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Weaponisation of War Memories and Anti-German Sentiment

By Roberto Orsi

In the aftermath of the tumultuous events in Brussels and Athens, public opinions in Europe and elsewhere have been rapidly polarised, to an extent perhaps not seen in decades. The dramatic deterioration of Greek finances (both public and private) with the consequent set of social and political impacts, have produced the mobilisation of very strong language and imageries from all sides. Many commentators, some as authoritative and diverse as Jürgen Habermas, or Slavoj Žižek, have explicitly sounded the alarm that this may well be the end of the European project, preluding a return of inter-state rivalries and possibly wars. The handling of the Greek crisis has allegedly shown both within the EU as an organisation, as well as in the mindset and behaviour of the European political leaders, a lack of concern for “core values” such as democracy and solidarity.

i1This polarisation owes much to the uncomfortable landscape of political communication in Europe, dominated as it is, for reasons which escape the scope of this piece, by slogans built on gross oversimplifications and emotional appeals to knee-jerk reactions. The Greek government has been particularly active on this front by using the escamotage of a snap referendum to present its course of action and its position as the “democratic” one. It does not actually matter what is meant here by democracy in analytical terms. The point is that, in a binary opposition (Germany vs. Greece), if one side occupies the ground of “democracy”, i.e. of something practically all Europeans have been raised to consider as a synonym of “absolute good”, the other must rest on the ground of “absolute evil”. Any attempt at showing that the matter is more complicated than this is doomed to fail considering that it would require a somewhat more sophisticated form of communication, currently restricted to a certainly influential, nevertheless rather small part of the population and the electorate. The same is true of “solidarity”, whose alleged counterpart, the dreaded austerity, cannot be but the manifestation of sheer sadism, greed and other moral evils, incarnated by essentially degenerated individuals. More nuanced analyses of the Greek economic and political situation, often with remarkable long-term historical insights, are plenty, but they can hardly scratch the thick skin of the Manichean behemot. Continue reading “Weaponisation of War Memories and Anti-German Sentiment”

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God in Berlin, Newton in Brussels: On the Power of Linguistic Images in the Eurozone Crisis

By Hans Rusinek

Forbidden_fruitThe limits of our language are the limits of our world, famously observed the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. For him, word and fact are in a representational relationship: a word is only an image of a fact, but we are only able to think this image and not the fact behind it. This is the archetypical source of failing communication.

These times of frantic disputes between Greece and the “institutions”, formerly known as the Troika, can be confusing: Michael Thumann argues that soon nobody will know what has been accepted or rejected by whom, or even who is to blame. The present crisis questions the European motto “united in diversity” in many ways. One source of this diversity is language. Thus it is also a source of misunderstandings.

Therefore it is worth stepping back and examining which linguistic images are used and how those images create our understanding of the crisis by making it “thinkable”. For a German living in the United Kingdom, it is striking to see how the images differ between the languages and what persuasive power some of these images bear. Looking at German images helps to comprehend a specifically German understanding of the current situation. Continue reading “God in Berlin, Newton in Brussels: On the Power of Linguistic Images in the Eurozone Crisis”

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The real sins of Varoufakis: why Greece is being punished for refusing to play by the Eurogroup’s rules

By Christopher Bickerton

Talks continued through the night in Brussels, with Eurozone leaders eventually reaching an agreement on Greece. While negotiations were always likely to be tough, the original discussions between Greece and its creditors did not break down because of an unbridgeable ideological gap, but instead reflected a reaction to the negotiating tactics pursued by the Greek government under finance minister Yanis Varoufakis. By breaching the etiquette of the Eurogroup’s decision-making process, Varoufakis generated entrenched opposition among Greece’s creditors for which the country is now being punished.

Why did the original negotiations between Greece and its creditors collapse, to a point of virtual no return, when both sides had repeatedly said they want the same thing: for Greece to stay in the euro?

The conventional wisdom is that the policy gap between the two sides was simply too great. Elected in January, the Syriza-led government sought to reverse years of austerity under the slogan of no more bailouts. Its flamboyant finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis (who has since stood down), spoke of an economic transformation in Greece, taking on the long-standing power of the country’s oligarchs. His renegotiation with the Troika was part of this broader agenda.

