Alessia Corti

February 20th, 2025

What are the legal implications and human rights concerns of the 2024 Italy-Albania agreement on migration?

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Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Alessia Corti

February 20th, 2025

What are the legal implications and human rights concerns of the 2024 Italy-Albania agreement on migration?

4 comments | 10 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

The expansion of offshore asylum processing has raised international concerns over human rights. Alessia Corti examines whether the 2024 Italy-Albania Migration Agreement breaches Italy’s international human rights obligations.


In February 2024, Italy and Albania agreed to transfer up to 36,000 asylum seekers yearly from Italy to two detention centres in Albania. Fully funded by the Italian government (Article 4 (5), Protocol Italy-Albania, Law n.14/24), these centres are seemingly designated for “fast-track asylum procedures”. Migrants deemed ineligible for asylum will remain detained in these Albanian centres until repatriation (Law n.14/24).

Offshoring processing allows Western states to shift the responsibility for asylum seekers onto third countries, distancing themselves from direct accountability and potential human rights violations. Outsourcing asylum procedures can create legal and practical barriers that hinder asylum seekers’ access to fair protections under international law.

The Italy-Albania agreement applies to migrants rescued in international waters by the Italian Coast Guard and the Italian Navy. Crucially, decisions on eligibility for transfer to Albania are made on board the rescue ships. Only individuals from countries designated as “safe”, excluding vulnerable groups such as children and pregnant women (though this exclusion is not explicitly stated), are sent to Albania. Initially brought to a centre in Shengjin for asylum processing, those denied asylum are transferred to another facility in Gjader to await repatriation. Unlike the UK-Rwanda migration plan, these Albanian centres operate under Italian law.

This agreement has sparked significant legal and ethical concerns. Critics argue that conducting vulnerability assessments aboard rescue vessels lacks fairness and humanity. Indeed, conducting such evaluations in the middle of the sea means conducting them without the necessary medical, psychological, and linguistic personnel to assess the migrant’s circumstances comprehensively. For instance, doctors are essential in addressing migrants’ health conditions or eventual pregnancies, and psychologists are vital in determining whether migrants suffered torture. Furthermore, conducting these assessments on board can exacerbate the psychological stress of migrants, forcing them to stay longer than required on the sea while facing life-altering interrogations in a language they may not understand. The inadequacy of these on-board assessments was demonstrated during the first implementation of the agreement in October 2024, when 16 migrants were transferred to Albania; however, 4 of them were quickly returned to Italy after it emerged that some were minors and others had pressing medical conditions.

In a report published in January 2024, Amnesty International had already expressed the risks of determining the “vulnerability” of the asylum seekers on the rescue boat. The organisation emphasised the lack of resources and time required for accurate and fair evaluations, noting that decisions made under such circumstances jeopardise migrants’ chances of obtaining asylum.

Indeed, the test of vulnerability and the determination of whether a migrant’s country of origin is “safe” have the purpose of sending to Albania those whose asylum applications are expected, for the majority, to be rejected. Amnesty also pointed out that international law obliges states to minimise the time rescued migrants spend at sea and ensure prompt disembarkation in a place of safety. Sending migrants to Albania—a journey of over 926 km — violates this obligation and compounds their trauma.

 Let’s take a moment to consider the real-life consequences of this agreement on those seeking asylum.

A migrant crosses the Mediterranean in a small, overcrowded rubber boat, fleeing war, persecution, or extreme hardship. Under the cover of night, the rubber boat capsizes. People fight to stay afloat, gasping for air, as others succumb to the waves. Eventually, the Italian Coast Guard rescues the survivors, offering a momentary sense of relief—but they remain at sea. Many are in a state of shock, exhausted and traumatised, yet they must immediately undergo questioning in a language they may not understand. This happens without any legal aid, medical evaluation, or psychological support. Their responses, given under extreme distress, determine their fate. Some will be transferred to Albania—a country they may have no connection to—where they face a fast-track asylum process, the haste of which comes from the assumption that their application will be rejected.

Days at sea turn into weeks of detention, then months of limbo. Those deemed ineligible face repatriation to the very dangers they risked their lives to escape. Lacking empathy and violating international obligations, this process erodes the migrants’ human dignity.

The agreement’s reliance on the concept of “safe countries” has also been criticised. In October 2024, the Court of Rome ordered the return of all migrants transferred to Albania, citing the “impossibility of recognising as safe countries the countries of origin of the detained persons”, namely Egypt and Bangladesh. The court referenced a ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In response, the Italian government issued a decree law (decreto legge) listing 19 “safe” countries, including Egypt and Bangladesh. However, the question remains: safe for whom? The 1951 Convention (Article 1 (2)) defines a refugee as someone with a well-founded fear of persecution. This includes people targeted due to their membership to a particular social group, such as LGBTQI+ individuals or women and girls risking genital mutilation. For these individuals, countries described as safe by the Italian government, such as Bangladesh or Egypt, might not be safe at all. Returning asylum seekers to such places violates the principle of non-refoulment (1951 Refugee Convention, Article 33 (1)) which prohibits sending individuals to countries where they might face serious harm; and is a non-derogable norm, meaning that non-refoulment cannot be suspended or ignored, even upon the consent of states.

Concerns about the migrant’s human rights extend beyond the transfer process. Drawing parallels with the 2017 Italy-Libya memorandum, human rights groups fear a risk of recurrence, in the Albanian centres, of the human rights abuses happening in the centres in Libya, which include torture and inhumane living conditions. Although Albania’s centres are governed by Italian law, oversight mechanisms and transparency remain limited, raising concerns about the treatment of migrants after transfer.

While addressing migration challenges is complex, policies must adhere to international law and prioritise humanity and fairness. This agreement, as it stands, risks threatening the dignity and rights of asylum seekers and undermines the very principles of asylum.


All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of the Department of Sociology, LSE Human Rights, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Image credit: Julie Ricard

About the author

Alessia Corti

Alessia Corti is an MSc student in Human Rights at LSE. Within the field of human rights, she is interested in refugee rights, gender, and their intersectionality, as well as broader questions of internationalism and postcolonial theory.

Posted In: Migration

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