I believe that President Obama does not accept the wider argument. He has taken a long hard look at Syria and decided that, redlines or not, he isn’t going to allow the US to get involved. The situation is too complex, identifying the ‘good guys’ is too difficult and the support of Russia and Iran means that Assad will not be left friendless, the fate of Gaddafi a couple of years ago. The appointment of two prominent liberal interventionists to important positions within the US Administration – Samantha Power to the UN Ambassadorship and Susan Rice to the post of National Security Adviser – is seen by some to indicate a contrary stance, but, if they mean anything in this context, these appointments are designed to neutralise potential critics rather than to signal a genuine change of tack. There is the potential here for a serious rift between the US and its close British and French allies, but Obama’s cold realism will attract support from other members of the G8, and Britain and France are unlikely to push their arguments too far especially in view of Obama’s small shift in their direction with the arms decision.

Cameron in particular will be conscious that his own backbenchers are unenthusiastic about his activism over Syria. Everyone realises that an active intervention in Syria – ‘no-fly zones’ and the like –  could only be successful if the US  were to take the lead and if Obama doesn’t want to intervene there will be no intervention, end of story. The best hope for the Syrian people is that Obama and Putin will manage to thrash out a common position on the upcoming conference and put pressure on Assad and the opposition to attend. Sadly, even if such pressure succeeds and the conference takes place without walkouts, it is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects of a successful outcome.  Most likely the conflict will continue until one side wins, although from the perspective of ordinary Syrians, ‘winning’ is likely to be indistinguishable from ‘losing’.

Final point; what of the effect of the Summit on Northern Ireland? This will be the biggest security exercise ever in Northern Ireland – which, when you consider the history of the last hundred years is in itself pretty extraordinary – but the very fact that the meeting could take place in the Province tells us something very important, and very encouraging, about the changes that have taken place there in the last decade. Let us hope that all goes well and that Enniskillen will become known for something other than murderous mayhem – a long feature story on the town in the New York Times on Tuesday 11 June could be an encouraging start. Apparently Lough Erne, Northern Ireland’s only 5 Star hotel and golf course, has been up for sale for two years. Perhaps one of the world leaders will decide that for $16 million it would make a classy holiday home?

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.

About the Author

Chris Brown is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. He writes on international political theory, human rights, and issues of global justice. He is the author most recently of Practical Judgement in International Political Theory(2010) and of International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (1992),Understanding International Relations (1997; 4th edition, 2009), Sovereignty, Rights and Justice (2002), the editor of Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives (1994), and has published numerous journal articles. He is also the coeditor, with Terry Nardin and N. J. Rengger, ofInternational Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Greeks to the First World War (2002).

A Life in Education and Architecture: Mary Beaumont Medd. Catherine Burke. Ashgate. December 2012.

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Mary Beaumont Medd (née Crowley; 1907 – 2005) was a Bradford-born architect who devoted her career to the reform and planning of primary, secondary and nursery schools in the postwar years, one of a number of progressive figures in the field of British education during this period. She is the subject of a biography by Catherine Burke, senior lecturer in history of education at the University of Cambridge.

Medd’s father was Ralph Henry Crowley, a medical officer heavily involved in child health and welfare and a pioneer of the open air schools movement in England, and both father and daughter shared the habit of travelling widely and regularly to study the most innovative learning environments being planned throughout northern Europe and the US.

Her own work aimed to lead school planning away from the rows and rows of desks of the Victorian era to an approach centred on the needs and perceptions of children. Through a succession of school plans, and a number of Building Bulletins that disseminated the ideas in each, the classroom was reconstituted as a family of heterogeneous spaces, each supporting different types of learning activities. The intention was to encourage teachers to embrace recent innovations in pedagogy that focused on the formation of the well-rounded child.

Two drawings entitled “Ingredients of Planning” published in 1971 illustrate her approach. The classroom may have a “general work area” consisting of relatively traditional desks and chairs in the centre, but it is surrounded by other spaces each with distinct architectural characters: the “home base”, a place of “mutual trust” and furnished “with curtains, pictures, flowers, a carpet, window seat, possibly a bed to rest on”; an “enclosed room” either for “quiet activities such as reading or story telling or for making a noise such as music”; “particular bays” are architecturally more flexible but provide semi-enclosed task spaces for individuals and small groups; and a “covered area” ensures that every classroom comprises an outdoor space. The landscape surrounding the building should be provided with “sheltered gardens”, “hard play areas”, and “wild areas” to provide enough stimulus for inquisitive children.