Yanis Varoufakis with Finland's Finance Minister Alexander Stubb, Credit: EU Council Eurozone (CC-BY-ND-NC-SA-3.0)
Yanis Varoufakis with Finland’s Finance Minister Alexander Stubb, Credit: EU Council Eurozone (CC-BY-ND-NC-SA-3.0)

Facing Greece was a German-led bloc committed to more austerity and structural reforms. Within this bloc were countries – Ireland, Portugal – that had turned to the EU for their own bailouts and had undertaken the cuts and reforms asked of them. They were implacable in their belief that Greece should do the same.

But this view cannot explain why both sides came as close as they did. The often-forgotten truth of the last few weeks is that Greece and the Troika very nearly secured a deal. From the outset, the policy differences between them were minor, largely because of Syriza’s moderate demands.

Continue reading “The real sins of Varoufakis: why Greece is being punished for refusing to play by the Eurogroup’s rules”

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The Ukrainian Crisis: A Year On

By Roberto Orsi

More than a year has gone by since the overthrowal of Viktor Yanukovich, the starting point of a severe international crisis between Moscow and the West, successively escalated by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the outbreak of a separatist war in the Donbass. While any talk about “winners” and “losers” in such crisis would be superficial and over-simplistic, the unfolding strategic situation, especially since the ceasefire agreement of February 11, deserves some attention.

Considering Russia’s interests in the region, particularly if those are to be understood according to the Russian geopolitical and strategic vantage point, Moscow has managed to protect some of its vital interests, succeeding in three main dimensions.

Firstly, the non-violent takeover of Crimea, albeit clearly illegal under international law, has secured the country’s access to the Mediterranean and to the Middle East, eliminating a serious point of contention with the Ukraine, and a lethal threat to Russia’s projection capabilities. The move also subtracted the peninsula from NATO’s encroachment, allowing instead a significantly more secure Russian hold in the Black sea region.

Secondly, Russia has effectively avoided international and diplomatic isolation. Despite Beijing’s endorsement of traditional conceptions of sovereignty and territorial integrity, China has de facto sided with Russia, going to the extent of signing a $400 billion worth gas deal during the crucial weeks of the Crimean crisis when the US and the EU launched their sanctions, in a clear political gesture towards Washington and the rest of the world. India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Korea and numerous other nations have been taking little if no action against Russia in the wake of the crisis.

Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, the secessionist conflict in the Donbass has provided a sure way for Russia to heavily intervene, practically for an indefinite future, in Ukrainian affairs.

There is no indisputable evidence that President Vladimir Putin is trying to expand the borders of the Russian state by means of re-unifying or annex parts of the former Soviet Union, but several elements, both ideological and geostrategic, point to that direction. If so, it would appear that Russian actions in the Ukraine aim at the disintegration of such state at least in three regions (the fourth, Crimea, is already in Russian hands): the West (Galicia), the Centre (Malorossiya), and the East and South (Novorossiya). Ideally from the Kremlin’s perspective, the Ukraine should become some sort of federation, from which the various autonomous regions would gradually secede and shift towards East, with the exception of Galicia, for which Russia has no interest.

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Germany, the giant with the feet of clay

By Terence Tse and Mark Esposito

 

untitledOn the surface, it stands to reason to think that, as Europe’s largest economy, Germany’s position in Europe can act as the saviour to pull the Eurozone out of its current plight. By many counts, the country’s economy is doing very well. Many people argue that Germany’s model could be the key to strengthening other economies in the EU: Just think the need for Greece to go through the austerity measures demanded by Germany. However, a deeper look into the German economy reveals that it is far more vulnerable than appears on first look.

