US tariffs on African countries may disrupt key exports, but they also present an opportunity to redirecting trade within the continent. This external shock can be a catalyst to accelerate the African Continental Free Trade Area, writes Thierry Kangoye.
When US President Donald Trump vowed to rebalance global trade through sweeping tariffs, Africa wasn’t expected to feature prominently. But Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Botswana, Angola, South Africa, Tunisia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Namibia have been unexpectedly caught in the crossfire. The tariffs, in some cases as high as 50 per cent, target labour-intensive and resource-based exports like apparel, cocoa, and oil.
With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in the early stages of implementation, the tariff shock exposes both a vulnerability and an opportunity. Rather than scrambling to recover US market access, Africa should turn inward and fast-track continental trade integration.
The tariffs bite deep
For many African countries, US trade preferences have shaped their export strategies. The tariffs now threaten to undermine those plans.
| Top African country hit * | Reciprocal tariff | Share of exports to the US in total exports (%) | Top goods exported to the US*** | Share of the top goods exports to the US in total exports to the US | Share of Africa’s imports of the top good from outside the continent in Africa’s total imports (%) |
| Lesotho** | 50% | 18,87% | Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (knitted or crocheted). | 77% | 71% |
| Madagascar | 47% | 15,43% | Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (not knitted or crocheted). | 32% | 64% |
| Mauritius | 40% | 10,12% | Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (not knitted or crocheted). | 15% | 64% |
| Botswana** | 38% | 2,03% | Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad. | 99% | 37% |
| Angola** | 32% | 1,21% | Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral. | 93% | 70% |
| South Africa | 31% | 7,45% | Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad. | 37% | 37% |
| Tunisia** | 28% | 0,01% | Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof. | 88% | 56% |
| Cote d’Ivoire | 21% | 4,48% | Cocoa and cocoa preparations. | 74% | 77% |
| Namibia | 21% | 2,65% | Ores, slag and ash. | 61% | 50% |
Source: Author, adapted from the International Trade Centre Data. Data are from 2024 unless otherwise indicated. *Trade data on Algeria (30 per cent reciprocal tariff) and Libya (31 per cent reciprocal tariff) are unavailable. ** 2023 data. *** Using the International Trade Centre Product Codes.
Lesotho sends nearly 19 per cent of its total exports to the US. Now 77 per cent of its knitted apparel will be hit with a 50 per cent tariff. Madagascar and Mauritius face similar risks with apparel. Botswana and South Africa are affected in diamonds and precious metals, Angola in oil, Côte d’Ivoire in cocoa, and Tunisia in auto parts. These are not marginal sectors, they are core to their respective countries’ industrial policy and employment. Apparel, cocoa products, oil, and auto parts are all sectors where intra-African supply is possible but underdeveloped.
The AfCFTA moment
The tariff disruption may be the political nudge AfCFTA needs. With 47 ratifications (of 54 signatory countries) and a framework to eliminate 90 per cent of intra-African tariffs, the agreement offers a pathway for trade redirection. Africa can reorient demand internally rather than trying to replace US market share abroad. Apparel from Lesotho, Madagascar, and Mauritius can supply Africa’s fashion retailers. Botswana and South Africa’s diamonds can fuel regional manufacturing or luxury markets. Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa and Angola’s oil can serve growing domestic and industrial demand.
These opportunities are not theoretical. Africa currently imports over 70 per cent of its apparel, 64–77 per cent of its cocoa-based products, and over half its automotive and processed mineral needs from outside the continent. If bottlenecks are addressed, AfCFTA could help replace these external imports with trade between African countries, as those goods can be made available on the continent.
Despite its promise, AfCFTA remains underutilised. The Guided Trade Initiative (an early pilot scheme of the AfCFTA) has launched, but full tariff schedules, rules of origin coverage, and services liberalisation are incomplete. Customs systems are not harmonised, and many businesses remain unaware or unprepared to trade under AfCFTA terms.
Governments and businesses affected by market loss now have clear incentives to press for faster AfCFTA implementation. Redirecting stranded exports to regional markets could be the most viable short-term and sustainable long-term option.
Still, obstacles remain. Countries like Lesotho or Madagascar may have limited capacity to retool their logistics for continental trade due to their landlocked or island geography, weak infrastructure, and dependence on a narrow export base. Financing gaps, non-tariff barriers, fragmented regional regulations, and weak infrastructure all slow progress. Overcoming these will require stronger political coordination, targeted investment, and support from regional development finance institutions and continental policy bodies. But the motivation is now stronger than ever. A long-term development strategy has become an urgent economic necessity.
Trump’s tariffs were a shock. But they need not be a setback. For Africa, they could serve as a strategic pivot point. By redirecting trade internally and accelerating the AfCFTA, African countries can reduce their dependence on unstable preferences, build regional value chains, and create more resilient economies. This is a chance to turn trade pain into continental purpose. The question is whether Africa will seize the moment.
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