After studying at the Architectural Association in London from 1936 – 1941, she pursued these interests first within the Hertfordshire Education Department, then at the Architects and Building Branch Development Group (A&BB) at the Ministry of Education, and in later years as an independent practising architect and international consultant. Most of this work was done together with her husband, architect David Medd (1917 – 2009).

In A Life in Architecture, Burke draws extensively from archival material at the Institute of Education, University of London, and from interviews conducted with Medd’s husband after her death, and writes more in the idiom of an academic than a popular historian, using the detail to evidence her account rather than embellish it. Whether as a result of this idiomatic decision, or of the intimacy Burke established with her subject through the meetings with Medd’s husband, or whatever else, a number of frustrating tendencies soon develop. Burke seems frequently distracted by trivial and sentimental anecdotes, such as the number of miles the Medds cycled on their honeymoon, or where they ate their meals when they were visiting schools in Stockholm, or which of them drove the rental car on a US tour. At the same time, Burke mentions only in passing the major debates taking place in education and in architecture throughout the postwar period which ought to have formed the backdrop to Medd’s story, and into which Medd’s story ought to have provided powerful insight. For example, Burke’s account of how Medd finally left the Ministry of Education seems to place almost as much weight on petty office politics within the A&BB as on changing political attitudes towards progressivism during the 1970s. While both may be true, the latter is surely more salient for our understanding of the relationship between architecture and education.

The biography must also inevitably fall short as an architectural monograph, since this is the one discipline addressed in this book where Burke is writing as a layperson. Whereas an architectural historian brings a personal understanding of the dialectic between form and function, as well as knowledge of the currents of thought within the wider architectural profession, Burke is forced to take her sources’ opinions (again often sentimental and biased) at their word, having no personal expertise with which to weigh them. So she seems too willing to report Medd’s influence spreading throughout England and Northern Europe without being able to accurately delimit such reporting with knowledge of how much of Medd’s philosophy was already shared by similar pioneers throughout the region, such as Walter Gropius, Jan Duiker, or Aldo van Eyck. Most of the floor plans of the schools, which for both architects and educators alike should be the centrepieces of the publication since they show more succinctly than any other method the implementation of Medd’s pedagogical ideas, are published without detailed commentary, almost as if they were there merely to decorate the pages like any other photograph of smiling children.

It is also a great shame that Burke decided not to pursue at least one chapter on Medd’s extensive international consulting to schools and foundations in contexts as diverse as Iran, Ethiopia, Fiji, Venezuela, El Salvador, Botswana, Oman, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Pakistan and Uganda, especially given that two whole chapters were devoted to the minutiae of her travels throughout the US and Northern Europe.

Burke is somewhat stronger when she compares Medd’s ideas with the current state of British education—for example how contemporary paranoia about paedophilia make some of Medd’s more closed and intimate spaces unusable, or how the pedagogical programme Medd promoted has been vindicated by children themselves in successive Guardian “Children’s Manifesto” surveys, who express their ideal school in profoundly social and programmatic terms such as “a listening school” or “a respectful school”, with a “chill-out room […] and a quiet place inside at playtime”,  “chances for pupils to have quiet chats with teachers”, and “opportunities for small group or private work”. The perceptions of children are indeed instructive for architects and educators alike.

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Kerwin Datu originally trained in architecture, in which he worked in Sydney, Paris and London, before completing the MSc in Urbanisation and Development at LSE. He is now pursuing a PhD on the role of the global city network in international economic development, focused on African cities. As Editor-in-chief of The Global Urbanist, he receives and publishes essays and magazine articles on issues affecting urban development in cities around the world, and is always open to submissions from new contributors. Read reviews by Kerwin.

The Fanaticism of the Apocalypse. Pascal Bruckner. Polity. April 2013.

Find this book: 

The most recent in a series of books examining fear and guilt, The Fanaticism of the Apocalypse is the newest publication from Pascal Bruckner, a French philosopher who rose to notice during the 1970s as part of the anti-Marxist ‘new philosophers’.

Offering a ‘take no prisoners’ attack on what he terms the “ecology of disaster” (p.184), Brucker argues that the dominant theme of contemporary environmentalist discourse has become that of an inescapable environmental catastrophe with a central aim to instil fear into the hearts of the masses. As the fear of communism has collapsed, our new adversary is ourselves, as we become framed as the enemy of nature.

