Slovenia was considered a star pupil among the states that joined the EU in 2004. Ana Bojinović Fenko writes that despite facing several acute challenges since accession, the country’s approach to the EU remains characterised by a distinct brand of “Euro-optimism”.
Since gaining independence in 1991, Slovenia has considered European integration as key to its survival and prosperity as a small multi-ethnic state. Such a highly Euro-optimist stance motivated Slovenian governments from the 1990s to 2003 to implement not only EU enlargement conditionality but also bilateral demands from Italy and Austria.
Slovenia and the EU
As a post-communist and Mediterranean country, burdened with post-Yugoslav succession issues, Slovenia held a peculiar in-between position among the ten “Big Bang” countries, which was initially perceived as an obstacle to fully belonging to the two groups. Ljubljana was discouraged from joining the Visegrád Group in 1993 and was not accepted as a participating state of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
In 1999 it ended its “away from the Balkans” policy and positioned itself as a Central European bridge between the EU and Southeastern Europe. Slovenia became fully integrated into the EU as a member of the Eurozone and the Schengen Area in 2007 and it became a member of the EU Med group in 2021.
After joining the EU, Slovenia was largely passive in EU affairs. The complacency of the Slovenian political elite towards EU issues and their limited policy engagement left the country unrecognised and isolated in Brussels. Even during Slovenia’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2008, Ljubljana “played it safe” rather than presenting impactful policy positions.
However, the 2015-16 migration crisis jolted politicians into action and marked the beginning of Slovenia’s active engagement in EU policymaking. A serious attack on Slovenian democracy by Janez Janša’s 2020-22 government not only triggered protests but also reignited Slovenian civil society’s self-identification as “being a part of the EU’s core”. Since the end of Janša’s third term as Prime Minister in 2022, Slovenia has emerged as an engaged participant in EU affairs and global diplomacy.
From star pupil to escaping an economic bailout
After the 2004 EU accession, the economic benefits of EU membership were clearly visible. Economic elites enjoyed the opportunities offered by the EU market, especially after Slovenia adopted the euro in January 2007, and even state-owned companies avoided pressure since Slovenia opted for a slow privatisation process. The first four years of Slovenia’s EU membership has been referred to as “the period of fat cows” due to the sharp increase in economic prosperity brought on by excessive government spending at a time of economic growth across the EU.
However, the economic and financial crisis brought Slovenia back to reality. Now, it was the time of “thin cows”. Slovenia’s previous high public expenditure brought the country to the verge of a bailout and led to the introduction of strict austerity measures in 2012. Slovenia inserted the “golden fiscal rule” into its Constitution and committed to meeting remaining liberal market conditions set by the European Commission, thus effectively finalising the country’s economic transition by completing the privatisation of state-owned companies.
Slovenia has a social state model of development based on strong public policies with one of the highest socio-economic equality scores in the world. The restructuring of the labour market therefore dealt a heavy blow to the Slovenian public, who are highly sensitive to any erosion of socio-economic equality.
However, the austerity measures also made citizens realise that the passive “blame it on Brussels” approach of political elites would not bring about the expected positive effects of EU membership and should not be tolerated. Civil society and market actors developed more realistic expectations of EU membership, such as high standards of food safety, EU-wide universal access to public health, positive measures for small and medium enterprises, a common primary school course on the EU and enlargement to the Western Balkans.
In recent years, Slovenia has been back on track for competitiveness and economic growth. The country has a lower than EU-average unemployment rate for 15 to 29 year olds (8% compared to 11% the EU average). The same is true of Slovenia’s risk of poverty rate, which sits at 12.1% compared to 16.5% for the EU average. Slovenia’s real GDP growth rate was 4.4% in 2004 (the EU average was 2.5%), while in 2023 it was 1.6% (against an EU average of 0.4%). GDP per capita in 2023 (in PPP) was 91% of the EU average and Slovenia is projected to become a net payer into the EU budget for the 2028-32 period.
Euro-optimism
During the initial five years of EU membership, Euro-optimism characterised the views of Slovenian citizens. In 2006, 60% of Slovenes had a positive image of the EU and 63% trusted the EU (the second highest score in the EU). Support for the EU then decreased between 2012 and 2014, when Slovenia contributed to the Greek bailout while facing its own fiscal and economic challenges.
