Political instability in Libya is viewed as one of the key contributing factors to Europe’s migration crisis, and the EU has taken an active role in addressing the problem. But how effective have the EU’s efforts been in Libya? Based on new research, Luca Raineri highlights some key failings in the EU’s approach, noting that there has been a significant disjoint between the ambitious objectives highlighted by EU leaders and their capacity and willingness to achieve these goals in practice.
The outcome of the recent Italian election has confirmed a trend that is becoming prevalent across the whole of Europe: a rise of far-right parties, propelled by the (perception of a) migration crisis at Europe’s borders. Borders that, insofar as migration is concerned, largely correspond to the Mediterranean Sea and Libya, especially since the EU-Turkey deal has clamped down on the flow of asylum seekers along the Balkan route.
Although populist politicians frequently claim that Brussels has done nothing to prevent the influx of migrants – or has simply made things worse – it is undeniable that the European Union has taken an active role in addressing the Libyan crisis. This crisis is complex and multi-faceted, and involves aspects far more intricate than migration alone, including energy security, strategic competition with Russia, and the struggle against terrorism, as well as subterranean hostilities among EU member states themselves. All of this, while Libyan state institutions have collapsed and there is no credible counterpart to negotiate with in sight, unlike in the case of Turkey.
What is much less clear, though, is the extent to which the EU crisis response in Libya is consistent with the commitments that, according to available strategic documents, should orient European action abroad. These include policy coherence and consistency, a comprehensive approach to security, conflict sensitivity, local ownership, human rights obligations, and humanitarian principles. Indeed, the European crisis response in Libya has exposed Brussels to unprecedented criticism, calling into question the EU’s ambition to be perceived as a bulwark of liberal values inspired by “principled pragmatism” (as per the 2016 Global Strategy), let alone as a “force for good” (2003 European Security Strategy) in its foreign policy and in its neighbourhood.
Take for instance the exceptionally virulent statement issued by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, on the eve of last November’s summit between the EU and the African Union: “the European Union’s policy of assisting the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept and return migrants in the Mediterranean is inhuman… The increasing interventions of the EU and its member states have done nothing so far to reduce the level of abuses suffered by migrants”. One could hardly find a greater discrepancy between this statement and the UNHCR’s assertion that “EU leadership in responding to refugee crises is crucial” and that the UNHCR stands with the EU in “upholding the key European values of solidarity and cooperation”.
Does this mean that EU leaders pay mere lip-service to the principles mentioned above, and that amidst the blood and dust of a real conflict what is written on paper is not actually relevant when it comes to putting into practice concrete policy measures? To answer this question, it is necessary to combine a top-down understanding of policy design with a bottom-up investigation of the implications and practicalities of crisis response on the ground. This is what I and my co-authors have attempted to do in a recent working paper which focuses on how the EU substantiates its crisis response in Libya, focusing on the security practices of practitioners connecting decision-makers in Brussels to final beneficiaries in Libya.
Our findings, which were based on a large set of interviews with key stakeholders in Tunis and Rome, are disturbing. A few examples are particularly illustrative of how the EU crisis response in Libya is falling short of fulfilling its normative commitments. Take the (much publicised) training of the Libyan Coast Guard, which was officially meant to contribute to saving migrants at sea and to help disrupt human smuggling. Our research uncovered that some individuals accused of being responsible for smuggling oil and trafficking human beings appear amongst the beneficiaries of EU training, thereby suggesting that the vetting procedure of the trainees has fallen short of appropriate standards of due diligence. As local sources put it: “criminal groups have already infiltrated everything as a result of thugs being turned into cops”.
No matter how distasteful, this outcome is largely in line with the predictions of the literature on protection economies, which warns that the most likely result of purely security-oriented responses is the sucking of state actors into the gears of the business of irregular migration. Coupled with the disruption of Libya’s institutional framework, the unwarranted legitimisation and co-option of highly controversial security actors can only lead to widespread impunity and a lack of access to legal remedies for the victims of abuses.
