by Marouf Cabi

The election of reformist Masoud Pezeshkian as Iran’s new president raises questions about potential political change. While some label him the ‘Iranian Gorbachev’, doubts remain about his ability to make an impact. This blog argues that the president and political system in Iran cannot meet the people’s demands. It emphasises the the Islamic Republic regime’s ongoing legitimacy crisis, highlighted by the 2022 uprising, and deepened by the elections.

The Problem of Introducing Pezeshkian

Numerous accounts of Pezeshkian’s biography exist, but biographies are not merely objective stories; they can carry values and serve ideological or political purposes. The initial remarks about Pezeshkian’s early life focus on his birthplace, the significant Kurdish city of Mahabad, and the ethnicity of his parents – an unprecedented emphasis in the history of the Islamic Republic. He is known as the child of a Kurdish father and an Azari mother, speaking both Kurdish and Azari fluently. Despite this, he has lived outside Kurdistan since finishing primary school in the 1960s and has shown little interest or involvement in the Kurdish region. Media often highlight his career as a heart surgeon, which began in the early 1990s, to present him as an acceptable, educated, and non-military figure compared to many clergy members or former president Ahmadinejad.

In 2001, Pezeshkian was appointed Health Minister under President Mohammad Khatami. In 2008, he was elected as a reformist MP from Tabriz to the Eighth Majlis (Iranian parliament) and was re-elected for five successive four-year terms. In the Tenth Majlis (2016), he became deputy house speaker, a position secured by the Omid Fraction, a reformist group, as a condition for their participation in the elections. Pezeshkian was also the head of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences from 1994 to 1999. This optimistic biography does not refer to his loyalty to and close relationship with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Pezeshkian attempted to run for president twice before: he withdrew in 2013 and was disqualified in 2019 by the Guardians Council, a 12-member body that vets candidates. This time, the council reversed its decision, allowing Pezeshkian to run as the sole reformist candidate. He faced five contenders, including ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili, his main competitor in the runoff. This decision reflects the regime’s attempt to address its legitimacy crisis by reviving reformism, which had waned by the 2020s amid rising unrest.

The Facts

The election turnout and Pezeshkian’s victory highlight the deepening legitimacy crisis. Turnout was historically low, with only 39% and 49% in the first and second rounds, totalling 24.5 million votes. Even pro-regime publications such as the Tehran Times could not hide this, despite claiming increased electoral determination. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei lamented the record-low turnout but denied it reflected the regime’s popularity. Additionally, the election exposed divisions among hardliners. Iran-based media outlet Ham Mihan noted that radical principlists (osul-garayan) competed not for public interest but to eliminate each other, revealing internal corruption and fraud.

The disarray among hardliners does not mean unity among reformists. Radical reformists (tond row) called for an election boycott, while moderate reformists encouraged participation. Saeed Hajjariyan, a key figure in the 1990s reformist movement, stated he would not participate in this election, just as he did not in the previous two presidential elections. The Reform Front, comprising around 30 reformist parties and organisations, boycotted the election. In response, 110 reformist activists condemned the election boycott, arguing it would hinder reform efforts. This highlights a division between those who have lost faith in reformism and those hoping to force change from within the system. Reformism is only effective when the system allows for it, rather than by attempting to obstruct it.

Therefore, while the division among hardline clergy highlights political anxiety and the need to address the growing gap between the state and society, the division within the reformist camp illustrates the failure of reformism as a dominant discourse since the 1990s.

The Context of Growing Political Division

The political divisions within and between the camps are not the causes but the effects of growing public discontent and political unrest. They highlight the deepening legitimacy crisis, which demands fundamental change – not merely through coercion or the illusion of reform. The 2017-2019 unrest, following the 2009 Green Movement, was mainly driven by economic and reformist demands. The Green Movement was the most significant popular challenge to the regime since the 1979 Revolution. Additionally, political movements in regions like Kurdistan have remained formidable challenges over the past four decades, as seen in the region’s central role in the Women, Life, Freedom uprising. However, while events since 2009 have not significantly challenged the regime’s legitimacy, the 2022 Zhina uprising drastically altered the situation by making the questioning of the regime’s legitimacy its most significant achievement.

The new situation created anxiety across the establishment, from hardliners to reformists. The 2022 uprising directly challenged the regime’s foundations, and the deaths of hundreds of young people further discredited the regime internationally. Consequently, many countries felt embarrassed about maintaining relations with the regime. However, authoritative regional states felt an urgent need to show solidarity with it.

The question of legitimacy in Iran has a significant economic dimension and cannot be fully understood without examining its political economy. The Iranian capitalist system is often described as an economy of gharat (looting), controlled by bonyads (foundations) under the Supreme Leader’s authority. According to economist Mehrdad Vahabi, it can also be termed an economy of Anfal (spoils of war), where the Velayat-e Faqih (guardianship of the jurists) dispossesses people of political sovereignty, while Anfal appropriates and monopolises public property under the Supreme Leader’s control (As Vahabi explains, Article 45 of the English translation of the Constitution has incorrectly translated ‘Anfal’ as ‘state’ property). Through mechanisms of destructive coordination, as he terms it, such as the bonyads linked to the IRGC, including the Foundation for the Wretched (Bonyad Mostazafan) and the Quds Force, Iran’s economic system enforces a confiscatory regime that supports Anfal. Four major foundations control 60% of the Iranian economy. The resulting deep economic crisis is evident in the impoverishment of the working class, high unemployment, hyperinflation, rising poverty, environmental neglect and significant domestic and international migration. These issues highlight the systemic failures of the looting economy. Indeed, as Vahabi argues, such an economy survives by maintaining ‘critical order’ or ‘ordered anarchy’, a mode of coordination focused on looting rather than production. This creates a fertile ground for confiscatory regimes that fuse sovereignty and property, exemplified by Velayat-e Faqih and Anfal (listen to his presentation in Persian).

Therefore, it was not surprising that, after four decades of such political and economic rule, Iran saw a widespread popular boycott of the 2024 presidential election, even with the presence of a reformist candidate with Kurdish credentials.

Pezeshkian’s Priorities

The regime expects Pezeshkian to accomplish two key tasks. First, he must reduce tensions between the state and society, revive reformism as a popular discourse and bring economic and political stability. This marks a retreat by the hardliners, while acknowledging that reformism has lost its momentum years ago. Second, Pezeshkian needs to ease tensions with the West to advance Iran’s nuclear goals, improve its international image, and strengthen its economic position. Success appears doubtful, as international rivalry and economic interests limit Iran’s prospects for significant leverage or gain.

Big economic deals have often fallen short of expectations. For instance, China signed a 25-year, $400 billion cooperation agreement with Iran in 2021, but invested only $19.7 million in Iran in 2022, while investing $279 million in Israel. According to The Economist, while China’s purchase of oil provides Iran with some support, China diversifies its energy sources, buying more from other suppliers and relatively little from Iran. Thus, Iran is flooded with Chinese imports, but China buys only a small amount from Iran apart from hydrocarbons.

Pezeshkian must navigate these challenges while managing internal political rivalries within and between different camps. These rivalries arise from the regime’s diminished legitimacy, with hardliners calling for more effective solutions and reformists either losing faith in reform or abandoning their reformist identity.