Despite opposing political views, Zambia and Rhodesia were indelibly economically linked in their formative years, write Teverayi Muguti and Sandra Swart.

Despite vast the political differences between Ian Smith’s white-minority ruled Rhodesia and Kenneth Kaunda’s black-majority ruled Zambia, the two states’ economies were inextricably interlinked between 1963 and 1973.

Weakened by international isolation and an internal war, Southern Rhodesia used its position as a producer of agricultural and manufactured goods and a transport link to regional and international markets to force Zambia into an uneasy alliance.

There has been a lot of focus on Rhodesia’s relations with South Africa, the United Nations and Portugal. But Rhodesia’s relations with Zambia have often been neglected. Yet they were crucial for Rhodesia’s survival in the post-Federation decade.

Dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

The dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963 left only Rhodesia under white minority rule. The other two states in the federation, Zambia and Malawi, became independent in 1964 and were ruled by their black majorities.

Post-independence, the Zambian government supported black political parties in Rhodesia including the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) who were fighting for Zimbabwean independence and freedom from white rule.

Despite the dissolution of the Federation, there were several joint institutions that still needed to be administered through cooperation between Zambia and Rhodesia. These institutions included the Amalgamated Rhodesia Railways, the Central African Airways Corporation and the Central African Power Corporation which administered Kariba Hydro Power Station, located on the two states’ shared border. Their mutual business interests compelled harmonious shared administration, despite antagonistic political relations between the two states.

Politics and trade

In 1963, Southern Rhodesia started to allow the top leaders of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) from Zambia into Southern Rhodesia in anticipation of improved trade relations between the two states. The leaders included UNIP President Kenneth Kaunda, Simon Kapwepwe, and Harry Nkumbula. Previously, they had been banned from entering Southern Rhodesia because of their opposition to the white administration in then-Northern Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesia’s Minister of Trade, Industry and Development, C. W. Rudland, negotiated with the Zambian government over a formal trade agreement in the latter half of 1963. Smith intended to convince Kaunda to maintain the Tariff arrangements from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which exempted most Rhodesian goods from duty when entering the Zambian market. The trade negotiations failed, and Zambia suspended the Federal Protective Tariffs on 27 June 1964, arguing that the arrangement was not of any benefit to its economy.  In 1965, Southern Rhodesia responded by suspending duty-free importation of Zambian commodities into its territory.

Apart from trade engagements, Southern Rhodesia used conventional diplomacy to forge cooperation with Zambia. Through its External Affairs Undersecretary J.F. Bowles, Southern Rhodesia sought establishment of consular services and security services’ cooperation with Zambia, to create a favourable environment for cooperative economic relations between the two states. However, Zambia declined these proposals, arguing that the diplomatic arrangements would only be feasible once Smith had allowed majority rule by ZANU and ZAPU in Southern Rhodesia.

Nevertheless, while professing this publicly, Zambia continued to trade extensively with Southern Rhodesia. Behind the public mask of politics, it was business as usual.

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence

On 11 November 1965, Smith’s cabinet declared the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Rhodesia (previously Southern Rhodesia) now regarded itself as an independent sovereign state, free of the influence of Briain. The UK declared sanctions five days later, and the United Nations (UN) imposed selective sanctions in December 1966, with a total ban of all exports and imports from and to Rhodesia.

Isolated and facing an escalating internal war by liberation forces, Rhodesia used its connections with Zambia to continue to trade. Zambia feared that if it implemented sanctions, Rhodesia would disrupt the power supply from the shared Kariba hydroelectric power station. Kaunda also feared transport links to Mozambique and South African ports would be cut off, and the potential deportation of Zambian workers from Rhodesia.

Rhodesia leveraged this trifecta of Zambian insecurities, to ensure continued economic interactions between the two states despite international sanctions and their opposing political beliefs.

The 1973 Border Closure

Despite the importance of the economic relationship, the political differences between the two states remained. Rhodesia used border patrols and planted mines along its border with Zambia to deal with African liberation movements including the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). It also used complex intelligence and spy networks to keep track of Zambia’s military installations and economic activities. This was to counteract hostile military and economic plans against the former.

The liberation struggle intensified in December 1972 within Rhodesia. At the same time, Kaunda had established a one-party state in Zambia, with state repression of the banned opposition. Kaunda defended this move, which was motivated by internal politics, on the grounds that Zambia was at war with foreign aggressors. This led to his professing a more radical foreign policy against Rhodesia. Rhodesia responded by launching a blockade of the border with Zambia in 1973

On 7 January 1973, Smith announced on television that the Victoria Falls, Chirundu and Kariba border posts were to be closed until assurances were made by Zambia that it would stop supporting ZIPRA and ZANLA. Smith also increased military operations along the border. At that time, a significant proportion of Zambia’s transport links still passed through Rhodesia, and so bemoaned the border blockade as a declaration of economic warfare. However, a Rhodesia government spokesperson also highlighted that despite the ‘border closure’, Zambia was nevertheless still allowed to transport its copper to ports in South Africa and Mozambique through Southern Rhodesia. The border was only ‘re-opened’ in 1980 when Zimbabwe became independent.

While independent Zambia sought to oppose its neighbour politically, it could not do so without suffering a substantial loss of economic and transport links it needed for survival. Southern Rhodesia took advantage of this situation to implement various economic and diplomatic measures to maintain its lucrative market of agricultural and manufactured goods in Zambia. This was despite Zambia harbouring both ZIPRA and ZANLA forces, which launched their liberation struggle from Zambian military bases.

The two countries engaged in cautiously cooperative economic and business relations until the outright border blockade in January 1973, as the Zimbabwean liberation struggle intensified.

Photo credit: Wikicommons used with permission CC BY-SA 4.0