24 January 2022 marked the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Israel and China. Celebrations included a series of high-level meetings, highlighting what was perceived as warm relations between the two nations. And indeed, in the past two decades, China-Israel relations had shown a steady rise in economic aspects, while experiencing an observable standstill in all that is political. Economically, this is demonstrated through China’s trade in goods with Israel, which increased by 130 percent from 2013 to 2022, reaching an all-times high of US$17.62bn dollars, positioning China as Israel’s second largest trade partner. Foreign direct investments (FDI) from China have also increased, both in quantity and quality, reaching their observable peak at 2018, with 73 Chinese FDI deals in Israeli high-tech, with an emphasis on life sciences and the IT sector. However, and even before the events of October 7th 2023, economic relations between the two countries had started to display signs of relative decline, as trade decreased in 2023 by 18 percent from the previous year to US$14.6bn, while the number of FDI deals has been in steady decline since 2019; in 2022 only 18 deals were recorded. Therefore, even before the Israel-Gaza war, at least from a Chinese perspective, Israel’s image as an ‘innovation hub’ and a ‘start-up nation’, had started to erode.
Although China has maintained good relations with both parties of the conflict, China is considered historically as a long-time advocate for Palestinian independence and a Palestinian state and the two-states solution, but aligns more closely with a Palestinian stance. This is demonstrated through the rhetoric of Chinese delegates and officials in many international organizations, especially at the UN and its various bodies, as well as through its voting patterns, favouring the Palestinian cause, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. For example, in 2012 China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yang Jiechi, stated in his UN General Assembly’s speech that “China supports the Palestinian people in establishing, on the basis of the 1967 borders, an independent Palestinian state that enjoys full sovereignty with East Jerusalem as its capital. China supports Palestine’s membership in the United Nations and other international organizations”. Nevertheless, China’s political commitment to this issue has not been as strong and was not accompanied by real practical involvement. Moreover, China’s rhetoric used to place the responsibility on both the Israelis and the Palestinians when the majority of Chinese statements concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict called both sides to cease violence: supporting the two-state solution, insisting on negotiations as the ultimate way to resolve the conflict and opposing violence against civilians. Thus, China had been trying to balance between its economic ties with Israel and its aspiration to be seen as a defender of the Palestinian cause on the international stage; officially China describes its relations with Israel as a “Comprehensive Innovation Partnership”, which demonstrates that relations are concentrated on the technological-economic dimension, rather than on political-strategic aspects. For their part, Israel’s leaders focus on economic ties, positioning the cooperation as a practical technological and economic partnership and an opportunity to diversify Israel’s economic partners. And yet, the China-Israel relationship cannot be viewed as external to the context of China-U.S. relations.
Nevertheless, in the past years, China has become more proactive in its stance against Israel, at least rhetorically, and even more so since the events of October 7th that led to the Gaza War. When examining Chinese statements on the War in Gaza since October 7th, China failed to condemn Hamas’s actions’, and put most of the blame on Israel’s (in)action regarding the promotion of a sovereign Palestinian state. For example, on October 10th 2023, Zhai Jun, then acting as Special Envoy of the Chinese Government on the Middle East, stated that “The root cause of the cycle of conflict between Palestine and Israel is that the Palestinian question still has not been settled in a just manner”. As time went by, Chinese officials have further criticized Israel, while requested unconditional and immediate ceasefire, and supported Palestinian resistance. For instance, Ma Xinmin, Director-General of the Foreign Ministry’s Department of Treaty and Law remarked before the ICJ that: “The Palestinian-Israeli conflict stems from Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory and Israel’s long-standing oppression of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people fight against Israeli oppression, and their [struggles to complete] the establishment of an independent state on the occupied territories are, essentially, just actions for restoring their legitimate rights”.
The shift in China’s stance regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems less about the specifics of the conflict itself and more about its broader strategic interests. It appears that China’s actions might be influenced by two main systemic rationales: firstly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers China a platform to challenge U.S. hegemony and further criticize its policy in the Middle East. Amidst its growing tensions with the U.S., China sees the conflict as an opportunity to underscore the normative weaknesses of the U.S. and its perceived inability to act as a benevolent global leader. This can be seen in China’s frequent critiques of the U.S. in its declarations regarding the war. For instance, on April 18, 2024, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, called for the U.S. to “truly heed the voices of the international community and support a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people”. Statements such as this underscore China’s strategy of using the conflict to highlight what it describes as U.S. hypocrisy and double standards, while illustrating China’s ongoing efforts to position itself as a champion of international law and fairness, in turn casting the U.S. in a negative light for failing to uphold these principles. Secondly, China’s support for the Palestinian cause is also intended to bolster its strategic and reputational positioning within the Global South, which includes many countries sympathetic to the Palestinian plight. This alignment not only garners support from Arab and Muslim-majority nations but also enhances China’s leadership credentials among developing countries that see the Palestinian struggle as emblematic of resistance against colonial legacies. Thus, by taking a more pronounced stance and a more critical stance vis-à-vis Israel, China aims to position itself as a more just and equitable player on the world stage.
The Israel–Hamas war has posed a major test to China’s international commitment and capabilities. However, for now, China’s more assertive rhetoric is yet to translate into a more proactive role in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, with no significant resource allocation evident thus far — beyond some US$70m humanitarian aid. Clearly, China’s response to the war is influenced by broader geopolitical dynamics rather than solely its stance towards Israel or the Palestinians. The conflict symbolizes a broader geopolitical struggle that transcends bilateral relations, and Israel remains a relatively minor component in the larger geopolitical landscape. Thus, post-conflict normalization between China and Israel remains plausible. Nevertheless, many of China’s activities in the international arena are seen as more and more closely affecting Israel directly. In this case, the potential (unofficial) degradation of Israel-China relations may be a collateral consequence of what currently appears to be a clear siding by the Chinese.
This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the China Foresight Forum, LSE IDEAS, nor The London School of Economics and Political Science.
The cover image “Chinese delegation, Jerusalem March, September 2013/Chinalovesisrael.JPG” is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported licence. Attribution: Idont
