Alumnus Mustafa Chaudhry (MSc IR, 2018) offers his views on the future of Syria.

Bashar al-Assad’s ousting has been rightly celebrated within Syria and internationally. A first-hand look at prisons, and the harrowing prisoner testimony that has surfaced following Assad’s departure, reinforced something that was already evident: Assad presided over a security state that engaged in large-scale repression.

Having successfully mounted a rapid offensive from northwest Syria that led to the capture of Damascus, the Syrian rebels, under the helm of the Sunni Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), now face an enormous undertaking: the post-war reconstruction of Syria. There are plenty of challenges to overcome on this front. The Syrian economy is in shambles. Between 2011 and 2021, Syria’s GDP contracted by 87percent. The constant fighting has also left millions of Syrians displaced internally and externally, and critical infrastructure, including roads and hospitals, lies in ruins. Rebuilding Syria will be a mammoth undertaking, and as it stands now HTS and its allies are wholly unprepared for this undertaking.

Rebuilding Syria will be a mammoth undertaking, and as it stands now HTS and its allies are wholly unprepared for this undertaking.

Following the Iraq route to unsuccessful reconstruction

Successful post-war reconstruction requires national unity. Germany and Japan, arguably the best historical cases of effective post-war reconstruction, owed their thriving democracies to internally cohesive societies and a strong national identity. Building a national consensus around reconstruction is unlikely to happen in a country that is as fractured as Syria. The lack of internal cohesion, and the competing priorities of international actors, make it more likely that Syria could follow neighbouring Iraq’s route to unsuccessful reconstruction.

The lack of internal cohesion, and the competing priorities of international actors, make it more likely that Syria could follow neighbouring Iraq’s route to unsuccessful reconstruction.

After Saddam Hussein’s ousting, there was considerable disunity in Iraq manifesting itself in sectarian tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. Instead of fostering an inclusive state, Shias dominated the political setup thereby alienating the Sunni minority, mostly based to the north and west of Baghdad, that took up arms against the state ushering in a two-year civil war. Up north, the Kurds used Hussein’s ousting as an opportunity to further entrench their autonomy from Baghdad effectively establishing a state within a state. The power vacuum within Iraq also paved the way for the jihadist group al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and neighbouring Iran to flame sectarian tensions.

Unlike the Shia leadership in Iraq, HTS appears to be taking the proper steps towards fostering an inclusive government. HTS leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani met with Assad appointed PM Mohammed Ghazi al-Jalali to facilitate a peaceful transition to power. Even when Jalali stepped down as PM, Jolani indicated that the former PM would continue to preside over state institutions until a transition is complete. In a further nod to a peaceful transition HTS has not shown any inclination to undertake a large-scale purge of state institutions. Jolani issued a statement prohibiting military forces in Damascus from approaching government buildings. Such conciliatory actions are on point with the rebranding that Jolani and HTS have undergone to demonstrate to Syrians and the international community at large that HTS, which is still a US-designated terrorist organization, is up to the task of leading Syria in its recovery. It is still too early to predict whether this rebranding will hold sway amongst Syrians and the international community.

Past conduct by the Idlib-based HTS government in northwest Syria does not rule out that HTS could eventually follow the Iraq route by alienating its allies and consolidating power. Erstwhile allies could then very well take up arms against HTS thereby reigniting the civil war. It was only early last year that the HTS-led government in Idlib faced widespread protests over its torture and detention of opposition figures, widespread corruption, and botched response to the devastating February earthquakes.

Where Hafez al-Assad’s military coup ushered in 54-years of rule by an Alawite minority, HTS might usher in a period of exclusionary Sunni Islamist rule. 

Where Hafez al-Assad’s military coup ushered in 54-years of rule by an Alawite minority, HTS might usher in a period of exclusionary Sunni Islamist rule. Already, there are some concerns surrounding the interim-government’s inclusivity.  The current Syrian PM Mohammad al-Bashir, former head of the HTS government in northwest Syria, has brought several Idlib-based personnel to staff interim-government positions in Damascus.

Far from warming up to the idea of an HTS-led government, Syria’s Kurds, like Iraq’s Kurds post-Saddam, are not keen on ceding their autonomy. The US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) responded to Assad’s ousting by re-enforcing its presence in eastern Syria. SDF is also fending offattacks from Turkish-backed groups including the Syrian National Army (SNA) which is aligned with HTS. Any attempts by HTS at a significant conciliation with the SDF could draw ire from the SNA and, in effect, Turkey which views the SDF as a threat to its internal security. Separate from the SNA, HTS will no doubt be sensitive to Turkey’s concerns given that the country’s support helped the group execute a successful rapid offensive to overthrow Assad.

Competing International Priorities

International actors will likely exploit the current power vacuum to stifle domestic unity with their competing priorities. While Turkey is working on removing the SDF, Israel has decided to pursue its narrow security objectives by expanding control over the Golan Heights and carrying out over 400 airstrikes on Syrian military installations.

The United States continues to adopt a wait-and-see approach. It shows no signs of withdrawing its approximately 2000 troops that are there to support the SDF in the fight against the Islamic State (IS). It remains to be seen whether US presence and support for the SDF will change amidst a potential IS resurgence that could add to the already simmering cauldron of domestic instability in Syria. China, which backed the Assad regime, is also waiting on what an HTS victory could mean for its security concerns. Beijing is worried that HTS ally the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) could use its base in Syria to stir discontent in China’s restive Xinjiang province.

It also remains to be seen what kind of role Iran and Russia will seek to play in Syria. Both countries have started establishing some dialogue with HTS, and will want to retain their power-projecting capabilities as the situation evolves. Russia will look to keep its military infrastructure in Syria. Iran will want to continue supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon by holding a critical supply route that runs through Syria open.

Conclusion

A fractured domestic polity, and competing international interests, does not bode well for reconstruction efforts in Syria. If HTS abandons consensus-building altogether Syria could end up in another civil war within a year or two. Involvement by international actors with strong vested interests is likely to prolong such a war.  The US could ramp up support for the SDF. China might support its own proxy to help eliminate the TIP presence in Syria.  HTS on the other hand can potentially draw on support from Iran, Russia, and Turkey who do not share the same concerns for democracy and human rights that Western policymakers do. Cooperation among the three countries over Syria is not far-fetched. Only a day before the fall of Damascus, the foreign ministers of all three countries huddled in Doha to discuss Syria’s future.

Banner Photo by Ivan Hassib

This article represents the views of the author, and not the position of the Department of International Relations, nor of the London School of Economics.