Georgia is a country where socio-economic political priorities such as poverty and inequality have often played second fiddle to concerns of fundamental survival in the face of Russian aggression. As a country that faced three civil wars, a total economic collapse in the early 1990s, and a Russian invasion in 2008, this is not altogether surprising. This turbulent history of hard security threats has left a challenging legacy of a largely crisis-driven state-building process, concentrated on fending off existential threats rather than on the creation of a sustainable and multifaceted long-term security strategy. The current reality of Russia’s continued occupation of Georgian territory, its recent military aggression in Ukraine, and the escalation of new hybrid threats has fostered a political culture that privileges more traditional hard power, geopolitical, or diplomatic approaches to national security. However, the past 30 years have demonstrated that the traditional security paradigm has proven insufficient to counter the vast array of threats that confront the small nation.
A more detailed analysis reveals that non-military, social-economic threats such as poverty and inequality have played a significant role in undermining societal resilience and as a result, the security of the Georgian state itself.
According to official data, despite progress in decreasing absolute poverty, relative poverty in Georgia has remained almost unchanged over the last two decades. The number of recipients of targeted social assistance stands at around 668 555 people, making up 17.9% of the total population.[1] In terms of inequality reduction, Georgia has precious little to show for the last two decades of relatively healthy economic growth. It remains a poor country in which wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small elite.
Figure 1. Relative Poverty in Georgia[2]
In terms of national security, a direct impact of widespread poverty is the sharp decline in population and social capital. According to official statistics, about 1.4 million people emigrated from Georgia between 2002 and 2017, mostly for work.[3] This constant outflow of people undermines citizens’ faith in the state and feeds the belief that if a country cannot provide social security for its own people, it cannot guarantee physical protection either. The disproportionate outflow of younger, military-age demographic groups, especially highly-skilled workers who would be essential to national defence efforts, also has a clear direct negative impact on Georgia’s resilience and national security.
Poverty directly hinders the development of the defence forces in other ways too. High poverty is reflected in limited public finance for defence and security, as tax revenues from income taxes remain low, and expenditure on social assistance remains relatively high. As a result, the state is unable to provide the armed forces with costly weaponry and cutting-edge technology, which impedes the modernization of the military. A population tired of day-to-day socio-economic problems also tends to have little motivation, aptitude, or competence to participate in activities that support national defence and security. Consequently, every major social challenge, be it poverty, education, healthcare, or emigration, has a direct impact on recruitment and troop qualification.
Poverty also increases societal vulnerability to propaganda and misinformation. External actors can easily manipulate the societal dissatisfaction that arises from a challenging social context to undermine domestic stability and cohesion. Moreover, people’s main sources of information tend to be defined by social class with the poor getting information mainly from TV and wealthier sectors from online alternative sources, demonstrating the close relationship between these social class divides and information security.
Poverty also fuels radicalization and violent extremism. Underprivileged groups are especially susceptible to radicalization, which in the Georgian context tend to be religious fundamentalism or extreme right-wing nationalist ideology.
Social inequality is high in Georgia. In 2017 Georgia was among the top ten countries in the world with the highest Gini coefficients.[4] Income inequality and the nearly nonexistent middle class causes social and value-based fragmentation, and many alternative realities begin to emerge in a society divided so starkly into haves and have-nots.
Like poverty, economic inequality is also a grave threat to national security. It contributes to the delegitimization of state institutions and the diminishing role of the state as the main unifying institution in the eyes of the public. This is a result of the domination of the Georgian political elite by the wealthy classes of society since the 1990s. Therefore, anything related to privilege and power is automatically associated with the state, further weakening the latter’s authority and trust within underprivileged segments of the population.[5] Polls show that accumulated skepticism and low trust in the society towards the executive, legislative, and judicial authorities are at alarming levels[6] which creates a precondition for alienation between the government and the citizens.
The fading of public trust towards the army is another challenge derived from social inequality. Those from wealthy families easily avoid being drafted into the military, causing unfavorable attitudes towards the armed forces and contributing to public dissatisfaction.
Lastly, social inequality increases the risk of confrontation within society. Social solidarity among various social groupings wanes in the face of stark income inequality and the squeezing of the middle class. This exacerbates feelings of marginalization and deprivation, and makes it easier to provoke civil conflict. In a multicultural setting like Georgia, social disparity increases the risk of social friction and conflict if it intersects with the interests of ethnic or religious minority groups.
Given the threats discussed above, it is vital for Georgia to prioritise progressive social policy as a national security imperative. One of the major barriers to overcome on this path is an ideological one. Since the 1990s neoliberal economic doctrine has become an all but total political consensus in the country. In this view, poverty is predominantly perceived as a private problem for individuals, rather than a societal concern. State economic intervention in the economy, anti-inequality measures, or welfare programs tend to be associated with the Soviet past, making them not only an unacceptable model but also a source of public shame. As a result, it is now politically risky to even bring up the welfare state model in political, analytical, or intellectual discourse.
In order for a small country like Georgia to endure its difficult geopolitical environment, it is increasingly important to set aside the post-Soviet reluctance to countenance the use of social policy to reduce poverty and inequality. This means beginning to consolidate the state and its citizens in the process of protecting the country’s security through the promotion of welfare programs and building clear policy linkages between national security and social welfare.
This blog is published in partnership with the Democratic Security Institute (DSI) based in Tbilisi, Georgia. It is part of a series of blogs authored by fellows from DSI’s Eurasia Democratic Security Network (EDSN) on the interrelationship between democracy and security in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood. EDSN is supported by the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
[1] Social Justice Center. Number of recipients of targeted social assistance is at historical maximum. July, 2023. Available in Georgian at: https://socialjustice.org.ge/ka/products/sotsialuri-shemtseobis-mimghebta-raodenoba-istoriul-maksimumzea
[2] National Statistics Office of Georgia. Poverty and Gini Coefficients. Available at: https://www.geostat.ge/en/modules/categories/192/living-conditions
[3] REGinfo. 1.4 million People Emigrated from Georgia in 15 Years. 2019. Available in Georgian at: https://reginfo.ge/people/item/12786-bolo-15-xelshi-saqartvelodan-emigraziashi-1-4-milioni-adamiani-xavida%20%E2%80%93-kvleva
[4] Chandy L. & Seidel B. How much do we really know about inequality within countries around the world? Adjusting Gini coefficients for missing top incomes. 2017. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-much-do-we-really-know-about-inequality-within-countries-around-the-world/
[5] Tsitsishvili D. Change of Political Elites in Post-Soviet Georgia. 2011. Tbilisi State University. Available in Georgian at: https://old.tsu.ge/data/file_db/faculty_social_political/davit%20tsitsishvili.pdf
[6] CRRC Georgia. Caucasus Barometer: Trust – Executive Government. 2020. Available at: https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2020ge/TRUEXEC/