This is not obvious because seemingly economically and politically strong country is gradually going in decline. There are a number of reasons for this:

Excessive dependency on Exports. Germany’s GDP relies rather heavily on exports of primarily industrial manufacturing goods – its service sector remains far less developed and its share of the total economy has not grown since 1995. A further implication is that Germany has been falling behind in both private and public investments. The country’s current investment levels represent only 17% of its GDP, less than either France or Italy. Public spending on infrastructure and other similar projects, on the other hand, equals a meagre 1.5% of the country’s GDP. Education spending is also only 5.3% of GDP, which is lower than both the average of 15 European countries and the OECD average of 6.2%. In short, Germany has not been spending enough to invest in its future.

The changing nature of (un)employment. The average hours worked per person has continually fallen in the last twenty years. Since 1991, although an ever increasing percentage of the population is employed, there has also been an increase in volunteering and/or part time work as well: 22% of German labour are without full-time contracts or in temporary full-time positions. Germany is moving from problems of unemployment to underemployment, when workers do not get the hours they want or hold down jobs that are not in line with their education levels.

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Greece’s government deserves benefit of doubt

By Max Hänska

Wednesday’s Eurogroup meeting managed to underwhelm low expectations, as talks even failed to agree the usual face-saving joint statement outlining a structured agenda for future talks. It appears Varoufakis disappointed Eurogroup ministers by arriving without a written plan, and while several versions of a joint statement were drafted, disagreement over the inclusion of the terms program, extension and amendment meant that the waiting press corps had to contend with a press conference that merely announced that there was nothing to announce.

It may well be that, lacking hard facts, the cacophony of reporting only mirrors the diplomatic cacophony of the new Greek government. Nonetheless, in the haste of the moment we should remember that this young government, with little governing experience, stepped into a political situation that would be exceedingly difficult to navigate even for Europe’s political veterans. Yet Europe’s media has too often jumped the gun, fostering mistrust, and anticipating its failure.

Inspite of all doubts and risks involved, the Greek government deserves our trust that it will deliver real reforms, and a workable plan (despite Wednesday’s disappointment), in a package that is politicaly feasible. They have promised so much. And let us not forget that Syriza’s alternatives, Pasok and ND, were largely responsible for maintaining a clientelistic-oligopolistic economy, undertaking no real efforts to remedy these ills. Syriza may may well be Greece’s (and Europe’s) best chance for real progressive reform—if it succeeds, this would be a huge accomplishment for Greece, and Europe.

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The challenge of responding to extreme political views: Germany struggles to address Pegida’s anti-Islam protests

By Stefan Bauchowitz

Unlike European countries in times of the financial crisis, Germany’s economic success meant that it largely avoided debates on closing off countries against a “tide of immigrants”, and populism was largely confined to opposition to bailouts in the Eurozone. Pegida’s success is not an indication that right wing extremism in Germany is on the rise, however, it shows that right-wing extremist ideas have entered the conservative mainstream. Large parts of the population remain economically and politically marginalised and there is significant potential for right-wing populism in Germany. The political response to the movement’s success has been inadequate: for fear of alienating voters many are tempted to make Pegida’s demands their own rather than addressing the causes of discontent and disaffection, with the pernicious consequence of legitimising xenophobia.

Angela Merkel’s New Year’s address marked a departure from her usual hesitant style of indexpolitics. The German chancellor condemned Pegida, a populist movement whose name roughly translates as Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident.

Since October, Pegida has been holding weekly anti-immigrant rallies, the most recent of which, in Dresden, has attracted 18,000 protesters. Pegida’s leaders are keen to appear as respectable citizens (a tough sell: in 1998 the movement’s chief rabble-rouser, Lutz Bachmann was convicted for burglary and fled to South Africa to avoid a three-and-a-half year prison sentence) and disavow any links to right-wing extremist ideology. Despite the movement’s name, its aims are somewhat diffuse and given their dissatisfaction with established parties and skepticism of the media Pegida’s protagonists refuse to enter into dialogue with outsiders. A 19-point document serves as an insurance policy and outlines the movement’s demands ranging from a more efficient asylum policy and the deportation of criminal asylum-seekers to opposition towards political correctness, the use of gender sensitive language and the establishment of sharia courts in Germany. The sentiments behind those demands and of those who attend the rallies are more overtly xenophobic than its “policy document” would suggest.