He argues that “ecologism has become a global ideology” that, in succeeding Marxism with a similar blend of “fatalism and activism” (p.18-19), requires us to believe in a coming apocalypse in a quasi-religious manner. This, ironically, echoes the climate sceptic trope of the ‘Church of Global Warming’, whereby scientists and others are said to ‘believe’ in the reality of climate change because it supports their paycheck, akin to evangelical preachers found with their hands in church funds. It is therefore no surprise that Bruckner’s thesis has been welcomed by sceptical organisations, and that he was the guest of the UK’s Global Warming Policy Foundation, delivering a presentation on his book in April 2013 at the House of Lords.

While climate change is not the explicit subject of the book, with the more general ‘cataclysmic ecology’ instead used as a broader term, it is an oblique undercurrent running through the various chapters (creatively titled, among others, ‘Blackmailing Future Generations’ and ‘Humanity on a Strict Diet’). Bruckner seems somewhat angry at the thought of having been promised a future based on inexhaustible resources which has now been pulled from under him. His arguments echo those who contend that while climate change is indeed happening and humans may be responsible, it is not a major problem, and we don’t need to do anything about it (disputed in a concise Deutsche Bank Group report from 2010).

However, Bruckner’s argument that it is difficult for people to react to the enormity of climate change when faced with claims such as “marine ecosystems will collapse between now and 2050” (p.32) is indeed valid, as it is well recognised that it is extremely difficult to internalise and react to the possible impacts of such significant future environmental change. He also points out the potential futility of solely making changes such as recycling and eco-friendly light bulbs when the scale of the issue requires much larger fundamental changes in human behaviour.

Nonetheless, it is tempting to level a criticism of cherry-picking at Bruckner, as he relentlessly builds his case according to a distinct ontological view. For example, by choosing to critique “little propitiatory gestures” (p.32) he ignores the pleas echoing around the world for large-scale paradigm shifts in how we view our relationship to the planet and to each other. Critiquing the encouragement of the small changes that individuals can make in their daily lives – which, when done en masse, would be significant – also seems unfair when the previous paragraph lambasts Al Gore and other ‘Greens’ for sharing information that one can only react to with “distress and passivity” (p.32).

However, it is important to remember that Bruckner is a philosopher, and this is intended to be a book of ideas and assertions, not one that is supported by research. He summons numerous concepts to support his critique of ecologism, although some, such as the contention that the Green movement is keen to evoke a “scatological fantasy focused on decomposition that begins with sorting rubbish” (p.150), are quite difficult to know how to address.

As part of his critique of ecology, he suggests two options for its future. Either it chooses “anti-humanism as its principle, celebrating rivers and forests the better to castigate human beings” (p.100) or chooses what he terms an “open anthropocentrism” (p.100) whereby non-human life forms are, to all intents and purposes, valued because of the benefit they bring to humans, albeit including their ability to broaden our sense of humanity. It seems a false dichotomy somehow, with the exhortation not to let our respect of the environment “lead us into an idolatry of nature” (p.102) where radical ecologism restricts our every move, seeming to be fear mongering of the very sort Bruckner critiques.

For a non-philosopher this book is a frustrating read, particularly given its lack of comprehensive references and its structure as a meandering philosophical tour, where references to Gaia sit alongside Rabelais, Francis Bacon and Robocop. The book also seems to wilfully ignore the results of a large cannon of climate science which indicates significant detrimental impacts, particularly to those in developing countries. Thus, likely to appeal more to philosophers, The Fanaticism of the Apocalypse may also find an audience among those who share Bruckner’s anthropocentric world view.

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Amelia Sharman is a PhD student at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the LSE. Her main research interests are in the relationship between science and policy, and uncertainty and controversy in political decision-making. Previously, Amelia was a Sustainability Specialist at the International Hydropower Association and a Senior Policy Advisor at the New Zealand Ministry for Economic Development. Read more reviews by Amelia.

This article was originally published on LSE’s Impact of Social Sciences blog.

Imagine having years of rich data on how new technologies, changes in funding and other environmental factors, have an impact on research and are reflected in the attitudes and behaviours of academics. Such a body of data might be used to help critically inform new services, resources and systems to support staff and students in universities and colleges across the UK. Since 2000, universities in the US have had precisely that thanks to Ithaka S+R, who have been undertaking a survey of US academics every three years to identify changes in research processes, teaching practices, publishing and research dissemination, alongside the evolving role of the library and scholarly societies.

