Following the recent M23 resurgence in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ponsiano Bimeny asks whether the United Nations Stabilisation Mission has outlived its relevance and what it means for the country and its neighbours.

A decade ago, it looked like M23 had been defeated, overpowered by a combination of UN and government troops. Now, at the start of 2025, the M23, a militia group in eastern DRC has re-emerged and overwhelmed the coalition forces to capture Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu provinces.

In response, the Congolese government and the International Community have blamed Rwanda for the recent turmoil. A recent Security Council resolution called on Kigali to cease support of M23 and immediately withdraw its troops from the DRC without preconditions.

Not for the first time, the Council overlooked the key factors underpinning the crisis in eastern DRC and instead focused on natural resources as the root cause and driver of the crisis.  The idea is that Rwanda is funding M23 to plunder and pillage Congo’s natural resources and that by stopping Rwanda you stop the crisis is as remarkable as it is untrue.

M23 and other combatants

The M23, or March 23 Movement, is a group of ethnic Tutsis of Congolese nationality who claim they need to take up arms to protect themselves against abuses by the Congolese state and militant Hutu groups. The latter include the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda which was one of the main actors in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. M23 accuse Kinshasa of not honouring previous deals to end violence against the Tutsis that were signed between the government and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) – A Tutsi rebel group created in 2006.

Their name derives from the peace agreement of 23 March 2009. A treaty that would have seen the release of prisoners, the transformation of the CNDP into a political party, the reintegration of refugees, and the integration of CNDP members into government institutions and the Congolese army. 

Upon its creation in 2012, the M23 rapidly gained territory, including Goma, before it suffered numerous defeats at the hands of coalition forces in 2013 and its fighters expelled to Rwanda and Uganda. An agreement was later reached to repatriate and integrate M23 fighters into the army but was never implemented.

Crucially, there are more than 100 active armed groups in eastern DRC. The myriad actors and interests involved defies easy analysis of the conflict. Uganda and Rwanda have historically oscillated between collaboration and competition in the region. Both countries were initially on the same side in the First and Second Congo Wars, but then began to diverge and support separate rebel groups as they sought to carve out their own sphere of influence.

The international community’s understanding of the crisis has focused on the nexus of natural mineral exploitation and conflict, accusing Uganda and Rwanda of manipulating the conflict to plunder DRC’s mineral resources. Even if these claims were accurate, this is a simplistic representation of Congo’s problems with the resource curse just one of an interconnected yet confusing array of causes and drivers.

A less well-understood feature of the current DRC’s crisis a legacy from the Second Congo War that began in August 1998. That conflict drew in states from across Africa, many of whom are still in the country creating proxy forces and interests that may not align with the Congolese people. This has been exacerbated by the consistent exclusion of the Congolese population both politically and economically from peace processes and agreements.

Twenty years after the end of the Second Congo War Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi now face armed rebellions from groups based in Eastern DRC. In November 2021, the Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan rebel coalition whose largest faction has sworn allegiance to the Islamic State, conducted a series of bombings in the capital, Kampala, killing four people and wounding many others.

Following the Kampala bombings and an incident in Burundi, the DRC president, Felix Tshisekedi, allowed Ugandan and Burundian soldiers back into the country to fight the rebel groups. Tshiekedi ignored the risk this could ignite historical antagonism between neighbours further destabilising his country. The move has coincided with M23 re-emergence and a heightened instability in the country.

What has been the response to M23 re-emergence?

Upon assuming the chair of the East African Community (EAC) the Kenyan government pushed for the deployment of EAC forces into eastern DRC. However, the history of recycling officers among Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC and their use of proxies has complicated this move due to serious lack of trust between these countries.

Some of M23’s top commanders once served in the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF leadership – including President Paul Kagame – once served in Uganda’s military and were part of the rebellion that brought Yoweri Museveni to power in 1986. They then occupied top positions in Rwanda’s military and government after seizing power there with Uganda’s support in 1994. When both countries invaded the DRC in 1996 to remove Mobutu Sese Seko and install Laurent Kabila (First Congo War), a similar pattern transpired with James Kabarebe becoming Chief of Staff of the DRC’s military. However, when Kabila fell out with Uganda and Rwanda, the two countries sponsored another rebellion in the DRC in 1998 (Second Congo War).

EAC troops were removed from the DRC after just 11 months of action as President Tshisekedi accused the EAC of being lenient to Rwanda, opting for international intervention instead. Tshisekedi subsequently asked the UN mission to leave the country citing its failure to resolve the conflict, although it now looks likely it will remain in DRC.

Emerging from this crisis, is a promising partnership between EAC and Southern African Development Community (SADC), both of which count DRC among their members. Trust issues between these member states means the partnership remains fragile.

Given that there are historical, sociopolitical, and economic aspects to the DRC crisis, it is time for interventions in the region to scale back their obsession with the resource-conflict nexus and recognise the historical and sociopolitical aspects of this conflict and the importance of Congolese people in resolving the conflict.

This will require interventions to adopt an inclusive and even-handed political process that focuses on the historical, political, and socioeconomic issues within the DRC. To resolve the conflict, these must consider the legitimate grievances of each social group in the DRC, including M23, and the hundreds of other rebel groups in the region. Secondly, an external political process is required that tackles the unique security and political challenges of each member state within the EAC. This needs to be done in the context of regional heads of state and the political and security context that underpins the region rather than solely simplistic conflict-resource analysis.

Photo credit: Wikicommons used with permission CC BY-SA 2.0