However, in 2024 Slovenia again registered one of the highest levels of support (88%) for the euro and 77% of Slovenians indicated they feel they are citizens of the EU. Overall, the EU has a neutral or positive reputation in the eyes of most Slovenians, though the average figures for the EU are slightly more positive. For Slovenians, the most common things associated with the EU are freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU, peace and the common currency.
An active civil society against de-democratisation
Slovenia is considered a democratic transition success story and has been regarded as one of the strongest performers in Eastern Europe. However, democratic backsliding took place during the 2020-22 government led by the Slovenian Democratic Party under Janez Janša, which coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic.
The government used the health crisis as a justification to engage in systematic illiberal practices. These included the erosion of democratic practices and institutions and ruling by decree, diminishing the role of the National Assembly, limiting or obstructing the opposition and attempting to limit the independence of the judiciary. The government undermined civil liberties and used unprecedented physical violence at public protests. It also sought to concentrate power through state capture and curtailed media freedom and independence.
In 2021, concerns about the rule of law in Slovenia cast a shadow over the second Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the EU. The European Commission noted the state of the rule of law in its annual reports and the European Parliament issued a critical resolution on fundamental rights and the rule of law in Slovenia, urging the government to act on 17 points considered grave violations of European values.
After continuous anti-government protests, more than 70% of the electorate voted in the April 2022 elections, which were won by the Freedom Movement (Gibanje Svoboda). The vote represented a clear and loud “no” to illiberal democracy, effectively putting a stop to the so-called “Orbánisation” of Slovenia.
Slovenia in the EU
In terms of the political agenda, a large vacuum appeared after EU membership. It seemed that the main tasks from Slovenia’s 1999 foreign policy strategy had been achieved: consolidated statehood, joining the EU and Nato membership. Political elites relaxed and essentially every Slovenian government afterwards simply followed the European Commission’s political agenda.
Studies in 2008 observed very weak Europeanisation among Slovenian political parties, with only some organisational changes occurring rather than substantive changes to party manifestoes. The same result was confirmed after 15 years of membership. The state became passive to such an extent that consecutive governments did not formulate a new foreign policy strategy until 2015.
The main Slovenian contribution to EU policymaking in this period came when Slovenia became the first among the Big Bang group to hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2008. Although Ljubljana positioned itself as a strong advocate for further enlargement in the Western Balkans, the Slovenian Presidency failed to develop a common EU position on Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. This reflected the inconsistent stances of EU member states on the issue as well as Slovenia’s limited capabilities.
The 2015-16 migration crisis was a key turning point. The crisis compelled Slovenia to actively engage in EU policymaking to avoid becoming a “pocket state” for migrants if EU member states responded inconsistently to the flow of refugees and migrants along the Balkan route. Despite pressure from opposition right-wing parties, the government led by law professor Miro Cerar managed to develop a primarily humanitarian rather than securitised response and strongly advocated for a common EU solution.
A committed pro-European member state
In recent years, Slovenia has been active and visible in European and international politics, grounding its foreign policy on sustainability and feminist principles. The country was elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the 2024-2025 term.
Ljubljana has implemented policy initiatives in high alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and values, and has advocated for building trust and respect in international law, conflict prevention, the promotion of gender equality and climate security. In December 2024, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs led by Tanja Fajon, a former MEP, endorsed a new foreign policy strategy in which it confirms “Slovenia’s vital position in the core Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area and expands Slovenian foreign policy priorities into the global space” through active engagement within the EU, but also in Nato and the UN.
Slovenia remains a staunch supporter of further European integration. It is in favour of the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and strongly advocates for future enlargements especially in the Western Balkans.
Having positioned itself as a model for other countries from the region to follow, Ljubljana was disappointed by the European Court of Justice judgment regarding its lack of jurisdiction in resolving the Yugoslav succession bilateral border dispute with Croatia. Nevertheless, Slovenia remains committed to the European project and will continue to actively contribute to debates about the future of the Union.
This article is part of a series organised by Eli Gateva on Rethinking Europe’s East-West Divide – 20 Years since the Big Bang Enlargement.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union / Shutterstock.com