Two UK organisations who are helping universities respond to the changing needs of academics, Jisc and Research Libraries UK (RLUK), recognised the invaluable resource that Ithaka S+R had developed with their US faculty survey programme. Collaborating with Ithaka on a UK version of the survey was therefore a very exciting opportunity and the results represent a chance to build on a valuable source of research looking at the changing practices of academics.

The findings of the UK academic survey, published on 16^th May, contained a rich set of data that the sector can continue to interrogate and interpret.  We want to share three aspects of the survey which we believe show the influence of new technologies on research, the altering perceptions of support services and the changing role of the academic library.

The academic author/reader dichotomy

As authors academics aspire in the main to reach an audience of their peers while broader impact issues are of less concern [figure 38, page 67]. The choice of publication to disseminate their research is similarly driven by a desire to be read by academics in their field and creating high impact, this is often therefore a peer-reviewed journal [figure 40, page 70].

While two-thirds of respondents valued a journal for being free to publish in, only one-third saw value in it being free to readers. Although, interestingly, there were considerable differences between the humanities and sciences/medical sciences on this question.

Figure 40, page 70

In contrast, academics as readers seem to be more attuned to a rapidly scholarly landscape.  90% of respondents indicated the importance of the library as content provider for commonly used journals and monographs. But, interestingly, the next most important source was freely available material on the web (this was around 60% for arts and humanities and up to nearly 80% for medical and veterinary sciences) [figure 20, page 39]. The importance of freely available material on the web was emphasised when the survey asked how academics would search for material that is not available through the institutional library. Here 90% of the respondents – with almost no disciplinary difference – searched online for such material.

figure 22, page 41

As readers, academics therefore discover and access a very large proportion of their content freely online. Some of this ‘free’ content may actually be paid for and delivered through their institutional library. However, this contrasts with the value that the academic as author places on the journal that is free to publish in, but not free to access.  Understanding this apparent dichotomy might be very important to furthering both the definition and practice of Open Access.

From print to electronic

For academics, whether as readers or authors, the survey suggests a resounding acceptance of electronic journals. Indeed, when asked, ‘If my library cancelled the current issues of a print version of a journal but continued to make them available electronically, that would be fine with me’ around 70% of respondents agreed strongly (around 60% for arts and humanities and 80% for sciences and medical and veterinary sciences) [figure 10, page 29].

Despite continuing concerns surrounding entirely replacing hard copy journal collections with e-only ones [figure 12, page 30], electronic journals are a case where the digital version has supplanted the hard copy version in regard to actual use. For ebooks however the picture is less straightforward.

The survey underlines that for academics, electronic versions of monographs are not well suited to some research activities.  Specifically, a majority of academics indicated that reading cover-to-cover or in depth reading was ‘much easier’ or ‘somewhat easier’ in print format [figure 16, page 34]. In contrast, searching content and exploring references in digital monographs was viewed as ‘much easier’ or somewhat easier’ by a majority of respondents (around 65%) [figure 16, page 34].

The transition to digital monographs emphasises the continued role of print within the scholarly landscape for some time to come, in lieu of technologies that assist researchers to mine and collate information more easily using electronic versions

Indeed, few respondents saw the use of ebooks becoming so prevalent amongst academics and students that it would no longer be necessary to maintain physical collections within the next five years (only around 8% of humanists, rising to just over 20% of medical/veterinary academics) [figure 18, page 36]. 

The role of the library and the librarian

A major set of findings highlights the value academics place on the role of the library within their teaching and research. While only 2% of respondents visited the library to begin their research query, nearly 90% of respondents saw the library’s most important function as a purchaser of content. Furthermore, around 30% of respondents indicated that the library has a role in increasing the productivity of their research.

figure 45, page 79

This is perhaps not surprising, but may have implications for libraries as their role in collecting and procuring content gradually changes with an increase in open content and user-initiated purchasing. If the library as ‘gateway’ to content has been eroded with the emergence of the web, so the role of the library as ‘buyer’ of materials under traditional regimes may also be under threat with the development of new content models. However, the obverse of this is that there may be more room for the library or academic institution to act as a publisher itself. This may be underlined by the high degree of preference expressed by academics to publish first and foremost through university presses over other academic publishing routes.

If the overwhelming view of the library’s role is currently as buyer, it was also seen as having a valuable role in teaching and learning. Around 40% of respondents agreed that interaction with librarians helped their students do better in their courses.

