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Given the current political climate, it’s hard to imagine a time when migration wasn’t seen as a national security threat. Yet, the shift towards viewing refugees not as victims, but as potential threats, only began in the 1970s. As undocumented migration across the U.S.-Mexico border surged, the fear of “illegal aliens” stoked by media outlets and politicians, resulted in stricter enforcement and fewer legal pathways – a trend that soon echoed in Europe. Securitisation, the process of framing something as an urgent threat, has resulted in European countries creating hostile environments for migrants and refugees. This blog will explore the unfolding of this process in ‘Fortress Europe’ and delve into its consequences.
Building ‘Fortress Europe’
The Schengen Convention of 1990 was a major turning point. It aimed to ease movement within Europe yet ended up creating a “halfway house” between integration and the preservation of national sovereignty. This resulted in the strengthening of external borders, reinforced by the absence of a unified European asylum and migration system. This resulted in the strengthening of external borders, reinforced by the lack of a unified European asylum and migration system.
The events of September 11 and the subsequent War on Terror intensified the situation, igniting divisive debates and prompting hostile policy responses. Since then, Europe has spent €11 billion on deportations. So, how did European countries manage to portray migration as such a significant threat, warranting substantial expenses and policies?
The Copenhagen School’s Take
The Copenhagen School offers one explanation. They argue that security threats are socially constructed, through a shared understanding among actors. This is often achieved by politicians using strong speech acts to frame immigration as an emergency. This “emergency frame” has been particularly effective in Europe, where situations such as the 2015 European migrant crisis have been depicted as unprecedented challenges.
Consider Viktor Orban’s 2018 campaign, which relied heavily on anti-immigrant rhetoric. In one of his speeches, he asserted, “Africa wants to kick down our door, and Brussels is failing to provide adequate defence.” Statements of this nature stoke fear and rationalise extraordinary measures, showcased by the expansion of Frontex’s operations, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
The Paris School’s Perspective
On the other hand, the Paris School examines securitisation through the lens of policies and practices. They understand Europe’s immigration regime as a self-perpetuating industry: with stricter policies leading migrants to take riskier routes, which in turn justifies more spending on border control. For instance, Eurosur was launched in 2013, a surveillance and information sharing system covering Europe’s southern maritime border and African pre-frontier. Tasked with monitoring irregular immigration, Eurosur’s practices contributed to the depoliticisation of migrant interception and immigration control by framing it as a technological security task.
Consequences of Securitisation
The formation of these self-perpetuating migration regimes has devastating consequences, as they thrive off their failure to address the root cause of displacement. Increased controls and deterrence techniques have produced counterproductive effects, instead fuelling a booming smuggling industry leading to over 29,000 documented deaths on journeys to Europe between 2014 and 2021.
Another result of securitisation has been the outsourcing of responsibilities to third countries, creating “offshore black holes” where EU norms and laws conveniently don’t apply. Italy and Libya’s ‘push back’ bilateral agreements serve as a notable illustration. In December 2007, the two states joined forces with Italy providing surveillance technology to Libya, in return for access to Libyan waters where Italian coast guard vessels could operate. In May 2009, the Berlusconi government cracked down on illegal migration, imposing €5,000-€10,000 fines, issuing detention orders, and green lighting direct deportations to Libya before processing any asylum claims. Italy used these bilateral agreements to bypass EU regulations, all the while achieving their goal of “safeguarding” their shores from immigrants.
The EU has securitised migration through diverse ways from speech acts to the practices of security professionals. However, these efforts fall short of their goal to reduce immigration to Europe, ultimately increasing risk and reducing control. In response to this, Academics Bello and Andersson call for a rethinking of human mobility governance. For this shift to occur, Andersson, professor of social anthropology at Oxford University’s Department of International Development, asserts “the illegality industry first needs to be dismantled and the product on which it works seen for what it is: nothing more, and nothing less, than people on the move.”
The views expressed in this post are those of the author and do not reflect those of the International Development LSE blog or the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Featured image credit: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies on Flickr
