An escalation in tensions and clashes between the government and opposition has raised the spectre of renewed national conflict, while external players from the across the region muddy the waters, writes Flora McCrone.

South Sudan is closer to the brink of an all-out civil war than at any time since 2018.

The country, which only became independent in 2011, last faced internal conflict in 2016. Then, a year-old peace agreement ruptured, and the capital, Juba, became the epicentre for renewed fighting between the government SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) forces and the rebel SPLM-IO (SPLM-In Opposition). Violence spread throughout the country and caused mass displacement and thousands of fatalities. The 2018 peace agreement created a power-sharing arrangement between the two sides, which demilitarised the capital and froze the conflict, creating a tenuous détente which has held for seven years.

Through 2024, several incidents in Juba have indicated that the close-knit ruling SPLM party and its military forces – rebranded as the South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) – were fracturing. President Salva Kiir spent the year decapitating various ministries and security agencies. Most notably, he sacked the head of the intelligence agency, long-term Kiir-loyalist Akol Koor, amid swirling rumours of a coup. These political machinations took place against a backdrop of economic crisis in the country. South Sudan’s oil export pipeline, which runs through its northern neighbour Sudan, was damaged during the conflict in the north. This cut off South Sudan’s primary source of revenue. The government was unable to pay the salaries of its SSPDF soldiers and civil servants or provide patronage payments to its political inner circle for most of the year.

In February and early March of 2025, Kiir changed track and arrested several SPLA-IO leaders based in Juba. Then in a dramatic shift, a chain of events dragged attention away from Juba to Nasir, near South Sudan’s border with Ethiopia. On 4 March, ethnic Nuer militias known as the White Army, linked to the SPLM-IO, overran an SSPDF base in Nasir. Though reports are conflicting, it appears that during the siege, a high-ranking SSPDF general was shot and injured. The UN sent a helicopter three days in a row to try and rescue him and his remaining men. On the third day, the helicopter landed but was attacked by the militias, who killed the general, many of his soldiers and several UN personnel.

Since the events in Nasir, there have been reports of recruitment drives by the SPLA-IO linked White Army militias, as well as bombings by government forces in civilian areas.

To add to the insecurity, there are reports that Sudan’s two-year civil war is spilling across the border. Rival factions of the military regime – the Rapid Response Force and Sudanese Armed Forces are both suspected of sending arms across the border to SPLM-IO-linked militias, and the SSPDF. What is at stake is oil-rich territories on the Sudan-South Sudan border.

The South Sudanese government has called in foreign help. Ugandan military forces (UPDF) were deployed in large numbers to Juba and other parts of the county to ‘protect key installations’ on behalf of the government in mid-March. UPDF chief and son of the Ugandan president, Muhoozi Museveni, has made inflammatory comments about targeting civilians from the Nuer community. 

The UPDF is alleged to have funnelled weapons up to the SSPDF – reportedly including illegal chemical weapons. While such reports are difficult to verify, it is apparent that all sides are preparing for conflict and unpredictable and self-interested regional players are being drawn into an already convoluted domestic theatre.

In July 2016 there were two clearly defined ‘sides’ in the battle for Juba, but in the current circumstances, it is harder to predict where the fault lines will fall. On 24 March, SSPDF forces attacked an SPLA-IO base just a few kilometres from Juba. In the week-long battle, command and control broke down which resulted in the ransacking, looting and murder of civilians by the presidential guard. Through late March and early April, further sporadic clashes between the SSPDF and SPLM-IO forces or White Army in Ulang in the country’s north-east have continued.

The recent fragmentation and ambiguity of both the government and opposition sides, matched with the injection of new weapons, raises critical questions about where the loyalty of those holding the weapons lies.

The UN peacekeeping mission has issued warnings of a relapse into civil war. Regional diplomatic envoys have flown in to persuade the two sides to back down. Foreign embassies have begun withdrawing their personnel from Juba. Meanwhile, South Sudanese hold their breath expecting a return to war for the third time in the country’s short history.

Photo credit: Enough Project used with permission CC BY-NC-ND 2.0