Overall, such being the high regard in which institutional libraries are held, only about 12% of respondents felt that access to online content and resources meant funding should be redirected away from the library buildings and staff. But, around 25% of respondents saw easy access to online content as potentially devaluing the role of librarians. Indeed, if we isolate scientists that figure increases to nearly 35% [figure 51, page 87]. These figures may point to the need for librarians to adapt more quickly, in the secure knowledge however that the functions of the library have an essential place in the minds of researchers.

What’s next…?

The survey results will be put to practical use as part of both Jisc and RLUK’s ongoing work. The findings will feed into Jisc’s work on scholarly communications as well as the Information and Library Infrastructure programme. For RLUK it will inform its work on redefining the research library model (which will help to shape RLUK’s next strategic plan from 2014) and its ongoing activities to help member libraries and the wider community adapt to the changes and patterns of service use portrayed in the report.

However, in the meantime, we urge you to read the report and its findings, and keep an eye on the Academic Survey events page where videos and a report from the survey workshop will be posted shortly. 

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Impact of Social Science blog, nor of the London School of Economics.  

About the Authors

Ben Showers is a programme manager with the Digital Infrastructure team at Jisc. Ben is part of the Information and Library Infrastructure programme and manages a number of areas of work, including library systems, user experience, mobile infrastructure and shared services.  Ben is also currently managing a project to develop a shared analytics service for UK academic libraries. Prior to this Ben worked with the Content team at Jisc, working on a number of digitisation and digital scholarly resource programmes exploring innovative new models of content creation and curation, such as crowdsourcing.  Ben holds an MA in Philosophy as well as an MA in Library and Information Science from University College, London.

Mike Mertens is Deputy Executive Director and Data Services Manager of RLUK. Previously, Mike held posts at the University of Birmingham, in Bibliographical Services and Learning and Research Support. Originally involved in NFF-funded work and RSLP cataloguing projects, during that time he also contributed to the creation of the Eurostudies section of Intute, and was commissioned by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to work on a Conflict Studies portal. Mike currently also serves in an advisory capacity for the following organisations and projects: Archives Hub Steering Committee (2006-); Copac Steering committee (2009-); LIBER Steering Committee for Digitisation and Resource Discovery (SCDRD) (2009-); LIBER Europeana Working Group (Chair) (2010-), and both the JISC/RLUK Discovery Advisory group (2011-13) and Discovery Technical Advisory group (2011-13). Mike also served as a member of the Digital Preservation Coalition Board (2006-2011).

The Eurozone crisis has brought the EU’s division into two types of membership into relief, with the euro member states moving closer towards deeper fiscal and economic union, and the others, such as the UK, who remain in the single market with no wish to join the Eurozone, at risk of becoming ‘second class’ states.

There are now two types of membership of the European Union.  The first is the Eurozone group of states, heading towards deeper fiscal and economic union – with tight constraints on national macro-economic and welfare policies and potentially new fiscal transfer instruments at some point.  The second is a group of countries who would like to remain in the single market and its associated policies but are unlikely to join the Euro. These two groups are not – to repeat the tired metaphor – two trains on the same track go at different “speeds”.  Instead, the two trains are on different tracks heading to different destinations.

Some policy-makers at the heart of British government like to argue that what we are seeing is simply a new version of “variable geometry”, with Britain “at the top table” on some issues, namely defence and the single market, yet opting-out of other issues, such as Schengen and the Euro.  However, this conception misses the powerful dynamic at the heart of the Eurozone in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, which is captured by the political commitment to “do whatever it takes to save the Euro”.  This commitment has so far produced the European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, the Euro-Plus Pact, 6-Pack, and now 2-Pack of instruments to monitor and shape basic domestic macro-economic policy choices.  Building a more tightly governed economic and monetary union is now the driving force for the Eurozone.  Regulation or reform of the single market is a secondary concern.

Credit: Kaptain Kobold (Creative Commons BY NC SA)

This challenges the constitutional design of the European Union.  Two parallel decision-making processes are starting to emerge.  The single market is still governed by the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, with the European Council as an arena for resolving disputes.  The Euro area, meanwhile, is currently governed by the Euro Group and the European Central Bank, and in time there will be pressure for a Eurozone “Finance Minister” and for a sub-set of MEPs from Eurozone states to monitor the ECB, the Banking Union, and approve the legislative instruments governing macro-economic constraints.