More generally, EU-sponsored humanitarian and development programmes in Libya are often subject to high politicisation and pressure from Brussels, carrying the risk of turning needs-driven projects into politically or funds-driven projects. The limited room for local stakeholders to provide input into the process reduces local ownership as well as context and conflict-sensitivity, while remote management amplifies the room for suboptimal project design and monitoring. These shortcomings also affect some of the projects funded by the EU Trust Fund (EUTF), a newly established (and again, much publicised) tool that should theoretically contribute to tackling the root causes of migration.
Our research suggests that there is a significant disjoint between the ambitious objectives and declarations of the EU’s response in Libya, and the EU’s capacity or willingness to achieve its stated goals. Distorted expectations among beneficiaries, local counterparts, and European audiences are the result of prioritising short-term objectives. EU leaders have sought quick-fix solutions in responding to the anxieties of their constituents, who allegedly perceive growing migrant flows from Libya as an existential threat. As migration has become securitised and framed as an emergency, EU leaders have appeared to address the needs of European audiences more than those of Libyan stakeholders and vulnerable groups.
However, this decoupling of rhetoric and practice could lead to EU external action and crisis responses being seen as little more than abstract wish-lists rather than serious policy strategies. And this, in turn, risks lending weight to those who cast doubt on the usefulness of the European Union, both for the wider world as well as for Europe itself. Overlooking EU core liberal values can only make anti-European sentiments more, not less, relevant.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics.
_________________________________
Luca Raineri – Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies
Luca Raineri is a Research Fellow in International Relations and Security Studies at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy.
” EU leaders have appeared to address the needs of European audiences more than those of Libyan stakeholders and vulnerable groups.” I must remind you, Sir, that “the needs of European audiences” are what “EU leaders” are SUPPOSED” to be addressing. Your jargon and verbiage are absolutely typical of the elite contempt for “populist” concerns. You aren’t part of the (contemptible?) class of Europeans who were hurting for jobs, services and housing BEFORE the “refugee crisis”.
Hear me; those who want a much more humane response to irregular migration and refugee flows simply MUST pay respectful attention to the needs and fears of low-no-income EU citizens. The more contempt you and those like you show for the human beings who comprise the “populist” class, the angrier they get and the more they will pull the EU (AND the USA) to the right. You and those like you can scold, moralize, legalize and turn up your superior noses when you are forced to take the needs and concerns of “populists” into consideration, but you have to grasp the fact that no matter how certain you are that those “populist” concerns are beneath your sense of what’s important, those “populists” are turning into raging fascists. Ignore hurting, angry, frightened EU citizens and you risk reversing progressive gains all over the first-world West.
Laura, with respect, you seem to be trying to argue that caring about some of the most vulnerable people in the world (people with no welfare protections, no access to healthcare, no rights, no homes, no possessions, people fleeing a warzone) is an “elitist” viewpoint. It’s the exact opposite of an elitist worldview to care about what happens to some of the worst off people in the world. Similarly, the idea that anyone who cares about refugees doesn’t care about the poorest citizens in the EU is flawed in the extreme.
The “populist” argument is to claim that the way to help poor EU citizens is to keep refugees out (rather than to actually tackle the problems in EU countries that cause people to fall into poverty in the first place, which has almost nothing to do with the presence of refugees, who are simply an easy vote-winning scapegoat). It’s a spectacularly bad argument and it will do nothing, at all, to actually help those in need. If you believe this then great, but if the only defence you have of your arguments is to cry “elitism” any time someone disagrees with you then you can’t have much confidence in your own opinions.
The admonitions aimed at struggling westerners to do more to accommodate refugees (and economic migrants) have come from the wealthier, better-educated and more politically empowered class. Struggling middle/low-income westerners were already feeling socially and economically neglected and then they shamed and sneered-at, accused of “populism”, ignorance, xenophobia and racism by people who have higher incomes, more opportunities and more political clout when those non-“elite” expressed their concerns and objections to refugee/migration flows.
The worst thing, IMO, about the elitist contempt for the concerns of struggling westerners is that the vast majority of more-privileged westerners will NEVER experience any of the negative impacts of mass migration that the least-privileged do. More-privileged westerners who have been shaming and sneering at less-privileged westerners concerned about refugee/migrant flows are not those facing longer waits for housing and health care. Their kids are not sharing already-overcrowded schools. They are not facing increasing crime and intimidation in the streets and public transportation from young migrant/refugee men.
