Strong militaries, a history of coups, and global competition are all helping to drive coups across Africa writes Nina Wilén.
Over the past few years, observers of African politics have grown used to images of badly lit TV studios, filled with officers in camouflage uniforms declaring an imminent take-over of the state and the suspension of the constitution.
Since 2020, the African continent has seen a wave of military coups with nine successful coups and seven additional attempted coups. Three reasons for the current upsurge of coups stand out: the long histories of coups in the states in question; the military’s central standing in the states; and the current global power competition. In addition to these, coup leaders have watched and learnt from each other, and at times even collaborated. These factors have produced a climate that is conducive to coup plotters and have increased their chances of being successful.
The nine successful coups in less than four years is an impressive figure even for Africa, which has seen a disproportionately high number of coup attempts with 220 out of the 492 coup attempts across the world since 1950 taking place on the continent.
One reason for the new coup wave is exactly that: the long history of coups creating a self-fulfilling precedent. The more coups a state has experienced, the more likely it is to see more. Burkina Faso, which saw two coups in 2022 alone, had already experienced seven coups before that. It holds the record for the highest number of successful coups in Africa. Coup leaders are not safe from attempts by their military colleagues to seize power. On the contrary, the risk of counter-coups or “coups within coups” is high. At the same time, leaders who have come to power through extraconstitutional means – like coups – are more likely to try and expand their power further which in turn may trigger a new coup. A vicious circle of coups generating more coups is thus part of the reason for the current coup wave.
A second reason is the military institution’s central position in the states which have experienced coups. This is partly a legacy from the colonial period when the colonial powers built relatively strong security forces to oppress local resistance against colonialism, and partly a result of subsequent African elites’ desire to stay in power. In many states, military leaders got political positions in exchange for regime loyalty, while promotions and increased defence budgets became coup-proofing strategies – which in some cases backfired by creating a powerful army that is then more capable of seizing and maintaining power. In the past decade, states fighting violent extremist organisations have also increased the military’s central role in government. Due to the expansion of violent jihadist organisations in the region, the Sahel has received multifaceted security assistance from international actors, making the security forces important players in both security and political matters.
Finally, potential plotters are encouraged by the prospect of impunity as a consequence of the current global power competition. In a period of intense rivalry between global powers, values and norms are the first victims of states’ renewed focus on national security interests. Hence, coup leaders, who by definition defy legality and democratic norms, have a broader choice of external partners that are willing to forego principles in return for strategic alliances. The Sahel region, which has seen six of the nine coups over the past four years is an example of this. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have all shifted security partners from France and the US to Russia after their respective coups.
The coup playbook
The Sahelian coup leaders adopted several similar approaches following their respective coups. First, they suspended their security cooperation with the long-term partner France and strongly promoted a narrative about reclaiming sovereignty. Second, both Niger and Mali portrayed the regional organisation ECOWAS as an enemy to their states, following the latter’s adoption of sanctions. In January 2024, all three states jointly withdrew from the organisation. Third, they all rapidly turned to Russia after the expulsion of France and welcomed Russian troops as part of their counter-terrorism efforts. These similar moves suggest that they did not only watch and learn from each other but have also directly collaborated. These states have subsequently created a new defence alliance the Alliance des États Sahelian.
The recent coup wave in Africa has reinforced the democratic decline the region witnessed over the past few years, which was further entrenched during the Covid-19 pandemic. Coup leaders on the continent seem unlikely to hand over power to democratically elected leaders any time soon. Strategies to stay in power include expanded transition periods, imposed referendums and claims of the need for stability before democracy. The increasingly authoritarian trend is accompanied by an increase in armed conflicts on the continent.
Africa is experiencing a (re)turn to authoritarian rule and armed conflict in the midst of global power competition, mirroring similar tendencies globally.
Photo credit: Prachatai used with permission CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
