On the 5th of August 2019, the Indian Parliament decided to abrogate Articles 370 and 35A, which granted special status to the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir amid an unprecedented lockdown. The Modi government also undertook the bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir into two separate regions—Jammu and Kashmir in the west and Ladakh in the east—both of which are now governed directly by New Delhi. As a result, Kashmir lost its flag, criminal code, and constitution which were previously protected under Article 370. While many Kashmiris perceive the 2019 decision as an annexation, arguing that the new laws were designed to alter the region’s demographics, for the ruling dispensation, Modi’s actions are seen as a corrective to what it views as Nehru’s overly idealistic policies in Kashmir.
Nehru has been accused of being an idealist in foreign policy matters and having a utopian vision of world politics. His handling of Kashmir and his faith in International Institutions such as the UN are often strongly criticized. In this article, I will argue that contrary to this opinion, Nehru’s handling of Kashmir was pragmatic and based on a realist understanding of world politics from an Indian perspective. Nehru purposely situated his decisions in a moral setting since India lacked any material power, and if India wanted to have a voice in world affairs, it had to come from a moral standpoint. Hence, his handling of the Kashmir dispute was rooted in pragmatism rather than an idealistic or a moral conception of world politics.
Kashmir and Nehru’s Attachment
Ever since the partition of the subcontinent into modern-day states of India and Pakistan and later Bangladesh, Kashmir has been a lingering dispute between the two South Asian nuclear powers. Before 1947, Kashmir was a princely state ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, while the overwhelming population of the state was Muslim (77.06%). Most of the princely states decided to join India or Pakistan based on the advice of the British that “due consideration should be given to numerical majority and geographical congruity” (Schofield, 2017, p. 25). Hari Singh, the ruler of the Dogra dynasty that ruled Kashmir, was undecided. He even had ideas for an independent state of Kashmir. In October 1947, while the question of accession was still undecided, large-scale killings of Muslims started in Jammu province (Bazaz, 2003). In response, Pakistan sent in militants. The Maharaja appealed to the Indian government for help, which responded positively but on the condition that the state should accede to India. Since the Maharaja had no choice, he accepted, and Kashmir acceded to the Union of India on the 26th of October 1947 (scholars Alastair Lamb and Victoria Schofield have questioned the veracity and legality of the accession). India took the matter to the United Nations, which called for a plebiscite to determine the future disposition of the state. (Resolution 47, 1948) Nehru’s critics allege that it was here where it all went wrong. They believe Nehru was singlehandedly responsible for taking the dispute to the UN and internationalizing it, to the chagrin of the Indian state. Critics allege that had it not been for the folly of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Kashmir dispute would have taken a different turn.
Nehru’s Strategic Calculations
So, was Nehru’s Kashmir policy idealistic? Evidence suggests otherwise. He was a practitioner of realpolitik, as my arguments will demonstrate. Nehru himself was a Kashmiri. His ancestor, Raj Kaul, had settled in Mughal Delhi in the 18th century (Tharoor, 2012, p. 5). He was preoccupied with Kashmir and had an “emotional attachment with the land of his ancestors” (Schofield, 2017, p. 29), which is visibly evident in all his written works: Discovery of India, An Autobiography, and Glimpses of World History. He “plotted for Kashmir’s accession to India even before the partition” and determined that “Kashmir had no choice but accession to India” (Noorani, 2015, p. 15). As early as May 1947, he took the matter of Kashmir with Mountbatten, the last viceroy of British India, and sent him a note with the population figures and a brief history of the state (Noorani, 2015, p. 15). In the note, he wrote that the National Conference has stood for and still stands for Kashmir joining the Constituent Assembly of India. He also urged for the removal of Ramchandra Kak, who was the then prime minister of the princely state and was pro-independence and “the release of Sheikh Abdullah from prison and warned against the state’s accession to Pakistan” (Noorani, 2015, p. 15) (Wolpert, 1996, p. 414). The note also made clear how important strategically Kashmir was for India. In another letter to Vallabhbhai Patel in September 1947, Nehru wrote, “The approach of winter is going to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India… Time is of the essence… and things must be done in a way to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible” (SWJN, Second Series, Volume 4, p. 264-265). This was September 1947, way before any ‘tribal militias’ had set foot in Kashmir.
For Nehru, Kashmir was symbolic of India’s secular polity. In one of his speeches in the Indian parliament given in the aftermath of the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah on 9th August 1953, Nehru argued, “We have always regarded the Kashmir Problem as symbolic for us, and it has far-reaching consequences in India. Kashmir is symbolic as it illustrates that we are a secular State, that Kashmir, with a large majority of Muslims, has nevertheless, of its own free will, wished to be associated with India” (Nehru, 1958, p. 213).