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Pegida shouldn’t be dismissed that easily

By Alessio Colonnelli

President Joachim Gauck and PM Angela Merkel have a point in cautioning the German public that Pegida (a German acronym standing for Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) could normalize racism. Back in December Gauck warned about Pegida and similar xenophobic movements by arguing that “extremists and relating currents that are unhelpful” should get less attention.

Merkel has voiced similar concerns. In her New Year’s speech, she openly rejected the motives of Pegida’s organizers: by using mottos like ‘We are the people’, such activists imply that some citizens don’t belong because of their skin colour or their religion. Gauck’s and Merkel’s warnings are not politically motivated. Their plea is genuine, beyond any 606x340_292272electoral calculation. Gauck has no party membership. CDU leader Merkel also doesn’t have any interest in attacking Pegida for fear of losing votes. German political scientists and sociologists have found that those joining Pegida’s rallies tend to be from right-wing to far-right stances with many from the centre-right bourgeoisie. Sociologist Johannes Kiess from Leipzig University, whose research focuses on far-right and extremist political movements, told eastern German public radio MRD that “Pegida is reminiscent of several other anti-asylum demonstrations […]. [The type of protesters range] from average citizens to neo-Nazis, everything is possible. […] In Dresden people have demonstrated against immigration and the asylum seekers’ issue has also played a role in the rallies.”

Gauck and Merkel’s message seems a genuine effort to make citizens aware of the motives behind Pegida. A slow shift towards unreasonable, xenophobic attitudes by those who’d be otherwise politically moderate is easy to foreshadow. Pegida promoters say they don’t wish their movement to be linked to far-right extremists or be portrayed as racist. Yet, as the MDR journalist Christin Bohmann pointed out in her interview with Dr Kiess, well-known neo-Nazis have been seen taking part in Pegida’s parades. How likely is potential radicalisation to spread in this case? The sociologist’s reply is: “Crossing points are open in either directions. However, even though the organizers and participants do not see themselves as extremists, their views are nevertheless rather extreme, i.e. anti-democratic and derogatory against certain minorities.”

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Time for the 89ers to Defend Europe

By Henry Radice

On the eleventh day of the eleventh month, the familiar rituals of remembrance feel particularly poignant in a year marking the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War, yet itself scarred by a grim array of conflicts which seem appallingly to celebrate, rather than to mourn, the innovations in inhumanity witnessed a century ago.

BerlinWall-BrandenburgGateIn contrast, our rituals of commemoration of 1989 and its symbolic centrepiece, the fall of the Berlin Wall, remain haphazard and unsettled, despite the far more positive legacy at stake (and the moving celebrations in Berlin on Sunday).

Taking stock of this twenty-five year anniversary in a powerful essay in The Guardian, Timothy Garton Ash asks where the 89ers are, contrasting the absence in our culture of such a group with the undoubted resonance of the generations of 1968 or 1939. Garton Ash ponders whether such a generation of 1989 might yet emerge, placing his hopes in those born at or around the end of the Cold War. But, on reflection, I would also like to lay tentative claim to the label, having come of age in an era in which European political consolidation was rapidly taking place through force of will rather than force of arms. For some of us born almost a decade before the fall of the Wall, a political challenge lies ahead, the importance of which directly relates to the events of 1989. Continue reading “Time for the 89ers to Defend Europe”

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European economy’s invisible transformation: expulsions and predatory capitalism

By Saskia Sassen

Parts of our economies, societies, and states in Europe are being stripped bare by an extreme form of predatory capitalism.[1] And this stripping can coexist with growth in much of our economies. The majority of workers and economic operations keep functioning, even if at reduced levels.

The language of low growth, unemployment, inequality, poverty, is not enough to capture what is going on in the current phase of capitalist political economies. All of these are present, but then they always have been part of capitalism. There is a specific difference I want to capture: something far more brutal and acute that we cannot capture with the usual language. Further, I want to argue that these dynamics are not only hitting Greece, Spain and Portugal, but in fact are present throughout Europe, including Germany and the much admired Scandinavian countries.

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