MSc Development Studies alum, Deborah Doane, shares her research for her new book ‘The INGO Problem: Power, privilege and renewal’. Including the critiques INGOs have faced and how they can overcome them to suit the multiple and diffuse poly-crises of the 21st century.
“I have left international aid…..I found it increasingly hard to reconcile my beliefs working in an INGO. I’m proud of what I led [trying to decolonise the sector], but quite cynical about my 30-year involvement in INGOs.” – former CEO, INGO.
Peter is a former CEO of two well-known INGOs, someone I occasionally reached out to for feedback in my current work focussing on locally-led development. He messaged me recently to share where he was at and why he had moved on. This is just a summary, but critically, his words are a damning indictment and reflect much of what I heard in researching my recently published book, ‘the INGO Problem’.
INGOs were once the standard-bearer for what was good in civil society and international development. Their importance grew after WWII, with further growth in the sector throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, following the period of decolonisation. Where governments weren’t always able to meet people’s needs, INGOs stepped in as service deliverer and advocate in the years to come. Many grew exponentially in size with incomes of the largest INGOs now exceeding $1 billion/year, alongside the influence and standing to match.
But all is not rosy. For some years now, INGOs have come under the spotlight, and not for good reasons. The sexual exploitation scandals that hit the headlines in 2018 were quickly followed by criticism of fundraising practices, and later an upswell of accusations of racism and neo-colonialism when Black Lives Matter came to the fore shortly thereafter.
These critiques were not new. My own personal first encounter with the sector was working with a project trying to establish an International Ombudsman for Humanitarian Aid in the late 1990’s. This was my first role after graduation from what was then called ‘DESTIN’ – the Development Studies Institute at the LSE. It was a proposed accountability solution to the critiques of the sector that emerged following the patchy Rwandan genocide response. The recommendation for an independent Ombudsman was never fully implemented and most of the challenges that the project was intending to address at the time, remained unmet.
Over 20 years later, the COVID pandemic exposed the futility of ‘experts’ flying around the world to ‘save’ poor people. In fact, it showed that local actors were already doing the work. The crisis itself helped to strengthen the voice of what is known as the #ShiftthePower movement which represents local civil society actors who have come together to demand a more equitable civil society, where national and local CSOs have more power and resource in the overall system. They note that the vast majority of resources go to International civil society actors like INGOs (roughly 90 – 93%) whilst most of the work is done on the ground by local groups.
Governments had long ago committed to giving a higher portion of their funding to local actors, following from the Grand Bargain Commitments of 2016. USAID, for one, has pledged that 25% of their funding should reach local CSOs by 2030. And OECD governments have widely committed to increasing local funding for development, too. Nonetheless, such commitments remain an aim rather than a reality. USAID has seen less than 7% reaching local CSOs. And only 10% of funding from OECD DAC donors is given directly to local organisations.
INGOs, meanwhile, have attempted to respond to some of the concerns through ‘localisation’ attempts by improving partnerships or creating national chapters of their offices. But there has been a backlash to this move too, as many have seen these as a more cynical attempt to grow a new fundraising base. National chapters of INGOs are eligible, for example, for USAID localised funding. Some argued that these moves were not actually getting closer to local communities, but instead were further marginalising them, poaching their own limited sources of local funding. A now infamous open letter to INGOs cynically stated [with regard to localisation], that “all of this serves to weaken us locally. It keeps us in a master/servant relationship continuously begging for grants from your institutions, while we remain bereft of core funding ourselves.”
So, what next for INGOs? Perhaps surprisingly, in spite of the many critiques that have arisen, most people I work with, including local CSOs, see an ongoing need for INGOs. This is reflected in a 2021 study by the West Africa Civil Society Institute, done for the RINGO Project, a systems change project to ‘re-imagine INGOs’. The majority of over 600 respondents indicated that they wanted and needed INGOs but found the relationships to be highly unequal. Eighty-four percent of respondents noted that they collaborated with INGOs yet 85% of these reported that they were not mutually beneficial.
The potential roles for INGOs has been articulated through the RINGO project and other recent initiatives, such as the Pledge for Change. The roles identified include investors, facilitators and advocates. The INGO role, nonetheless, will undoubtedly be a smaller and more focused one, where more is done through networks and less through big competing brands. Moreover, on-the-ground work should all but disappear. Their way of organising should include new inclusive governance structures with solidarity with local actors at the heart. Most INGOs started from a point of solidarity: can we return to that?
Interestingly, both IRC and Save the Children have recently announced mass redundancies, following a stark projected drop in their income, which had increased significantly during the start of the war in Ukraine. Had they instead sought to invest in local actors at the time, and indeed for years before, rather than increasing their own staff and expenditure, this could have been avoided.
We continue to need a globally connected civil society, like INGOs. They are an important counterweight to states and the corporate sector. But the writing is on the wall that their current incarnation is no longer suited to the multiple and diffuse poly-crises of the 21st century. In spite of the fact that progress is slow, locally-led development or shifting power, isn’t just a passing fad, it’s here to stay. We need stronger local civil societies everywhere and this mean right-sizing and adapting INGOs to meet these needs. This transformation requires a concerted effort on the part of the wider system to change the incentive systems that keep them on their throne: donors, leaders and demand from local actors can all contribute to this much-needed transformation.
The views expressed in this post are those of the author and in no way reflect those of the International Development LSE blog or the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Featured image credit: Practical Action Publishing
As someone who has worked primarily in the aid sector, I agree with most of your above assertions. However, I have come to observe that corruption in Locally led NGOs seems to be higher compared to INGOs, so I think localization should be gradual and systematic, and should first focus on building and strengthening systems aimed at reducing fraud and improving accountability, especially in operations (Finance, HR and logistics) and AAP
Thank you for sharing your perspective. It is important to acknowledge that corruption can occur in any organisation, whether it is a locally led CSO or an INGO. However, the issue is not solely about the type of organisation but rather about the systems, structures, and culture in place to prevent and address such challenges.
Firstly, while it is true that some locally led CSOs may face challenges related to corruption and accountability, this often reflects broader systemic issues, such as limited resources, weak institutional frameworks, and the pressure to deliver results with minimal overheads. In many cases, these organisations operate in environments where corruption is pervasive at multiple levels, making it difficult to maintain rigorous accountability standards.
On the other hand, INGOs are not immune to corruption either. They often have more robust systems and processes due to greater access to resources, but they can still encounter significant issues. Moreover, the complexity and scale at which INGOs operate can sometimes obscure accountability, particularly in remote or conflict-affected areas.
Localisation should indeed be gradual and systematic, but it should also be ambitious and rooted in the recognition that local actors are often best placed to understand and address the needs of their communities. Building and strengthening systems to reduce fraud and improve accountability is crucial, but this should be done in partnership with local NGOs, rather than imposed upon them. Capacity building should focus not only on technical aspects like finance, HR, and logistics but also on fostering a culture of transparency, trust, and mutual accountability.
It is also worth considering that many locally led NGOs have successfully implemented innovative approaches to accountability, often in contexts where INGOs might struggle. These organisations can offer valuable insights into how to adapt systems and processes to local realities, which can enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of aid efforts.
I believe that while there are legitimate concerns about corruption in locally led CSOs, the solution is not to delay localisation but to ensure it is supported by the necessary investments in capacity building, systems strengthening, and the promotion of a culture of accountability. Localisation, when done thoughtfully and inclusively, can lead to more resilient and responsive aid systems.