The public expects scientists to be certain and unbiased when informing policy. Often they can’t be, which leads to distrust. Vanessa Schipani argues journalists can help scientists earn the public’s trust in these cases by pointing out when scientists are being responsive to alternative hypotheses and the public’s values.

Midway through the 2016 U.S. presidential election, I was hired as a journalist to report on politicians’ claims about science for FactCheck.org. Coming off of finishing a master’s in the history and philosophy of science, my eye for stories was more philosophical than most. Starting with my first article on whether climate science was pseudoscience (spoiler: it’s not), I noticed a trend in how politicians misunderstood the process of science, especially when it came to arguing for policy inaction: They set the bar for action at certainty, and they condemned researchers when they offered their opinions about how we should act when the science remained uncertain.

Now on the cusp of finishing a dissertation on trust in science, I see more clearly the trick these politicians (and the tobacco industry executives who came before them) were playing: If you set the bar for action at an unachievable level (certainty), then you never need to act. Unfortunately, this is a trick that many members of the public fell for because a certain image of science permeates popular culture. In our films, classrooms, and, yes, in our journalistic reporting, we portray scientists as depositories of indisputable, value-free facts, trustworthy only when in consensus. So, when scientists disagree, aren’t certain or share their values and opinions publicly, we think we shouldn’t trust them. As many philosophers of science, including myself, have come to agree, this view of science is mistaken.

If you set the bar for action at an unachievable level (certainty), then you never need to act.

In a recent paper, I outline how this faulty image of science makes it difficult for journalists to ethically abide by the norms of their trade when reporting on scientific disagreement – an image, let us not forget, to which they themselves contributed. By integrating social science research on science communication and philosophical work on trust in science, I also offer a solution to this problem – what I call the responsiveness model of trust in science. The model grounds trust in a characteristic central to both science and democracy: responsiveness. As I explain below, journalists not only need this model to be able to ethically carry out their work, but they’re also a crucial component of model’s success.

The model grounds trust in a characteristic central to both science and democracy: responsiveness.

Here, in short, is the problem that journalists face: Good journalists care about maximizing the accuracy of their reporting. They also care about minimizing their reporting’s harm. These are two central journalistic norms. But when journalists accurately report science rife with disagreement, there’s a reasonable chance their coverage might lead to distrust of science, as recent research on communicating scientific uncertainty suggests. In many policy-relevant cases, this distrust could lead to tangible harm, such as not wearing a mask when doing so may prevent the spread of a deadly virus. Most policy-relevant science is rife with disagreement, so this means that much accurate reporting of such science may risk causing the public harm.

I illustrate this argument by outlining how this problem occurred early in the coronavirus pandemic when scientists disagreed about the efficacy of broadscale masking in curbing the virus’ spread. Along with debates over how to interpret the data, these disagreements were grounded in value differences, including how to best protect the public’s health and rights. With all this disagreement, it may come as no surprise that the public lost trust in science during the pandemic, at least in countries like the United States. Unfortunately, scientists have only continued to lose the American public’s trust since then. This has led many to look for ways to convince the public to trust scientists.

when journalists report disagreement, they can minimize potential risks by explaining why trust in scientists’ claims is warranted

How can we overcome this problem? We need to shift the public’s image of science, which is exactly what I designed the responsiveness model to do. This model helps journalists mitigate the risks associated with reporting scientific disagreement by instructing them to communicate reasons that warrant the public’s trust in scientists that go beyond certainty, value-freedom and consensus. Instead, when journalists report disagreement, they can minimize potential risks by explaining why trust in scientists’ claims is warranted when scientists exhibit a responsiveness to evidence, especially alternative hypotheses, and to the public’s values. Importantly, the responsiveness model also requires journalists to verify and communicate whether scientists are being properly responsive, thereby performing their central duties in a democracy – cultivating a well-informed public and acting as the public’s watchdogs.

In short, the model tells journalists to do a better job of explaining the process of science to the public, instead of just its product – knowledge. As research by my colleagues suggests, this is something journalists have historically failed to do. Outside of my time at FactCheck.org my own experience as journalists can attest to this. Of course, knowledge is important, but obtaining knowledge is difficult, and my point is that we need to trust scientists even before they know. Otherwise, as some politicians might hope, we’d rarely act. And when we do act, it often might be too late, as may be the case with climate change.

knowledge is important, but obtaining knowledge is difficult, and my point is that we need to trust scientists even before they know.

All this philosophical theory is well and good, you might say, but the question is – would the model actually work in practice? Recent research suggests that it would. It turns out that being responsive to other people’s points of view could make them more receptive to your point of view. As one researcher put it, “acknowledging the target’s opinion is conceptually similar to doing a favor,” as both acts are “[b]ased on the social influence principle of reciprocity.” So, instead of asking how we can convince the public to trust scientists, my research asks – how can scientists earn the public’s trust? It turns out doing the public a favor by being responsive to their values might help.

This post draws on the author’s article, Journalism and public trust in science, published in Synthese. You can find more of her work on her website, http://www.vanessaschipani.com/

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