by Esther Meininghaus and Carina Yıldırım-Schlüsing

The ongoing Israel-Gaza war bears great risks of drawing in neighbouring states. In Syria, this war has had an immediate impact on two separate fronts: In southern Syria/Damascus – through Israeli attacks – and in eastern Syria – through non-state armed group attacks against US troops. Both have increased steeply.

How does the Israel-Gaza War affect Syria?

Adding to the immense suffering of the Syrian population from the ongoing Syrian war, these escalations display three major trends: First, while international attention has been focused on Gaza since October 2023, the Syrian regime and Russia have significantly escalated airstrikes on the last remaining so-called de-escalation zone in Idlib and Aleppo. These attacks  displaced 120,000 Syrians between October and November 2023. Second, Israel has escalated airstrikes and rocket attacks e.g. on Hizballah positions, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Syrian state military in southern Syria and Damascus. These actors are hostile to the state of Israel but notably, since October 2023 and before, hardly attacked Israel from Syrian soil. Third, Hizballah, present throughout Syria as an ally of the Bashar al-Asad dictatorship since the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, together with affiliated groups pursues attacks on US targets in the east of the country.

Israel’s Attacks on Non-State Armed Groups and Regime Troops in Syria

According to ACLED data, Israel launched 204 attacks on Syria causing 317 casualties between October 2023 and August 2024. Israeli attacks on Syria are not new, but their intensity is as Israeli bombings have at times occurred almost daily post-October 2023. State relations are hostile as Syria, like Iran and Iraq, diplomatically does not recognise the state of Israel. The regime regards Israel as an occupying force on Arab land for Palestine, but also for the part of the Golan Heights that Israel occupies since 1967. Additionally, the fact that arms and ammunition supplies are transferred from Iran via Syria to Hizballah in Lebanon led Israel to frequently target Syria since 2011. It further aims to curb the ongoing expansion of more than 70 different armed groups considered to be linked to Hizballah and/or Iran across the country. These include Syrian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Afghan, and Pakistani fighting units in the Syrian war. Violating Syrian sovereignty, Israel predominately targets Syrian civilian and military airports (Damascus/Aleppo) as well as weapons/ ammunition depots, training sites, and alleged meeting places of Hizballah, IRGC and affiliated armed groups in residential areas. Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility for these attacks, although they can be traced back to Israel.

Why have there been hardly any attacks from Syria on Israel?

According to ACLED, unidentified non-state armed groups have launched 14 attacks from southern Syria onto Israel between October and August, and attacks have largely ceased since. This is a question of capacity: For the Syrian regime, it generally relies on the Russian air force that entered the war in 2015 to maintain control over large parts of the country. However, Russia currently needs its own military resources for the Ukraine war and may not (yet) support an escalation of war with Israel. Also, any further escalation with Israel could jeopardise the Syrian regime’s military hold over the country: Recently, the Syrian war has intensified in the North West (Idlib/Aleppo), tying up troops; protests and armed resistance against the regime are persisting in southern Syria since August 2023; and since last summer, conflict between Arab and Kurdish leaders has repeatedly escalated in the east amid Turkish airstrikes on the area. Lastly, Bashar al-Asad appears to hold back on counter attacks in an attempt to regain acceptance by the US.

Why do Hizballah and other Armed Groups attack US bases?

With the Israel-Gaza war, Hizballah and IRGC-affiliated groups did step up their attacks in Syria. Rather than against Israel, they opened a second front against approximately 900 US troops which parts of oppositional, pro-regime armed groups and the Syrian regime alike have regarded as illegitimate for years. 105 attacks on US bases until August 2024 killed six US-allied SDF personnel and one civilian and injured several dozen persons. The attacks consisted of drone strikes, improvised missiles, and mortar shells, while they focus on US bases at al-Omar and Conoco oil fields (Deir ez-Zor countryside), Kharab al-Jir base, Tal Beydar, and al-Shaddadi base (al-Hasakah countryside), as well as al-Tanf base on the Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian border. By 6 November 2023, Hizballah and IRGC forces had formed a joint operations centre near Albukamal (Deir al-Zur) to coordinate attacks on US bases by their affiliated armed groups and to support Hamas. As part of the ‘Revenge Campaign for Gaza’, these groups are aiming to pressure the US to leave Syria. Notably, however, ACLED data also shows that half of all attacks on US troops in Syria since October 2023 were carried out from Iraq by groups operating under the label of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IR, al-Muqawama al-islamiyya fi l-Iraq) with the same goal on the other side of the border.

Fact Sheet: Overview of Attacks, Fatalities and Civilian Targeting between 10 October and 24 May 2024

How did the US respond?

In response, the US launched four phases of airstrikes, for instance in early February, killing 84 persons in over 80 attacks until August. The US stated that they aim to disrupt and restrict the freedom of movement of Hizballah, the IRGC and affiliated groups. Instead of withdrawal, the US increased their so-called defensive counter air patrols and installed additional Patriot batteries. In anticipation of US strikes, Hizballah and IRGC-affiliated groups took sudden measures to withdraw senior officers from Syria in late January by closing offices to disperse them among the population or by sending them to Iran. Meanwhile, Hizballah and IRGC-affiliated armed groups largely halted their campaign against US bases but are now attacking bases of the US-allied Syrian Democratic Forces instead – possibly to reduce the risk of US attacks.

In sum: What is new?

The current situation shows that since October 2023, Israel has launched over 200 attacks on Syria, while actors involved in the Syrian war have restrained attacks from Syria on Israel. Hizballah prefers to trade fire with Israel from Lebanon. Instead, in alliance with IRGC-affiliated groups in Syria, it attacks US forces. Meanwhile, the US and Israel have divided attacks in the south and the east between themselves into two fronts. The Syrian population, as a result, is exposed to warfare on multiple new fronts. Amid hyperinflation, 9 out of 10 Syrians suffering from poverty, and without political solutions or reconstruction, for many, the spillover of the Israel-Gaza war on Syria deepens the sense of danger and fear. This adds to the deep-seated frustration with the Syrian dictatorship and foreign armed actors alike, who are seen to be engaged in a bloody struggle for power while ignoring the devastating impact of the war(s) on the needs and hopes of Syrians themselves.

In this series:

• ‘How does the Israel-Gaza War affect Lebanon? Mass Displacement, High Levels of Attacks and Fear of Greater War‘
• ‘Regional Impact of the Israel-Gaza War: Zooming-in on Iraq‘

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