As the UK leaves the European Union, Philip Allott (University of Cambridge) reflects on ten occasions when Britain has badly misjudged and mishandled challenges to its hegemony – both internal and external – and traces the cause to the dominance of the executive branch.
An alternative British political history since 1945 could focus on a remarkable series of failures by British governments which have seriously damaged the country. We who have lived through them have tended to regard them as natural and inevitable. They are not.

Unusually, it is possible to identify the probable cause. After World War One, the executive branch of government found that it had acquired a de facto dominance over the House of Commons, which thereafter became its poodle. Lord Hewart called it ‘the new despotism’ (1929). Lord Hailsham called it ‘elective dictatorship’ (1976).
Liberal democracy, as practice and philosophy, is Britain’s greatest achievement. It is the fruit of a continuous process of constitutional evolution from Anglo-Saxon times, as the country adapted, to use the Darwinian word, to our ever-changing circumstances with an almost miraculous intuitive intelligence. We have not made the mistake made by so many other countries of adopting a written constitution, transient selfie of the distribution of power at the time when it is written. It is time for us to adapt yet again, before it is too late.
It was inevitable that India would become independent soon after World War Two. It was not inevitable that it would do so in a state of chaos whose effects are felt to the present day.
It was inevitable that we would give up our empire, under the pressure not least of the insidious populist doctrine of self-determination preached by a self-interested United States. It was not inevitable that we should do so in such haste in countries often lacking the most basic structures of modern society.
It was inevitable that President Nasser of Egypt would take control of the Suez Canal. It was not inevitable that our government would cause it to be a national humiliation affecting every aspect of our foreign policy for years to come.
It was inevitable that the United States would take over from us as a global imperial power. It was not inevitable that it would do so on such terms as those dictated by the US at Bretton Woods, or that our government would believe the illusion that the ruthless government of the United States is our special friend.
It was inevitable that the war-torn nations of Europe would create a new basis of their co-existence other than diplomacy and war. It was not inevitable that we would join the new European system late, without any enthusiasm and without any plan for playing our part. At that time we had what were probably the best civil service and diplomatic service in the world. We might have played a leading role.
Gross British misgovernment and disdain of Ireland over the course of centuries had made some sort of Irish independence inevitable. Ireland has always been, since earliest times, a source of cultural and personal enrichment for Britain. It was not inevitable that a form of agreement would only be found after years of violence and suffering.
It was inevitable that, sooner or later, we would have to modernise our position in relation to the smaller Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf. It was not inevitable that in 1971 the government would abandon a great achievement of British diplomacy, dating from 1820, leaving the fabulous wealth of the area to the reconstituted states and to global oil and gas corporations.
It was inevitable that, after the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, a new structure would be created for their relationship with the new Europe. To this day, it is not clear why the government took the lead in a policy of more or less immediate full membership for the ex-Soviet states, leaving the suspicion that they had the vague idea that it would dilute the coherence of the EU of which the UK itself, with amazing tolerance on the part of the other member states, had already made itself into a semi-detached member.
It was inevitable that age-old sentiment in Scotland about its place in the United Kingdom would have to be faced by the British government. It was not inevitable that this would be done in a referendum which did not seek the opinion of the whole population of the United Kingdom. Scotland has contributed an enormous amount to the history, the culture, the social order and the economy of this country, and to the making and managing of the Empire. It was not inevitable but scandalous that its future and the future of the United Kingdom would be made to rest on such a one-off ‘in or out’ basis.
It was inevitable that government would have to respond to gathering opposition to British membership of the European Union. It was a legitimate political decision to consult the British people and to decide to implement the outcome of a referendum. It was not inevitable that implementing those decisions would be carried out in political and diplomatic chaos, profoundly unsettling the future of the country for many years to come.
The remedy for all this misgovernment must be found in restoring the dialectical secret at the heart of Britain’s unique form of liberal democracy, in which government and opposition struggle vigorously and co-operate effectively in the task of good government, with everyday public opinion and occasional general elections always having the last word.
This post represents the views of the author and not those of the Brexit blog, nor LSE.
An interesting tour d’horizon of UK misgovernment. Although most people will find much to agree with in the analysis, supporters of Scottish independence may cavil at the sentiment behind the statement:
“It was not inevitable that this would be done in a referendum which did not seek the opinion of the whole population of the United Kingdom.”
Just as it would have been problematic for Scots and Northern Irish voters to expect their Remain votes in the 2016 Brexit referendum to have acted as a “lock” to prevent the UK leaving the EU despite a UK wide vote to Leave, it is surely democratically unconscionable for Scottish self determination to be regarded as contingent on the permission of English voters, irrespective of the views of Scots?
