The government has set itself 12 goals as it prepares to begin Brexit negotiations – ranging from leaving the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to controlling migration and ensuring Scotland stays in the Union. Some are readily achievable, others nigh-on impossible, says Richard Rose. He assesses the likelihood of achieving each goal.
The government’s new White Paper on Brexit is optimistically described as meant to achieve a new partnership with the European Union. But before that can happen, the terms of divorce must be negotiated, and that is never easy.
The first goal of the White Paper is to introduce certainty and clarity, subject to the qualification ‘wherever we can’. Insofar as a policy is negotiable, the outcome can hardly be certain at the start of negotiations. Limited clarity and certainty allows both hard Brexiteers and the salvage squad of the remain campaign to project their own hopes onto the government’s plans for Brexit.
To achieve an agreement, the UK government must be prepared to accept compromises. When a new policy is proposed, a member state in good standing can expect to get about two-thirds of what it wants. EU negotiators have made clear that since the UK has chosen to leave the EU it will be given less than any member state gets.
The likelihood of achieving the government’s goals varies from goal to goal. Each can be classified on a simple scale ranging from 0 (impossible); 1 or 2 (achievable with difficulty or only partially); 3, (amenable to bargaining and compromise); and 4 (readily achievable). They rank as follows:
4 Cooperating in the fight against terrorism. When a terrorist threat erupts, security services are always willing to work together to prevent or apprehend terrorists.
4 Securing rights for UK nationals now resident in Europe and EU nationals now resident in the UK. This is a win-win policy for both the UK and the EU since it will confirm the status quo.
4 Protect and enhance existing workers’ rights. Repatriating EU laws to Britain will leave existing standards in place. Enhancing rights will be disputed in the British Parliament; foreign voices will hardly matter.
4 End the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union over the UK. This can be achieved by unilateral British action, but at a price. It jeopardises agreement on trade and finance because the EU wants its Court to adjudicate any disputes arising from an agreement.
3 Controlling the number of European nationals coming to the UK. A law or a ministerial statement can set a numerical limit on EU migration but the Home Office has a long record of failing to meet numerical limits. Brexit will free the Mayor of Calais to put refugees there on a train to Britain without any obligation to accept their return from a non-EU state.
2 Protecting historic ties and the common travel area with the Republic of Ireland. Given the negative impact on security of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, the EU may make concessions to the Republic that the UK could not achieve on its own. The scope for maintaining free trade between England and Ireland is much more limited once the UK becomes a non-member state. Britons flying from London to Dublin or vice versa may have to join long passport queues with foreigners before be crossing the sea border between Ireland and Britain.
2 Securing new trade agreements with non-EU countries. Leaving the EU will give the UK the freedom to negotiate agreements with other countries. President Trump shows that major countries can have national leaders that are less keen on trading with the UK than the UK is on trading with them and negotiating details of a trade agreement cannot be done in a flying trip or a phone call.
2 Seeking collaboration with European partners in science and technology. Collaboration could be maintained by agreement with the EU – subject to the British government making a cash contribution to the EU research fund and leaving in EU hands the power to decide which British proposals are funded and which are not. People are required to do research and many research workers in Britain are from EU countries. Because of Brexit, some are preparing to return to the continent and immigration controls will make it more difficult to hire replacements.
1 Securing the freest trade possible between the UK and Europe. Not a lot is possible without the British government making a U-turn, because the EU’s requirements for participating in a single European market are unacceptable to the British government’s current position. The UK government’s hopes of “cherry-picking” existing rights of the City of London are also unacceptable to EU leaders.
1 or 0 Strengthening the Union. The Scottish government’s stated goal is to remain an economic and political partner with the EU. Calling and winning another independence referendum is its hoped for means of achieving Scotxit, that is, leaving the Union. If Scottish voters rejected independence, this would preserve the UK as a four-nation Union; whether it would strengthen it is a moot point.
1 or 0 Delivering a smooth, orderly exit with agreement within two years plus a limited transitional period for implementing what Brexit requires. The White Paper recognises the need for an additional period of time to implement a new partnership and avoid a cliff-edge leap from membership to non-membership. To achieve any agreement within a tight deadline will require substantial compromises. Since the impact of Brexit is much greater on the UK than on the 27 states that will remain in the EU after Britain leaves, this increases the risk that the British government will reject the only transition deal on offer as a bad deal and head for the cliff-edge with no deal.
The outcome of negotiations cannot be assigned a numerical mark; it will be graded politically. The Prime Minister can hail whatever is achieved as a great success, whether it is a full loaf, a panini, a few slices of bread or just a biscuit. By contrast, many Conservative MPs will view the results as a curate’s egg, good in some parts and bad in others. They will want the red meat alternative of exiting without any deal.
