by Ali A. Ghareh Daghi

Masoud Pezeshkian was elected as Iran’s president on 6 July 2024 to succeed Ebrahim Raisi, who died prematurely in a helicopter crash on 19 May. As the post-election honeymoon ends, meeting expectations becomes crucial. Everyone, including those who boycotted, voted for, or abstained from the elections, is watching to see if his economic and social promises will be kept.

Though Pezeshkian served as health minister under reformist president Mohammad Khatami from 1997 to 2005, he now faces a new level of tough decision-making.

During this author’s fieldwork in Iran from March to June this year, society appeared to be focused on two main issues: economic problems, largely due to sanctions, and internal social tensions, mostly around conservative legal dress codes for Iranian women and social media access. The key question is whether Pezeshkian, seen by many as a ‘token reformist,’ can effectively address these concerns.

Lifting US-led Sanctions

Pezeshkian’s campaigned on the assertion that Iran’s economic issues can only be addressed by improving relations with the West. This involves easing tensions surrounding the stalled negotiations to revive the 2015 nuclear deal with major powers, ultimately aiming to lift sanctions.

The new president faces many economic problems that have built up over the last ten years of the tough US sanction regime. The exchange rate for the dollar has almost doubled in three years, rising from 257,000 rials in August 2021 to 573,000 rials by July 2024. Sanctions, high inflation (36.1% in June 2024), and widespread corruption have worsened the situation, impacting all economic sectors.

Pezeshkian must therefore handle relations with the West and contend with powerful radical conservatives in the Iranian Parliament, who remain supportive of former President Raisi and the defeated candidate Saeed Jalili’s policy of distancing from the West and aligning with the East.

Sanctions tend to be imposed quickly but lifted slowly, if at all. After signing the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran met its obligations in six months, including dismantling a plutonium enrichment reactor. However, by the time the Trump administration scuppered the deal in 2018, the US had lifted only a small portion of the promised sanctions.

Whether a Democrat or Republican sits in the White House, they must negotiate with Congress to remove a significant portion of the sanctions. Congressional opposition to Iranian policies extends beyond the nuclear issue, with the sanctions based on three main statutes enacted by Congress and numerous executive orders.

The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) 1996 targets Iran’s nuclear programme and geopolitical influence by sanctioning those who invest over $20 million annually in its petroleum sector. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) 2010 prohibits foreign financial institutions from transacting with Iranian banks and entities. Finally, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA) 2012 imposes broad sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for alleged human rights violations.

Given the interconnected nature of sanctions, the Biden administration seems committed to the twelve-point demands from the Trump administration’s list. The list extends beyond Iran’s nuclear programme to include issues like regional influence and missile programmes, effectively aiming the sanctions toward regime change.

However, negotiations on Iran’s regional influence and missile programme are likely to go beyond the remit of Pezeshkian. These two areas are within the purview of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the IRGC.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian former foreign minister from 2013–21 who is set to have a role in Pezeshkian’s cabinet formation, complained in a leaked 2021 recording that the IRGC has more influence over foreign affairs than he does. ‘The (military) field’s success was more important than diplomacy’s success. I was negotiating for the (military) field’s success,’ he said.

Pezeshkian seems unlikely to be authorised to negotiate regarding Iran’s regional presence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, or over its missile programme, as these are considered strategic issues by Khamenei. The consequences of this are that Pezeshkian may not be able to achieve a comprehensive deal, as sought by the Americans.

Alleviation of Internal Social Tensions

Upon arrival in Tehran in March, I observed two notable social changes: the persistence of girls and women in refusing to wear the Islamic veil, and the slow internet speed which blocked access to social media platforms like Instagram and WhatsApp.

During my time in Iran, I rarely saw the morality police on the streets, but their presence was significant in some instances. In early May around 6pm local time, I noticed members of morality police stationed at nearly every alley on Gohardasht Street in Alborz province, a known protest centre during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. On that day, Gohardasht Street, usually busy and vibrant, was unusually quiet.

Pezeshkian opposes using force to enforce hijab rules through the morality police. He has expressed sorrow over the death of the young woman Mahsa Amini, who died in police custody after being arrested for a hijab violation. Amini’s death sparked nationwide protests.

However, does holding such a position mean he would be able to confront the morality police as president? The judicial system, headed by an appointee of Khamenei, and the Parliament are primarily responsible for writing and verifying hijab rules. The executive branch, guided by Pezeshkian, is responsible only for implementing, not changing, these rules – such is the separation of power dynamics within the Iranian state.

During his presidential campaign, Pezeshkian promised to make social media accessible to the people, appealing to young voters. However, this promise appears more verbal than practical. The attorney general, appointed by the head of the judicial system, is responsible for censorship in Iran, and the president lacks any mechanism to challenge these decisions unilaterally. Pezeshkian could address this with Parliament’s help, but it is currently dominated by conservatives.

In conclusion, Pezeshkian faces significant challenges in addressing Iran’s economic and social issues. While he sees the need to improve relations with the West, he will have to navigate radical conservatives in Parliament who oppose this. His ability to address social tensions, like hijab enforcement and social media access, is limited by the judiciary and Parliament. These constraints make substantial changes in economic policies and social freedoms unlikely under Pezeshkian.