One of the main highlights of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visits to China (3-5 June) and later to the BRICS meeting of foreign ministers in Russia (10-11 June) was Turkey’s expression of interest in joining the BRICS. Although this was not the first time Turkish decision-makers expressed interest in joining the bloc, it signalled once again that Ankara is seeking to develop alternative alliances in the non-Western world, raising familiar questions about Turkey’s shift away from the West. Overall, diversifying international partners and seeking closer engagement with non-Western global powers such as China appear to have emerged as significant features of Ankara’s policy of carving out influence in an increasingly multipolar world and its pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Turkey’s emphasis on closer cooperation with China has been mainly driven by strong economic concerns in the domestic arena. Ankara seeks Chinese investments to deal with the effects of the ongoing economic crisis and to fund major infrastructure projects, such as those related to nuclear and renewable energy. Despite taking some measures to keep soaring inflation under control, such as formulating a public savings policy, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has not made much progress so far.
The local elections in March were a major blow for President Erdoğan, marking his party’s first electoral defeat in two decades. The cost-of-living crisis played a crucial role in the results, as many voters who supported the opposition in the latest election, including those who had previously voted for Erdoğan’s AKP, wanted to signal their dissatisfaction with government’s economic policies. Responding to the results of the local elections, President Erdoğan said they would focus on the “urgent issues” facing the country, mainly the economic problems, and reassured the voters that they would see the positive outcomes of the government’s economic program in the second half of the year. Therefore, decision-makers within the AKP are well aware that their political survival may be on the line if they cannot manage to stabilise the economy.
Against this context, Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit to China aimed to further develop economic ties and cooperation in areas where Turkish and Chinese geoeconomic and geopolitical strategies can align. He stressed, for example, that Turkey can play a complementary role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and, in turn, the BRI can be harmonised with Turkey’s Middle Corridor initiative. From the two countries’ mutual stance on Gaza, to a critique of the West through emphasising the need for fairness in the international system, to a reaffirmation of Turkey’s support for the one-China policy, many of the points that Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan raised in his meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi signalled that Turkey was keen to enhance both economic and political cooperation with China.
Another key highlight of Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit was his trip to the Xinjiang region. The issue of the treatment of the Uyghur Muslim minority in China’s Xinjiang region, which President Erdoğan described as “almost a genocide” in 2009, was a source of tension between Turkey and China. Not so long ago, in late 2022, relations soured over Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu’s open criticism of China as he said Ankara had to speak up against the human rights violations detailed in the UN High Commissioner for Human Right’s report in August 2022 and that Beijing was disturbed by Turkey’s support for defending the rights of the Uyghurs in the international arena. Çavuşoğlu also claimed that Beijing did not allow Turkey’s ambassador to freely visit the region and tried to dictate the terms by providing a “program” to control the narrative.
Recently, however, Ankara appears to have toned down its rhetoric on the issue of Uyghurs. The absence of explicit remarks about this issue during Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit, along with seemingly positive pictures from the region he shared on his social media, indicates that Ankara has curbed its rhetoric in favour of stronger economic ties. It was reported, based on information provided by an anonymous Turkish official, that Foreign Minister Fidan urged Chinese officials to protect the cultural rights of Uyghurs, highlighting Turkey’s “sensitivities” concerning this subject. Although it is unclear how exactly this interaction played out, it is likely that Foreign Minister Fidan echoed President Erdoğan’s use of the word “sensitivity” regarding Uyghur rights in his UN speech in September 2023.
Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit to the Xinjiang region raised concerns among some observers and critics, including Uyghur activists and Turkish opposition MPs. For example, in the Turkish parliament, MPs from different opposition parties criticised Fidan for his lack of an assertive stance on the issue of Uyghurs, and one MP asked a formal parliamentary question about why Fidan did not visit any of the “educational camps” in question, claiming that the violations were ignored during the visit.
In terms of economic ties, there are signs that Ankara’s policy of closer economic engagement with China is paying off, as many Chinese companies have shown interest in investment opportunities in Turkey in various sectors, including defence and energy, potentially seeing Turkey as a gateway to European markets. For example, shortly after Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit to China, China’s electric vehicle giant BYD signed a deal to develop a billion-dollar factory in Turkey which will have the capacity to produce 150,000 vehicles annually and will make it easier for the company to target the European Union market.
At the same time, strengthening bilateral ties with Turkey can be beneficial for China’s strategy in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. From major infrastructure projects in Iraq to its positions regarding the Israel-Hamas war, China has increased its presence in the region in recent years, challenging US influence. Strengthening cooperation in the region, as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned during his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan, can be beneficial to address mutual concerns.
Overall, bilateral relations between Turkey and China seem to be on an upward trajectory. On 4 July, President Erdoğan met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kazakhstan to discuss further cooperation and extended an invitation for President Xi Jinping to visit Turkey. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect high-level visits with a strong emphasis on mutual cooperation in the near future.
Yet, it remains to be seen whether Turkey will truly reap sustainable economic gains from cooperation with China. Given China’s favourable trade balance and the power asymmetry in the bilateral relationship, Ankara should be cautious about the potential risks of economic dependence on China in the longer term.
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This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the China Foresight Forum, LSE IDEAS, nor The London School of Economics and Political Science.
The cover image by 維基小霸王 is licenced under the CC BY-SA 4.0 licence, via Wikimedia Commons