The White Paper leaves this possibility on the menu. In a European political context, EU negotiators see no settlement as preferable to making concessions that would call into question the authority of the EU in relation to its 450 million citizens and 27 member states.
This post represents the views of the author and not those of the Brexit blog, nor the LSE. It first appeared at The UK in a Changing Europe.
Richard Rose is Professor of Politics at the University of Strathclyde, author of Representing Europeans: a Pragmatic Approach and a commissioning fund awardee of The UK in a Changing Europe.
Also by Richard Rose:
Delaying the countdown to Brexit: a cost-benefit analysis
I think this is an interesting piece. My only comments would be:
Securing rights for UK nationals now resident in Europe and EU nationals now resident in the UK:
I would accept that deportations are very unlikely but I would not accept this will be easy. Will EU nationals continue to be eligible for benefits, will they continue to receive free health care and will they continue to have the right to have family members join them? All three of these issues were raised by the Leave campaign as being things that needed to change.
Protect and enhance existing workers’ rights:
As someone who runs a business in the UK and has also run a business in the USA I can say that a free trade agreement between the UK and USA would necessitate labour and environmental standards converging. It seems much more likely that it would be the UK adopting the USA standards.
This is cloud cuckoo land scoring, as if flint would hit every ball of Sobers for 4 or 6.
There are no good things to come out of this.
“Brexit will free the Mayor of Calais to put refugees there on a train to Britain without any obligation to accept their return from a non-EU state.”
Surely the UK would then be equally free to put them on a train straight back again, though? Or indeed prohibit such a train from entering the tunnel, in the same way we don’t let any other government load up a UK-bound plane with all their unwanted populace in the belief we couldn’t return them?
The 2 for future free trade also seems unduly pessimistic – though of course since the score as an EU member was fixed at 0, that’s still a huge improvement.
The Scottish and free trade angles seem misguided: the rules for “participating in a single European market” are not relevant, the question is what the terms will be for exporting to it, as every country on earth except perhaps North Korea does: will they accept ongoing zero-tariff trade, or not? Which of the requirements that apply, for example, to Canada’s trade agreement would be unacceptable, if any? As for Scotland – Sturgeon’s goal may be EU membership and Scottish independence, but Scottish opinion has not moved in the way she would need for that. That may not technically be a “strengthened” union, but it’s one in which Scotland is no more willing to leave the UK than we were three years ago, which is surely what the UK government actually seeks.
Andrew raises interesting questions here about what EU migrants – I hope the answer will be that they get equal treatment to other immigrants, but we’ll have to wait and see what the EU wants there. As for convergence – were EU and US labour standards to converge as part of TTIP?
The reason for the camp previously existing in Calais is because the French have an agreement to allow UK customs and immigration to take place in France.
When we leave the EU this may no longer apply. The UK could return them but it’s much more challenging and expensive, and you can’t stop a whole train as we are talking about individuals.
2 for future trade seems optimistic and 0 is wrong for the current situation. We have a whole set of EU free trade agreements from South Korea to Chile and also ones coming on stream with Canada. In addition we also have a whole set of negotiated WTO schedules. As a smaller entity than the EU we are deluded into thinking we can break into global markets. It is much tougher to break barriers globally than Dan Hannan suggests and geographic distance is a big factor in trade. It is impossible to service customers in Lima in the same way as Milan, unless your product is something like whisky.
If you are looking for CETA (seven plus years in making) as a Single Market comparison for easy trade with no free movement you are wrong. It is designed for Canadian only origin goods which need to be checked on import, excludes certain agricultural products, doesn’t cover most services (majority of UK GDP surplus) and EU regulations generally apply without any say in setting regulations, and setting product standards. The deal is really based around the kind of bulk products shipping in containers we can trade at a distance with Canada. It does also have an element of free movement for key personnel. Whilst it removes tariffs completely(where they apply) it would be unworkable for me as a basis for trade.
As for Scotland then the UK economy will be the judge. If Theresa can keep the economy motoring (on debt) with a soft landing then I think Scotland would stay. A far more likely scenario is the Brexit economic fantasy unravels and there will be a lot of angry Scots and Northern Irish who will break the UK up. If the economy dips then Scotland will leave. Today’s opinion polls don’t matter as it was a much lower 28% at the start of the 2014 campaign.
I would also like EU citizens to be welcomed.
What is the current situation with regard to non-EU countries participating in EU research programs? Some form of participation seems to be possible for countries such as Israel and Turkey without freedom of movement. But when a Swiss referendum voted to curtail free movement, they seem to have been blocked from the main EU funding program. Has the EU outlined its principles in this matter?
I agree with the comment above that the score of 4 for rights of EU nationals is optimistic. I guess it depends on what “rights” are at issue. EU law guarantees a far wider group of rights than the standard migration rights such as residence and the right to work, and I think that this group of rights, below the tip of the iceberg, will be much more difficult than the more basic rights.