This growing separation inevitably presents risks for the ‘second class’ states only in the single market.  These states may be adversely affected by laws developed by the Euro Group.  There will also be coalitions between Eurozone states, to serve the exclusive interests of the macro-economic union, which will command majorities in the Commission, the Council and the Parliament.  Imagine a meeting of the Euro Group finance ministers on a Tuesday morning in Brussels, to then be joined by the British, Swedish and Czech ministers for an afternoon meeting of EcoFin to decide on legislation governing financial services in the single market.  Of course all the key decisions would already have been made before the “outs” arrive in the room.

One option is complete exit from the EU.  But leaving the EU would not secure sufficient autonomy for the UK or any of the non-Euro states.  The effects of the EU’s laws are pervasive.  Because of the size of the single market and its place as a hegemon in world trade, the EU’s laws are applied widely across the world.  The intensity of these external effects grow the closer a state is to the EU and would be particularly intense for a state who had just left the EU, as EU law would still be its default law in most cases.

This consequently leaves the UK and other states not planning to join the Euro caught between a rock and hard place: isolation inside the EU or isolation outside the EU.  The challenge for the UK-EU relations is to design a new architecture for Europe, which will allow the Eurozone and prospective Eurozone states to build deeper economic and political integration while enabling the non-Eurozone states to play a full part in the collective governance of the single market.

In building this new architecture we suggest three guiding principles: (1) safeguards for non-Eurozone members, (2) tests for the democratic authority of EU law, and (3) extension of the single market agenda.

The principle of safeguards concerns non-Eurozone states’ influence on EU decision-making as the effects of EU decisions are becoming more sharply asymmetric.  Each individual state in the EU only has limited impact on legislative outcomes, and the institutional architecture emerging from the Eurozone means that the states outside the Eurozone are increasingly disenfranchised.  Some EU decisions disproportionately affect one or two states.  Usually the interests of these states are taken into account when decisions are made.  But states outside the Euro are less likely to have their interests taken into account in decision-making as the process of deeper integration in the Eurozone unfolds.  As a result, institutional safeguards need protect the interests of all EU states in decision-making.  This protection should apply both to input into EU decisions and to respite from the consequences of these decisions.

With regard to the Eurozone, one manifestation of this input requirement might be that one place on the Executive Board of the ECB be reserved for a non-Euro area national.  When the ECB was established, it was not anticipated that it would become the central financial services regulator within Europe.  Its decisions will affect the interpretation and application of EU financial services law not merely within the Euro area but across the Union as a whole.  If non-Euro area states are to be affected by ECB decisions, it is only right that these states should have some voice on the ECB board, at least as non-voting members.

With regards to potential effects of an EU decision, another requirement might be that wherever a measure affects an industry which comprises either above a certain proportion of a state’s GDP or is concentrated disproportionately within that state, the matter can be referred to the European Council for mediation if that state believes a proposed measure is likely to have a significant negative effect on it.  It would, of course, be for the member state concerned to substantiate the case.

A second principle is that of democratic authority.  A new test of the democratic authority of EU law is required.  If the rationale for EU membership is primarily to join a single market it cannot be right that market rules are developed in a manner that erodes local democratic authority.  A test could be devised which safeguards the democratic authority of EU laws with two key components.

First, an EU legislative proposal should have relative democratic authority.  For example, it could only be adopted if two-thirds of national parliaments approved it, believing that the relative democratic benefits of the measure exceeded its costs. Second, EU legislation should be responsive to national parliaments.  There is a collective and a national element to this.  Collectively, this could entail that if one-third of national parliaments proposed an amendment or repeal of EU legislation, the Commission would be required to put a proposal to that effect.  Nationally, this could enable a national Parliament to override an EU measure that is seen to jeopardize vital national interests. In such cases, the matter could be referred to the European Council for mediation by a majority of other national parliaments where these provide evidence that either the process has not been applied in a bona fide way or the costs on other EU citizens is excessive.

It is worth noting that while a strengthening of national parliamentary scrutiny of EU laws may be sufficient to ensure democratic authority for member states outside the Eurozone, it is unlikely to be satisfactory in a more closely integrated Eurozone, where a stronger European dimension of democratic accountability – either through the European Parliament or a directly elected executive – would be needed to legitimize increased macro-economic integration.

