Current discussions about politics – be it European, British, or American – almost inevitably end up being discussions about populism. Yet we know little about how populist parties communicate their messages. Focusing on this area, and drawing on extensive research from across Europe, Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Stromback, and Claes de Vreese share some key findings on populist political communication.
In light of ongoing social, political, and economic turmoil – and recent populist backlashes against incumbent governments – the study of populism has perhaps never been more important. Yet existing research on populism tends to focus on parties and voters. To understand populism as an increasingly pervasive phenomenon in European politics, it is just as crucial to study the characteristics and organisation of populist parties as their electoral foundation. Indeed, as the Brexit referendum showed, the communicative aspects are also key to understanding the electoral outcome.
The Leave and Remain campaigns were able to make bold claims – not unusual for campaigns on European matters. However, populist political communication was also readily present: messages about self-serving elites, about out-groups – whether immigrants or the EU as a whole – were omnipresent, all while the campaigns were eager to define themselves as representing the ‘ordinary people’. These elements fit strongly with current definitions of populism.
Almost a decade ago, colleagues Jagers and Walgrave suggested a distinction between different types of populism: complete populism, which includes reference and appeals to the people, anti-elitism, and exclusion of outgroups; excluding populism, which includes only reference and appeals to the people, and exclusion of outgroups; anti-elitist populism, which includes reference and appeals to the people together with anti-elitism; empty populism, which includes only reference and appeals to the people.
Despite the plethora of definitions, references to, or the communicative construction of, “the people” should be regarded as the key component of populist messages, with anti-elitism and anti–outgroup stances serving as optional additional elements. These elements can be combined in various ways, resulting in different types of populism.
Constructing an in-group of “the people” lies at the heart of populist political communication. “The people” can have different meanings, and refer to the people as a sovereign group, as a class, as an ethnic group, as a nation etc. The additional elements – anti-elite and anti-outgroup messages – can be regarded as functional equivalents that define the standard to which “the people” (“we”) are contrasted, and strengthen individual identification with the in-group – they foster in-group favouritism, and contribute to self-enhancement, reducing self-uncertainty.
In current European scholarship there is a long list of case studies that help us understand the role of the communication strategies of, for example, Le Pen, Wilders or Orban. There are studies of how the media cover populist actors or launch campaigns themselves which are seen by some as expressions of the so-called media populism. Even still, little systematic evidence is available on the specific role of communication.
In light of this, the research in the new book Populist Political Communication in Europe is unique, covering work published in 24 languages. We show that on the side of populist actors we often find rhetoric that is emotional, includes blame attribution and scapegoats, uses straightforward and sometimes violent language, and presents simplistic solutions to problems. Again, the essence of populist communication consists of references to the people, anti-elitism, and the exclusion of various out-groups. Such an understanding of populist political communication is not merely theoretical but uses examples from several countries and finds empirical evidence of such strategies.
Looking at the media and how they cover populist parties across Europe we also identify three cross-national patterns: the previously limited coverage increased, often spurred by rising poll figures; with the increase in coverage we often see an increase in “negative” coverage – but given the anti-elite and anti-establishment feeling among many citizens, such negative coverage is not actually always negative for populist actors; some media actively engage in critical coverage of populist actors out of concern for democracy. In this way, we can think about the role of the media as populism by the media, populism through the media, and populist citizen journalism.
As scholars we have a wealth of research in different countries. Much of this knowledge remains undisclosed because it is published in different languages. But at the same time, there is a quest for understanding the popularity of populist actors. This goes for Britain, but also for continental Europe and the US in light of its current presidential campaign. We believe that not only including but focusing on the communicative aspects of populism will help us to better understand one of the hallmarks of contemporary politics.
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Note: This article draws on the authors’ edited book Populist Political Communication in Europe. The article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. It originally appeared at our sister site, British Politics and Policy at LSE.
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About the authors
Toril Aalberg is Professor at the Department of Sociology and Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim.
Frank Esser is Professor of International and Comparative Media Research at the University of Zurich.
Carsten Reinemann is Professor in the Department of Communication Studies and Media Research, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich.
Jesper Stromback is Professor in journalism and political communication at the University of Gothenburg.
Claes de Vreese is Professor and Chair of Political Communication in the Department of Communication Science at the University of Amsterdam.
For populist, read “highlighting and promising to address the domestic issues that actually matter to a large proportion of the population”
Actually populist parties do the exact opposite – they ignore all of the issues that actually matter and try to win support by playing on existing grievances and scapegoating some particular set of actors (foreigners, bankers, the EU, it varies). On the rare occasions when they do get into power they usually prove incapable of doing anything they promised because it was unrealistic in the first place.
That’s precisely what UKIP do – they haven’t a single coherent answer to anything that doesn’t involve cutting immigration or leaving the EU/scrapping foreign aid.
Excellent reply Burns. I would add that populist parties rely on ignoring, even vilifying, facts, evidence, rationality and experts, hence inevitably they are ill prepared for the reality of power.
Colin,
Should I assume that you are refering to “populist parties” from elsewhere in Europe and not the UK?
UKIP and the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservatives have been informed by careful, detailed research and knowledge accumulated by organisations like The Bruges Group.
