by Carina Yıldırım-Schlüsing and Esther Meininghaus

The Israel-Gaza war has triggered significant attacks between Israel and neighbouring states, as well as between US troops and armed groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In Iraq, the Islamic Resistance (IR)/muqawama label emerged as a telegram brand on 18 October 2023. It is used by diverse armed groups linked to Iran to claim attacks on US and US-affiliated forces in Iraq and Syria to halt US support for Israel. Armed groups such as Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kataʾib Hezbollah (KH), Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN) or Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) use this branding to avoid revealing the exact operator of a drone or rocket attack on US (-linked) targets.

Why are US forces being attacked?

Although the IR is fraught with internal disagreement, they agree on a twofold objective: (1) To get 2500 US troops, whom they regard as an occupying power, to withdraw from Iraq and Syria, and (2) to pressure the US to support a ceasefire in Gaza. They act in collusion with the Quds Forces as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) foreign unit. While Iran regularly denies its involvement in IR attacks, Iran’s financial and material support and close coordination between Iran’s IRGC and the transnational IR network are well documented.

Anti-US actions since the Israel-Gaza war thus blend into a deep-seated conflict between Iraqi political and armed actors, Iran and the US, which invaded and occupied Iraq under the false pretext of evidence for weapons of mass destruction in 2003. The Biden administration insists that currently ‘U.S. military personnel are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, as part of Operation Inherent Resolve’s mission to advise, assist, and enable the Iraqi security forces in their ongoing fight against ISIS.’ In contrast, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani publicly condemns US attacks in Iraq as occurred on 4 January 2024 in Baghdad, killing HaN-commander Mushtaq Talib Al-Saedi (Abu Taqwa): ‘We view this action as a dangerous escalation and assault on Iraq, diverging from the spirit and the text of the mandate and the mission for which the Global Coalition was established in Iraq.’ The Prime Minister is promoting negotiations to end US troop presence, while some question whether these negotiations are rather indicative of the pressure that armed groups exert on the government.

The IR network overlaps organisationally with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU; al-Hashd al-Shaʿbi) under the Iraqi Prime Minister and are thus state-affiliated. Relations between the Quds and PMU are often portrayed as being of ‘hierarchical dependence’, although many armed groups reject the definition of being Iranian proxies but highlight common interests. They are firmly entrenched in Iraqi politics and the economy, where they maintain large money laundering networks and have a severe impact on civil society. KH, closer with Iran than other armed groups in Iraq, has a year-long hostile relation with the US, where it is listed as a terrorist group. Through the PMU and alongside Lebanese Hizballah and others, the IR network also forms part of the cross-regional Axis of Resistance, which is hostile to Israel but has emphasised repeatedly that it will cease fire if Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians stop. Armed groups and their supporters perceive US support for Israel as part of the same hegemony. As a protester at the funeral of KH senior commander Wissam al-Saadi, who was killed in an US airstrike in Iraq in February 2024, stated: ‘We will take revenge. Not only through counter-attacks, but also through raising awareness of the culture of resisting the American occupation and hegemony in the region.’

Fact Sheet: Overview of Attacks, Fatalities and Civilian Targeting

What are major attack trends in Iraq in response to the Israel-Gaza war?

Recent ACLED data shows four attacks from Iraq on Israel and none from Israel on Iraq since October 2023. Using cruise missiles, the IR targeted Tel Aviv at the beginning of May. Iraq has never formally recognised Israel and armed groups in Iraq threaten Israel, which has equally launched attacks on Iraq before. Still, compared to attacks between Israel and Hizballah in Lebanon, direct attacks with Iraq are very low. Yet importantly, the Israel-Gaza war has triggered fighting between the IR network and US troops on Iraqi (and Syrian) soil: As the table above shows, IR groups conducted at least 62 attacks on US military bases in Iraq. IR operations’ main targets were the US Ain Assad air base and Harir air base (Anbar/Erbil province) and the Erbil International Airport. For example, a rocket attack on the Ain Assad air base injured several US personnel on 5 August in response to the prior assassinations of allied Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas, Teheran) and Fu’ad Shukr (Hizballah, Beirut).

Infographic: Number of Attacks, 7 October 2023 – 24 May 2024

In response, the US conducted at least 17 attacks on IR groups between November 2023 and May 2024. These targeted e.g. KH vehicles, headquarters and ammunition depots and positions of AAH and the al-Tufuf Brigade of the PMU in Anbar province. On 2 February, the US conducted major attacks in reaction to the Tower 22 event in Jordan, killing 3 US personnel, and killed at least 16 persons in Iraq, including civilians. Following this event, attacks significantly abated until the recent re-escalation. Further contributing to this spiral, Iran’s IRCG conducted a ballistic missile attack from Iran on Erbil on 15 January 2024 reportedly to target Israel’s intelligence in Kurdistan; this link to Israel has vehemently been rejected by KRI officials.

In sum: What is new?

Prioritising a stable, long overdue ceasefire in the Israel-Gaza war is the only way forward to defuse the acute risks of further escalation in the entire region. In Iraq, direct fire with Israel remains rare. Yet first, the pattern of regular IR strikes on US targets, partially justified with resistance to Israels war in Gaza, and occasional US reactions show a strong rejection of US hegemony. While these attacks have been contained so far, they do affect civilian lives and restrengthen existing conflicts. Intense discussions about the withdrawal or possible relocation of Global Coalition and US forces from central Iraqi territory to the KRI show how sensitive the question of Iraqi sovereignty is. Second, while recognising the strong influence of Iran on the IR and Iran-US-Israel conflict dynamics, this analysis reveals how Iraqi armed groups prioritise analytically often-neglected domestic agendas, nurturing their armed, economic, ideological, and political networks. Clear reactions to the Israel-Gaza war thus merge with local armed actor agendas in Iraq, stimulating new dynamics in persistent violent conflict across the country.

In this series:

• ‘How does the Israel-Gaza War affect Lebanon? Mass Displacement, High Levels of Attacks and Fear of Greater War‘
• ‘Effects of the Israel-Gaza War on Syria: Multiple New Fronts‘

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