What you don’t seem to understand is that formerly live-and-let-live westerners who were never racist or xenophobic and who felt compassion for not just refugees but for economic migrants have not just had their standards of living directly affected by mass inflows of refugees/migrants, they are being ignored or shamed for their honest concerns and fears. The direct results of failing to support struggling western citizens while they are held in contempt for their concerns is that the west is moving to the right and even the extreme right. This cause/effect was so predictable. My point is that refusing to respectfully address the concerns of the EU’s least privileged is working directly against the desire to welcome and support vulnerable refugees/migrants. This isn’t going to end well.
Look, the points you’re making are made so regularly that everybody “understands” them at this stage. But understanding a point is not the same thing as agreeing with it.
1. Many of those people who care about the fate of refugees are also poor. If you see pictures of a dead three-year-old boy washed up on a Mediterranean beach you don’t need to have a 100,000 euro a year salary to have sympathy for him. All you need, in fact, is a basic bit of humanity. It isn’t an “elite” concern to see images like that and want to do something about it.
2. Nobody mentioned racism here. It’s a classic straw man argument you hear again and again from those who oppose immigration to claim they’re being accused of racism. At best what you’re arguing against is a kind of stereotype of an elitist millionaire, sitting in a mansion sneering at the poor for being racist. Maybe such a person actually exists somewhere, but it has nothing to do with the conversation we’re having here and I think if you stop arguing against fictional monsters and engage with people on a human level you’ll find people are far more reasonable than you think.
3. We simply have to say here that political parties are using the refugee issue for their own purpose. They’re waving that issue in front of people, claiming that the presence of refugees is the real cause of their poverty, and using that platform to win power. You’ve said that I don’t understand what poor citizens in Europe think (shall we compare bank statements to see who is poorer?) but you have to understand how politicians think. Salvini, Wilders, Farage, Le Pen don’t care about the poor, they aren’t going to make your life better, it’s just a path to winning power for themselves to pretend refugees (those who can’t defend themselves, those who are an easy target) are the cause of all our problems. Caring about the poor does not mean we have to support Salvini or stop caring about poor people with the wrong passport.
Alan Kurdi’s death was a terrible example to support your arguments. The child was a victim of his parents’ bad judgement. The family was safe in Turkey but it wasn’t a sweet enough deal…So they paid a crapload of $ to some amoral human traffickers and loaded their tiny boy into an unsafe boat and let HIM take THEIR chances on a disastrous voyage between Turkey and Greece. It wasn’t a trip that had to be made. That family was no longer feeling Kobani’s hell-on-Earth violence. There is no excuse for what that child’s parents did. Assad is guilty for the Syrian civil war, ISIS is guilty for their genocidal reign of terror and Alan’s PARENTS are responsible for their innocent baby lying dead on that beach.
I live in the USA and you know who rules here. Trump was elected due to a populist backlash and every day there is some new, humiliating and frightening outrage coming from his mouth and the WH. Trust me, it sucks and I think it’ll get worse before it gets better. Italy (and the rest of the EU) is going to suffer the same political fate as the USA; Salvini and probably worse to come. This is because everyday EU citizens were ignored at best and at worst held in contempt by the more-liberal political establishment. If you can’t see why this happened to us in the USA (TRUMP- OMG) and can’t see that the EU is following the exact same pattern, you are willfully blind.
The first-world has to support developing-world poor where they live. Unfortunately, every intervention and almost every aid program that the privileged West has tried to apply to the benefit of the developing world seems to have backfired whether the intent was genuine or not. Overpopulation and climate change and the inevitable unrest and violence are creating ever more dire situations in the developing world. The solution is NOT to welcome the world’s dispossessed into an increasingly stretched-thin first world. That “borderless” fantasy is already backfiring and if the conflict between low-middle income westerners and too many developing-world refugees and economic migrants is not defused, things are going to get much, much uglier.