It’s true that Scots shouldn’t be expect to dictate a devolutionary settlement to the UK as a whole, particularly given the apparent lack of appetite for federalism in England, but also given the difficulty of crafting a mutually acceptable federal structure given the disparity in sizes of the constituent units of the UK. In the end however the views of the population of the whole United Kingdom on Scottish independence, while interesting, are immaterial where the aim is independence rather than federalism or some form for devo-max which would legitimately involve buy-in from all the involved parties.
My sentiments exactly.
Democracy: the least worst system of government.
Given how badly led we have been for most of the post war period, and, doubtless, before, the key to improvement surely lies in less government, so that the blighters can do less damage?
The tragedy of Scotland’s recent devolution squabbles is that a UK wide vote might very well result in Scotland’s departure.
The Lisvane proposals discussed in the house of lords perhaps offer a way forward for the entire country?
https://services.parliament.uk/Bills/2017-19/actofunion/documents.html
The Lisvane proposals, while interesting, are probably a few decades (or even 50 years?) too late. If there was any real appetite in England for such thorough reform of the current shambolic crypto-medieval British system of government, I think we’d already have seen some action. As it stands such plans are a day late and a dollar short. Having returned to Scotland in 2017 after 25 years in England I now see two countries with more dividing them than holding them together.
The differential brexit result has probably only served to make the departure happen more quickly than would otherwise have been the case. However, the demographics of support for Scottish nationalism and the apparent indifference (and even hostility) of many English voters to any reasonable accommodation of the aspirations of the Scots and Northern Irish electorates for compromises about future constitutional arrangements, makes the dissolution of the union more or less inevitable.
In the end I suspect its epitaph will be that it died mainly due to the indifference of English voters rather than dramatic action in Holyrood or Stormont.
If you are anywhere near Glasgow or Dundee, the borders, then your views will be widely held; elsewhere, I believe, less so. The next Scottish election may tell us which way the wind blows for the entire country.
But it does seem that the close result of the Scottish independence referendum demonstrates the lack of any real nationwide zeal for independence, contrasting markedly with conclusive independence referenda elsewhere: Ukraine, Croatia and so on; some kind of devo-max the consensus, in Scotland, to ‘lance the boil’.
Added to which, the brexit agreement may very well appeal to many in Northern Ireland (and Eire) who enjoy strong links between the north and south of one sort or another but are not ready, and likely will not be for some considerable time, for the expense and responsibilities of union. Hold on tight to nurse……..
But the West Lothian question does now require an answer if English ‘indifference’ is not to change to something stronger. That ship may already have sailed. Referenda are extremely unsettling, divisive; once in a generation, if at all, seems best.
The Lisvane proposals, or some version thereof, would, at least, in my humble opinion, get long overdue constitutional change on the move; far better done slowly, with consideration, than not done at all……
The author of this article hit the nail right on the head. For evidence look no further than the replies below the article. Unfortunately though, the irony is lost on those replying.
Whose sentiments, above, apparently, you share.
Hindsight is a wonderful gift, truly. One can learn much dwelling on the past, cogitating at length. As above, the mention of voting on Scottish independence by the rest of the UK is a rum one. It would make sense to gauge the feelings, so could be advisory, but really, it’s a mystery as to why he brought it up-and that from a professor. For another, to vote for independence is not a minor matter. There is the lead-up to the decision to hold a referendum, then a period to debate it, then a vote. The Scottish electorate decided against. Yet, some people contemplate another referendum, perhaps soon. That, imo, is a sign that there are many people in the UK, as elsewhere in the West, who have an Alice and the Looking Glass view of the world they live in. Understandable, yes, since a lot of politicians behave as if they have exactly such a view. Politicians, however, are only playing the game, fooling people, time and time again. The mention of opposition in politics, in the context of politics in the Western so-called democracies, as the author here earnestly does, is a sure sign the author is busy pulling the wool over people’s eyes. UKIP was true opposition, as were and are some very minor players who/which have no influence whatsoever. The Brexit Party was opposition in name only, it turned out. The Establishment in the UK won the day. It really is as simple as that. The UK electorate returned to the Establishment fold meekly. The British, that is, the English (and the Welsh) had not the stomach for independence. Even if Brino turns, miraculously, into a proper Brexit, the Establishment still runs the show, you know, globalisation, the ongoing disenfranchisement of nominally democratic nation-state citizens by stealth, by brazen hutzpah and international high finance. Boris has already made that patently obviously. And who, pray tell, set up and eased the Tory party into scoring this decisive win? Why, the master Brexiteer Farage. Very clever. So far so good, for Leavers, but the struggle for independence has only just begun.