Besides regional disparities and factors like age, sex and cultural identity, how much did attitudes towards inequality influence voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum? Queena Chong investigates, drawing on research jointly undertaken with Joan Costa-i-Font, Frank Cowell and Jakob Dirksen.

Brexit is estimated to have led to the UK economy being 5% smaller by 2023 than it would have been had the UK remained in the European Union. It is also widely regarded as being key to the 2023 cost-of-living crisis. Yet, despite well-known risks, over 17 million voters chose to leave the EU on 23 June 2016. This raises a critical question: what drove this decision to overturn the stability of the status quo? And what might have led to a different referendum result?

In our recent paper, part of the Perceptions of Inequality Research Programme, we investigate how factors such as inequality aversion and risk aversion might have influenced the Brexit vote, helping to shape perhaps the most consequential event so far in 21st century UK history.

Why does inequality aversion matter?

Reducing inequality typically involves trade-offs: we usually have to be prepared to forgo certain resources in order to reduce disparities. Inequality aversion can be expressed in terms of how much one is willing to give up in order to reduce inequality by a certain amount. Hence, changes in inequality aversion influence individuals’ support for programs and even institutions that work to reduce inequality.

In our analysis, we studied income and health inequality aversion, and how these might have affected the referendum result. Using a survey-based experiment, the study asked participants to choose which type of society they would prefer for an “imaginary grandchild” to live in without knowing their grandchild’s income and health status. Hypothetical scenarios included incomes ranging from £20,000 to £100,000 with an average of £60,000 or – in another case – incomes ranging from £30,000 to £70,000 with an average of £50,000. For health, similar scenarios were built using differences in healthy life expectancy. Participants’ choices allowed us to quantify their aversion to income and health inequality.

We find that greater aversion to income inequality was associated with a lower probability of voting Leave. At least, this was notable for male voters, where income inequality aversion made them 5% less likely to vote Leave (we found no substantial correlation for female voters). This is in line with the idea that limited consideration of inequality underpinned voting leave in the referendum. Health inequality aversion was also associated with a lower likelihood of voting Leave, but compared to income-inequality aversion, individuals appeared less certain or consistent in their aversion to health inequality.

In general, both income and health inequality aversions tended to be more prominent in the northern regions of the UK, with Scotland the most averse to health inequality. That said, aversion to the two forms of inequality did not always go hand-in-hand: London was found to be the least averse to health inequality but the most averse to income inequality. This might reflect the fact that the capital has a very large income disparity – making residents more sensitive to income inequality – alongside its relatively well-developed healthcare infrastructures, which may have contributed to lower scores for health inequality aversion.

Attitudes towards inequality varied considerably by age. Younger voters (aged 18-24) were, on average, much less averse to income and health inequalities than the middle-aged group (45-54). The former had an income and health inequality aversion of 0.4, which indicates a relatively low willingness to sacrifice aggregate outcomes in exchange for reducing inequality. By comparison, the middle-aged voters had a much higher average score of 1.3, suggesting they were substantially more willing to incur a cost to achieve greater equality. This age gap may reflect the younger generation’s perception of having more equal access to resources and services, such as income distribution and healthcare.

Overall, we found income inequality aversion to be consistently stronger than health inequality aversion, both across and amongst different age brackets.

Inequality aversion, or just risk aversion?

Inequality-averse voters may have supported Remain for a number of reasons. Leaving the EU meant greater uncertainty regarding income stability due to the loss of investments and jobs. The UK’s loss of membership in the European Single Market or the EU Customs Union, meanwhile, meant likely increases in trade frictions with other European countries. These factors, if considered, might lead to expected increases in income inequality, causing inequality-averse voters to be hesitant to leave the European Union.

What might have therefore driven Brexit supporters to take such a leap into uncertainty? Risk aversion may have been instrumental here. Studies suggest that aversion to inequality is often associated with risk aversion. Previous analyses suggest that risk-tolerant voters might have been more likely to perceive Brexit as a risk worth taking in exchange for the benefits of “regaining sovereignty”, controlling immigration, or building new trade agreements. These voters were willing to accept economic uncertainties in light of the promise of “national autonomy”.

Cultural identity and diversity

Cultural identity also appears to have played a significant role in Brexit voting behaviour. Previous studies found that those who identified strongly as British and who expressed anti-immigrant sentiments were more likely to support Brexit. This may be explained by their nationalist values and adherence to sovereignty narratives, like fears of cultural dilution and their viewing of the UK’s European membership as a threat to national identity. Many voters may thus have seen Brexit as an opportunity to safeguard cultural identity and national sovereignty. However, certain economic concerns, too – particularly regarding job security and immigration – might have played a part in influencing voters’ stance.

By 2016, there were approximately 2.2million EU nationals working in the UK, accounting for 7% of the national workforce, arousing fear of unemployment among some British people. 2016 YouGov survey results indicate that households with an income of less than £20,000 were nearly 30% more likely to vote Leave compared to those with an income of £60,000 or more. This may have been because the former group felt more vulnerable to financial challenges and job insecurity. Thus, economic anxieties may have contributed to negative EU membership sentiments.

Among the most striking predictors of voting behaviour is undoubtedly age. Polls have shown that voters over 50 were twice as likely to vote for Leave compared to voters under 24. Younger voters likely were raised in a more interconnected Europe, benefitting from opportunities such as studying or working in Europe and interacting with European individuals of similar age. These experiences may have led them to view EU Membership as culturally and economically beneficial. By contrast, older voters, perhaps more focused on sovereignty and immigration control, appeared to be more inclined to support Brexit.

Concluding remarks

Understanding what influenced voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum helps us identify societal issues that might require further attention. Besides regional disparities and factors like age, sex and cultural identity, the Brexit example suggests that the population’s attitudes towards inequality might have been important. Looking ahead to future political decisions, it could be that greater awareness or concern about inequality amongst certain demographic groups could have a decisive bearing on outcomes for society.

Written by Queena Chong together with Joan Costa-i-Font, Frank Cowell and Jakob Dirksen.

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All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s). They do not represent the position of LSE Inequalities, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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