South Korea’s 22nd General Elections, held on April 10th, resulted in a sweeping victory for the opposition Democratic Party (DP) securing 175 out of the 300 seats of the National Assembly. President Yoon’s ruling conservative party, the People’s Power Party (PPP) kept its minority status at 108 seats. President Yoon now faces the uphill battle of having to persuade a parliamentary opposition nearly 190 strong to achieve his policy goals.
Polls published prior had predicted the DP’s victory. President Yoon seemed unperturbed by high living costs, with public perception viewing him as an unyielding leader not shy to veto bills passed by parliament. This and his limited interaction with the Korean general public fueled an angry electorate to vote against him.
The Presidential Office holds the final decision-making call over crafting foreign policy in South Korea. The PPP’s minority stake within the National Assembly has to date not prevented President Yoon from reversing predecessor President Moon’s approach to bilateral relations with China. In light of this, the flexible approach adopted by President Yoon in aligning with Washington over its security policies while weighing against the prospect of economic cooperation with Beijing is likely to continue. Yet, the majority DP has shown to be more inclined toward economic cooperation with China. This—on top of election losses for Yoon—means frozen bilateral relations may thaw in the coming future.
Yoon’s approach to China
Since assuming office, President Yoon inherited the stance adopted by his predecessors from the conservative party: China for economic gains but not risking dependence, while maintaining independence on matters of sovereignty and security policies by means of close alignment with the US and Japan. Korea was not to be anything akin to a ‘tributary state’.
This approach became evident when President Yoon identified cross-strait relations as ‘a global issue’ similar to that of North Korea in a Reuters interview on April 2023, triggering a strong response from Beijing. President Yoon continued to align more closely with the Western Indo-Pacific Strategy of containing China as well by joining the NATO Summit in July 2023, and attending the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David alongside Japan — a sign of strengthening trilateral military cooperation.
Economic relations mirrored this approach. Under President Moon, bilateral economic ties flourished pre-COVID. Yoon, however, focused on decreasing economic dependence on China and developing resilient supply chains. South Korea publicly announced its participation in the ‘Chip4’ alliance in December 2022 — an initiative led by the US to isolate China from semiconductor supply chain. Also, South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy announced the ‘3050 Strategy Initiative’ in December 2023- aimed at decreasing dependence on China to less than 50% in its effort to secure supply-chain resilience. As a result of this initiative, the US exceeded China, becoming South Korea’s number one export destination for the first time in 20 years.
Yet amidst the adoption of measures aimed at decreasing dependence on China, Yoon did not abandon dialogue for cooperation with China: his recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul stated that “there is no de-coupling from China for South Korea. High-level meetings to seek cooperation will continue” during his meeting with the CCP Secretary Hao Peng at late April. The administration’s past shows these consistent endeavours. In November 2022, President Yoon had his first meeting with Xi Jinping at the Bali G20 Summit. In September 2023, President Yoon also met with Premier Li Qiang at the Jakarta ASEAN Summit. In early 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea announced that Seoul will be hosting the Trilateral Summit with Japan and China at late May—a summit that has not been hosted since 2019.
How does this impact bilateral relations with China?
China has maintained a neutral approach to the outcome of South Korean Election. Mao Ning- the spokeswoman for Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated at the regular briefing on 11 April that South Korean election results were matters of internal affairs of South Korea, yet China seeks to invest in working towards improving bilateral relations as an important neighbor. Indeed, China’s gesture of collaboration was followed up by the invitation of Wang Yi, Director of Central Foreign Affairs Commission, to the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae Yeol to visit China in early May.
For China, the election results are favourable. Whilst it is unlikely for Yoon administration to abandon its alignment with Washington and Tokyo regarding its security policies, Beijing’s strategy to maintain its influence over Seoul via strengthening economic ties- is able to be sustained despite Yoon administration’s efforts to decrease their dependence. Especially, DP holding the majority at the National Assembly will likely prevent adoption of legislations directly contradicting Beijing’s interests. The DP regards Chinese partnership as invaluable, particularly due to their potential role in brokering dialogue with North Korea to facilitate inter-Korea cooperation. China also regards the DP positively, as demonstrated by Ambassador of China to South Korea Xing Haiming’s invitation of the DP leader Lee Jae Myung to his embassy for a dinner in June 2023.
China views South Korea as the weak point amongst the broad containment strategy that US seeks to employ against them. To Beijing, maintaining economic ties would be crucial to sustain its leverage against Washington’s pressure on Seoul to opt into regional alliances countering China such as the Chip4, QUAD, and AUKUS Working groups. China will undoubtedly seek to strengthen bilateral economic cooperation, as there is not only a domestic incentive to do so given its economic circumstances, but also due to the domestic pressure that President Yoon faces upon the election outcome. With President Yoon’s risk of solidifying his obstinate reputation should he maintain his posture of vetoing bills passed at the legislative body, and the gloomy domestic economic prospects- there is an opportunity for Beijing to capitalize upon. As they have already demonstrated in exerting their economic leverage in 2015 upon South Korea’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system based on US recommendation leading to Moon administration’s adoption of the ‘Three No’ pledge against Washington’s desires, Beijing can work on establishing the foundations for expanding its clout over Korean peninsula.
As such, while the DP’s win will not drastically change the Yoon administration’s approach to bilateral relations with China, the President will undoubtedly grapple over his foreign policy. For Beijing, South Korean elections results presents an opportunity, whereas for Yoon administration and wider partners of Japan and the US it presents a challenge to completion of their Indo-Pacific Strategy.
This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the China Foresight Forum, LSE IDEAS, nor The London School of Economics and Political Science.
The cover image “Chinese and South Korean flags” is licensed under the Creative Commons BY-SA 2.0 DEED license. Attribution: Chris Phan