The final principle is one of extending the single market agenda.  Much of the British debate has focused on the repatriation of powers to the UK, but a cornerstone of any new relationship between Britain and the EU should also be concerned with a positive message to strengthen and reform the single market.  As mentioned, the effects of the single market are more pervasive than previously thought.  This requires a more ambitious political engagement with these effects.

EU rules both apply across the world and the European multinationals which grew to service the single market have global rather than European horizons.  As EU rules are increasingly global rules and European multinationals see themselves as global rather than European businesses, it is impossible to disentangle the single market from the world trading system.  A central agenda for the single market must, therefore, be how to secure a more seamless relationship between the Single European Market and other world markets.  This is both necessary to secure the position of European industries, but it is also necessary as the EU’s market power grants it a unique position to combat the excesses of globalisation.

Within the European Union, the single market has a particularly intrusive reach.  Many existing rules in the single market are “one size fits all” and are mainly designed for large-scale global manufacturing.  These rules are not ideal for many small businesses who produce goods and services primarily for local markets, and who generate most new jobs in the modern economy.  Reform of the single market, with the aim of generating growth and more employment, should hence aim for more sectoral flexibility.

The final question is how such a reformed EU architecture can be achieved.  We argue that each of the reform proposals is highly feasible.  However, together these, and other possible reforms, are most likely to succeed if they are seen as genuine multilateral improvements rather than as side-payments to the United Kingdom.

In general, these proposed reforms can be implemented without Treaty changes.  Reforms concerning safeguarding the interests of non-Eurozone members can be put in place by either a Joint Declaration of the Council, Parliament and Commission or by a European Council Declaration.  For example, there could be a Joint Declaration that there would be no Council common position adopted at first reading until national parliaments have given the necessary assent or if a member state believes a matter should be referred to the European Council because key strategic interest is at stake.  Equally, reforms relating to the democratic authority of EU law could be set out in a European Council Declaration.  The latter, after all, recognised itself as having some authority with its Declaration on the Primacy of EU Law, attached to the Treaty of Lisbon.  And, the extension of the single market agenda could all be realised within existing competencies.

However, while these reforms are achievable, there remains a problem of timing.  The current preference of the British Government is for multilateral reforms, and indeed this has been supported by the recent report of the House of Common Foreign Affairs Committee on the Future of the European Union: UK Policy.  The question, though, is how long this policy will be pursued.  The Prime Minister made it clear that he would resort to bilateral renegotiation if there was little prospect of multilateral negotiations succeeding.  Many of his MPs want a decision well before the next general election.  This will be before the Government’s Review of the Balance of Competences has been completed (at the end of 2014).  Also, the European Union is more likely to only commence a more substantial overhaul of its institutions after the European Parliament elections in the summer of 2014 and the investiture of a new Commission at the start of 2015.  There is a strong multilateral case for patience, but if domestic pressures in the UK are too great, the reforms we have suggested could be adopted earlier without pre-empting the Treaty negotiations post 2014.

This article originally appeared on LSE’s EUROPP blog.

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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. 

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About the authors 

Damian Chalmers – European Institute and Department of Law, LSE.
Damian Chalmers is Professor of European Union Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is also a Jean Monnet Chair and editor of theEuropean Law Review and EU Jurist. He has held visiting posts at the College of Europe, Instituto de Empresa and the National University of Singapore.  His most recent book (with Gareth Davies, and Giorgio Monti) is, European Union Law: cases and materials (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Simon Hix – LSE Government
Simon Hix is Professor of European and Comparative Politics and Head of the LSE Department of Government.  He is co-editor of the journal European Union Politics. He has held visiting appointments at UC Berkeley, Stanford, UC San Diego, Sciences-Po Paris, and the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.  He regular gives evidence to the committees in the European Parliament and the European affairs committees in the House of Lords and House of Commons. He has written several books on the EU and comparative politics, including most recently “What’s Wrong With the EU and How to Fix It” (Polity, 2008). Simon is also a Fellow of the British Academy.

Sara Hobolt – LSE European Institute
Sara Hobolt is Sutherland Chair in European Institutions at the LSE European Institute. Previously, she has held posts at the University of Oxford and the University of Michigan. She holds an honorary professorship in political science at the University of Southern Denmark and she is associate member of Nuffield College, Oxford. She has published extensively on European Union politics, elections and referendums. Her book Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration (Oxford University Press, 2009) was awarded the Best Book prize by the European Union Studies Association in 2010. She is Vice Chair of the European Election Studies (EES), an EU-wide project studying voters, parties, candidates and the media in European Parliamentary elections.