Their papers are full of “facts” “evidence” “rationality” and prepared by “experts”.
The Bruges Group isn’t an independent think tank full of experts researching policies, it’s a front group for Eurosceptic politicians that puts out outlandishly silly figures (every year for the last decade they’ve published “reports” claiming EU membership costs the UK £60-100 billion a year, a figure every established expert on the subject would find laughably overblown). The fact that you think they’re producing “careful, detailed research” full of “facts” produced by “experts” shows how warped your perspective on this subject is. You’re essentially arguing that we should ignore the entirety of learned opinion on a subject and rally behind party political propaganda as an alternative.
You clearly didn’t read UKIP’s manifesto covering nearly 100 policy points.
The vast majority were anything but immigration / EU.
There were plenty of policies that one could disagree with – but “not coherent” seems merely an assertion – probably by someone repeating what their Islington mates told them.
Yes, everyone who dislikes UKIP is a London elitist, great argument.
I suggest you actually bother to read the manifestos yourself. UKIP’s “other” policies have typically been completely incoherent – the hilarious pledge to make the Circle Line a circle, an idiotic flat rate of income tax, scrapping sex education for the under 11s, a blanket scrapping of equality laws (the list goes on). These are exactly the kinds of policies a populist anti-immigration party will come up with if you ask them to expand beyond their core appeal – a mishmash of pointless or outright damaging nonsense that looks like it was brainstormed in an afternoon down the pub.
But of course these policies don’t exist because UKIP actually wants to implement them, they exist so party activists (and their blinkered supporters) can claim they have a broader appeal whenever someone calls them out on being a single issue party – so congratulations on being so utterly predictable.
What is “incoherent” (or “hilarious) about the “Policies” you cite?
(Some are probably “old” and superceded anyway)
– “make the Circle Line a circle”
[not a “top ten” policy but clearly possible – and amongst 100 or so policy points]
– “an idiotic flat rate of income tax”.
[Why “idiotic”? It’s definitely “fairer” while ensuring that the rich always pay more than the poor. It’s also simpler (and fairer) when “special interest” allowances are cut to balance the books.]
– “scrapping sex education for the under 11s”.
[Plenty of people think sex-ed has gone too far in some schools. Personally I think that sex-ed for under 11’s can be OK – but some of the materials/messages have been questionable. Parents should be told/shown what their children will be taught.]
– “a blanket scrapping of equality laws”
[Please provide the source for “blanket scrapping”. There does seem to be an issue with minority “monitoring” when it leads to targets for minorities and consequent LACK of equal treatment for non-minorities.]
In short, disagreement is fair enough – but throw-away “trashing” is hardly intelligent discourse.
“populist actors we often find rhetoric that is emotional, includes blame attribution and scapegoats, ….. and presents simplistic solutions to problems.”
And how is that different from Labour and Conservative ???
Do Labour and Conservative not use:
– emotion (deserving causes, fear of criminals or enemies etc)
– blame attribution and scapegoats (bankers, previous government, trade unions, benefit fraudsters etc)
– simplistic solutions (tax more, spend more, make more laws, build more houses etc)
This article seems a weak attempt to undermine popular, democratic movements who challenge out of touch establishment orthodoxy?
Are the Authors worried that they may be part of that establishment ??
Well said in all your comments Jules.
Labour, the Tories and the (despicable) Libdems have, over the decades, consistently taken the voters of this Country for granted, believing that they had a monopoly on power. Government after Government ignored large sections of the voters, dismissing their concerns as groundless, while they lied through their teeth to get power. UKIP has broken that hold on power by putting forward an alternative vision of our future, which resonated with sufficient numbers of voters to ensure that the leave campaign was successful in the recent referendum.
UKIP haven’t offered an alternative vision, they’ve offered a scapegoat. Their entire platform is based on the idea that leaving the EU will make us better off by default. It won’t and their answer when that becomes apparent will no doubt be to berate the government for backtracking on Brexit (Farage is already laying the groundwork for this today with his comments about May) or simply call for further limits on foreign influence – fewer refugees, scrap foreign aid, forced deportations (and so on).
Anyone with a brain can see that for what it is.
Jules: Frantically pointing at the existence of other policies is irrelevant, that doesn’t mean they derive their support from the rest of their platform. Nobody in their right mind would vote for UKIP first and foremost because they think the Circle Line should be a Circle (and that absolutely is hilarious) while their other policies are so all over the place that it’s impossible to meaningfully characterise them. They also veer wildly from one standpoint to another between elections – see health for a classic example, or the fact that the 2015 manifesto ditched the vast majority of the “other” policies they had put forward in 2010 (and I fully expect the next leader to do something similar). Why? Because these policies are window dressing, not where they derive their support from.
I know you don’t get that, you’re not observing the party from outside, you’re unthinkingly defending the party like it’s a football team and demonstrating the same gullible worldview you see constantly from UKIP diehards. There are thousands of people like you all over the internet and trying to engage them in a reasonable way is pointless – just as it’s pointless trying to engage any blinkered zealot in a conversation about their chosen obsession. But there is zero reason why the rest of us have to share your delusion and it you think chirping in on the sidelines of an adult discussion is going to derail it then you couldn’t be more wrong.