Military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have upended democratic governance, enabling China to deepen economic and strategic partnerships with these regimes as Western influence wanes. This pragmatic engagement risks fuelling anti-China sentiment, write Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah and Christian Kaunert.
Since 2020, West Africa has seen a resurgence of military coups, reversing decades of progress toward democratic governance. Mali experienced two coups in 2020 and 2021. Burkina Faso had two in 2022. Niger’s democratically elected government was overthrown in 2023. These military takeovers have been justified by the juntas as necessary measures to address insecurity, corruption, and poor governance. However, they have also raised concerns about the future of democracy and stability in the region. The international community, including regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union, have condemned these coups, imposed sanctions and suspended the affected countries from their organisations. Yet, as Western nations and traditional partners distance themselves, China has adopted a more pragmatic approach, focusing on maintaining its economic and strategic interests.
China’s engagement with Africa has long been characterised by a policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, a principle that allows it to maintain relationships with governments regardless of their political systems. This approach has proven advantageous in West Africa’s current climate. The EU has condemned the coups and temporarily suspended its Common Security and Defence Policy missions, such as EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali. It has also imposed sanctions and suspended development aid and security cooperation with Niger, and refusing to recognise the junta. Meanwhile, China has continued to engage with these governments, offering an alternative source of political and economic partnership. Mali has signed several agreements with Chinese companies, signalling the start of a new “strategic partnership” between the two nations. This was announced during the 9th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, with Chinese President Xi Jinping meeting Malian President Assimi Goïta on 2 September 2024.
Similarly, in Burkina Faso, where anti-French sentiment has grown alongside the rise of military rule, China has stepped in to fill the void left by France. The two countries have signed a £38.4 million concessional loan agreement. The Export-Import Bank of China will finance the construction of the Donsin solar power plant and its electricity storage system. Also Chinese businessman Li Yubao, head of China Yunhong International Holdings Group, has become a key player since the coup. He has secured multiple gold, copper, and nickel exploration permits in the Hauts-Bassins, Plateau-Central, and Centre-Est regions during 2023. His close ties to the junta have facilitated ongoing and future mining investments, with public commitments to invest up to £1.3 billion and create 5,000 jobs.
In Niger, China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) has completed the 1,980-kilometer Niger–Benin Oil Pipeline, a £5 billion project allowing Niger to export up to 90,000 barrels of oil a day. In April 2024, CNPC provided Niger with a £300 million advance payment for future oil shipments. This helped the government manage its debt and fund security and social programs
Available data underscores the resilience of Africa-China relations amid political upheaval. China’s strategic interests in West Africa are also evident in its security engagements. In Mali, China has provided military equipment to the Malian army. China also contributed troops to the now defunct United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission. This dual approach—combining economic investment with security cooperation—has allowed China to position itself as a reliable partner, even in times of political uncertainty.
Pros and cons
The shift from democracies to military regimes in West Africa has created both challenges and opportunities for China. On the one hand, China’s willingness to engage with military governments has strengthened its influence in the region, particularly as traditional partners like France and the US have scaled back their presence. On the other hand, this approach risks alienating African citizens who view China as complicit in supporting authoritarian regimes.
The long-term sustainability of China’s strategy is questionable. Military regimes often lack the stability and legitimacy needed to ensure the success of large-scale infrastructure projects, which are central to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, the growing anti-China sentiment in West and Central African countries, fuelled by concerns over debt traps and labour practices, could undermine China’s efforts to maintain its influence.
Unlike Western nations, which often tie their aid and investment to governance reforms, China offers a no-strings-attached approach that appeals to military regimes seeking legitimacy and financial support. However, this strategy is not without risks. By aligning itself with unstable governments, China risks becoming entangled in regional conflicts and governance failures that could jeopardise its investments.
While much of the discourse around Africa-China relations focuses on China’s actions, it is important to recognise the agency of African nations in shaping these ties. Military regimes in Africa have actively sought partnerships with China to reduce their dependence on traditional Western allies. Niger’s junta has turned to China for support in mining its uranium resources, while Mali has sought Chinese investment to bolster its economy.
African governments must carefully negotiate their relationships with China to avoid falling into debt traps or becoming overly dependent on a single partner. The case of Zambia, which has struggled with unsustainable debt from Chinese loans, serves as a cautionary tale for West African nations.
The ability of military regimes to stabilise their countries and deliver on their promises will be critical. If these governments fail to address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and insecurity, their partnerships with China are likely to falter. China’s approach to debt management and investment sustainability will play a key role. If China continues to prioritise short-term gains over long-term stability, it risks undermining its own interests in the region. A more sustainable approach could strengthen its position as a reliable partner for African nations.
As China continues to navigate the complexities of engaging with military regimes, it must balance its economic and strategic interests with the need to foster sustainable and mutually beneficial partnerships. For West African nations, the challenge lies in leveraging their relationships with China to achieve development goals without compromising their sovereignty or falling into cycles of debt and dependency.
The future of Africa-China relations in the context of political instability will depend on the ability of both sides to prioritise long-term stability and shared prosperity over short-term gains. The rise of military takeovers in West Africa has undoubtedly reshaped West Africa-China relations, highlighting China’s pragmatic approach to diplomacy and its ability to adapt to changing political landscapes. As the sands of Africa’s political landscape continue to shift, the world will be watching to see how these dynamics unfold and what they mean for the future of diplomacy, development, and global power in the 21st century.
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