Taking Kashmir to the United Nations
But why did Nehru take the question of Kashmir to the UN? Was it because of his faith in multilateral institutions or his magnanimity? As Nehru reiterated in a speech in the Indian Parliament in March 1956, “Many people have criticized us for doing that [going to the UN]. As I said, it is easy to be wise after the event. But I think it was a right step to take, and there is no doubt in my mind that the matter would have gone there whether we took it or somebody else took it” (Nehru, 1958, p. 219). According to Nehru, “ [India] went there to ask the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the Indian Union territory. That was the main object” (Nehru, 1958, p.361). Legal expert A.G. Noorani offers further insight, arguing that Nehru’s decision was strategic. Had India not taken the initiative, Pakistan might have brought the issue to the UN first, putting India on the defensive. By being the complainant, India maintained a more advantageous position (Noorani, 2015, p. 722). Thus, Nehru’s decision was not based on an idealistic belief in the UN but on a pragmatic anticipation of Pakistan’s likely actions.
Nehru’s private correspondence further reveals his pragmatism. Despite public commitments to a plebiscite, Nehru expressed doubts in private about its feasibility. In a letter to Sheikh Abdullah just a week after the UN resolution called for a plebiscite, Nehru wrote, “You know well that this business of plebiscite is still far away and there is a possibility of plebiscite not taking place. I would suggest that this should not be said in public, as our bonafides will then be challenged” (SWJN, Second Series, Volume 9, p. 198). These statements challenge the view that Nehru was an idealist. Nehru’s agreement to a plebiscite in a 1953 joint communique with Pakistan’s Prime Minister M.A. Bogra was similarly strategic. In a letter to Karan Singh, Nehru explained that the communique was intended to buy time and prevent the issue from being immediately raised in the UN, which could have kept the agitation alive (SWJN, second series, volume 23, p. 347).
Hence, as Noorani notes, “the accord was not intended to be implemented. It was concluded to buy time” (Noorani, 2015, p. 41,42). In another letter written to Shiekh Abdullah dated August 25, 1952, Nehru wrote, “Purely from the point of view of India’s national interest, we cannot agree, unless circumstances force us, to see this part of Kashmir State go to Pakistan” (SWJN, second series, volume 23, p. 322.
As the evidence suggests, Nehru was never faithful to his public commitments on the plebiscite; nevertheless, he regretted taking Kashmir to the UN. He felt that Kashmir was getting mired in Cold War power politics, and he believed that Americans were causing problems in Kashmir. The belief in the Indian establishment was that the great powers were supporting Pakistan because they thought Pakistan was strategically important to promote cordial relations with the Arab states. (S. Gopal, 1979, p. 33). Nehru was angry that the United States and England were “sympathetic to Pakistan’s eloquent defence of itself in the Security Council debate on Kashmir, feeling that both powers had “played a dirty role” against India” (Wolpert, 1996, p. 434). In one of his letters to B.N. Rau in November 1950, he wrote, “I am a little tired of the intrigues and the various moves of Britain, the United States, etc. in Kashmir and have lost interest in them… this Kashmir question would have been settled long ago but for the pro-Pakistan attitude and activities of Britain and some other countries” (S. Gopal, 1979, p. 91). . Furthermore, writing to Balraj Puri, his admirer from Jammu, who advised restraint, Nehru wrote back, “We have gambled at the international stage on Kashmir, and we cannot afford to lose. At the moment we are there at the point of the bayonet. Till things improve, democracy and morality can wait” (Anderson, 2017, pp. 119-120).
Conclusion
In conclusion, as evidenced by the preceding arguments, Nehru’s approach to the Kashmir issue was not rooted in idealism but in pragmatic political strategy. Although some have argued that it was only after 1954 that Nehru adopted an intransigent approach to Kashmir, backing out of the plebiscite option, especially as a result of the US-Pakistan military pact in 1954 (Shankar, 2016), I detail how his correspondence suggests otherwise. Nehru’s handling of Kashmir reflects a shrewd understanding of the geopolitical realities of his time. His decisions were driven by the need to secure India’s interests, even if it meant setting aside democratic and moral considerations or reneging on the commitments India had made to the people of Kashmir.
Featured Image: “Sonamarg, Kashmir” by Dr. Partha Sarathi Sahana is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
