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Migration has been securitised through discourse, such as politicians’ speeches associating migrants with national security, and practices, like surveillance policies treating migrants as threats. These maintain and reinforce the political and economic interests of the political elite, security actors, and neighbouring third countries at the expense of ineffective policies, migrant protection, and human rights.
In Europe, migration has been securitised through various speeches and statements in which politicians define migrants as a threat to national security and call for exceptional measures to deal with them. European politicians have often portrayed migrants as collective invaders, criminals, and enemies of the European people, their identity, and their rights. For example, the UK’s Nigel Farage, former leader of UKIP (formerly known as the Brexit party), claimed that migrants created a “security crisis” and that jihadist fighters would be among them, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has said migration is poison, and Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni argued that the country faces a migrant “invasion”. The political salience of migration and the rise of the extreme right in Europe is evidence that Europeans have increasingly adhered to discourses of this kind.
Apart from speeches and statements, migration is also securitised through security practices. In Europe, border security has increased, there is more collaboration between security actors, and more surveillance technologies are used. We see this for example through Frontex’s expanding role in migration control. In 2015, it began coordinating operations that surveil borders, gathering intelligence on smuggling networks, and collaborating with Europol, European government authorities, and NATO, a military actor. Frontex’s focus on tackling criminality and its militarised activities evidence the securitisation of migration.
The problem is that treating migrants as threats has several harmful consequences. It maintains and reinforces certain actors’ political and economic interests at the expense of ineffective policies, migrant protection, and human rights.
It reinforces the political elite’s interests: electoral gains. By defining migration as a security threat, politicians contribute to people’s fears and gain anxious voters’ support because they become perceived as the solution to societal problems. The rise of the extreme right and the political salience of migration mentioned above shows that securitising migrants has indeed increased fears and political support for such politicians. The EU’s recent shift to the right following the European elections further testifies to this, as political observers attribute the extreme-right’s victories to rising anti-immigration sentiments and other socio-political concerns.
It benefits security actors’ interests: a self-fulfilling business. If migrants are perceived as threats, as long as they arrive, security actors will always have a crisis to manage. The economic benefits of a self-fulfilling business are clear for security actors. By lobbying European governments, they receive millions for migrant detention, border barriers, surveillance technology, and military hardware. Frontex’s budget increased from €19m in 2004 to €143m in 2015. Such “Illegality industry” reflects how framing migrants as threats to national security always warrants more business for security actors, even if their solutions are ineffective.
It benefits neighbouring third-country countries’ interests: more money and power. Through partnerships and informal relations with these countries, European governments externalise migration controls while granting benefits and allowing bargaining power for third countries. Morocco has used its leverage in migration to demand more funding from the EU and, through a partnership with Italy in 2008, Libya was granted 5 billion euros in exchange for migration control and migrant disembarkation on its land. As a result, the EU lost influence in its interactions with neighbouring countries while the latter benefited.
All of these interests in perpetuating the securitisation of migration have led to ineffective policies, lack of migrant protection, and human rights violations. In Europe, security measures making border crossings more difficult led to new illegal routes and a stronger smuggling business. Security measures do not solve the problem, they strengthen and displace it. Additionally, they make journeys more dangerous, which is evidenced by an increasing number of deaths and human rights violations. Externalising migration undermines migrants’ and asylum-seekers’ legal rights by pushing them to locations such as Libya, Marocco or Turkey where they risk refoulment, indiscriminate detention and torture. The same could now happen for asylum-seekers sent to Rwanda following the UK’s passing of the Rwanda Bill which has been considered unlawful by the UK Supreme Court and faced strong criticism from human rights organisations. They contest that Rwanda is safe and argue that the policy is dangerous to the lives of asylum-seekers. Being depicted as illegal or as a security threat is often a decisive factor between life and death, protection and abandonment. Securitising migration leads to policies reinforcing the “problem” and putting lives at risk.
The views expressed in this post are those of the author and do not reflect those of the International Development LSE blog or the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Featured image credit: © European Union 2016 – European Parliament
