After a period of a strained relationship caused by Brexit and the undermining of the Good Friday Agreement by the past Conservative administration, a new Labour government offers hope for renewed British – Irish relations. Keir Starmer’s commitment in the King’s Speech to the ECHR but also to the Good Friday Agreement is a promising start, though challenges remain, argues Etain Tannam. 

The Labour Party’s election victory on July 4 met with great relief in Dublin. The British-Irish intergovernmental relationship was the cornerstone of the peace process that led to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998, an international treaty comprising a Northern Ireland multi-party agreement, and a separate British-Irish intergovernmental agreement. The UK Conservative government from 2016 often disregarded the 1998 Agreement, particularly when Boris Johnson was leader. It frequently behaved unilaterally and undermined the Agreement’s consensual norms. Its threat to leave the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), also threatened the Agreement, as the ECHR is a core pillar of the Agreement. In contrast, the new prime minister, Keir Starmer sought to re-build British-Irish relations.

Re-setting the British-Irish Relationship

The new prime minister emphasised his commitment to the Agreement, and to being an honest broker about the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. He appointed the political heavyweight Hilary Benn as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, someone with a deep knowledge of politics in Northern Ireland.

Starmer also promised in the King’s Speech, to repeal the Conservative government’s “Northern Ireland Troubles Legacy (and Reconciliation) Act” that granted a conditional amnesty to all perpetrators of violence during the conflict, if they cooperated with the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR). The Act was in direct breach of the multi-party Stormont House Agreement’s provisions for legacy, brokered by both governments in 2014. The Legacy Act was opposed by all parties in Northern Ireland and in a rare move, the Irish government announced that it was challenging its legality at the European Court of Human Rights. The High Court in Belfast ruled that part of the Act, (not the ICRIR) breached the ECHR.

Both leaders issued a Joint Statement, after their meeting in Blenheim Palace, stating that they “discussed close relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom and agreed that the time was right for a reset of the partnership”.

Starmer has committed the UK to the ECHR and stated that as well as repealing the “conditional immunity scheme” in the Legacy Act, “further legislation will follow after consultation with the Northern Ireland political parties, the Irish government, and all communities in Northern Ireland”.

The new Taoiseach (Ireland’s prime minister), Simon Harris, has also sought to “re-set” the relationship between the two countries. Both leaders issued a Joint Statement, after their meeting in Blenheim Palace, stating that they “discussed close relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom and agreed that the time was right for a reset of the partnership”. They committed “as a first step towards rebuilding this unique partnership…to annual summits at which they will take stock of joint work to deepen and reinvigorate cooperation”. The statement also said that the leaders “discussed the Good Friday Agreement as co-guarantors and their shared commitment to its principles and institutions, and to furthering prosperity and reconciliation in Northern Ireland”.

The Harris-Starmer Statement did not set out an intergovernmental agenda, but instead was vague and implied it would be decided on foot of the new summit. Its vagueness is understandable.

Potential Challenges

Despite these promising steps towards a more positive relationship between the two governments, there are potential challenges ahead. First, the Joint Statement, while warm in tone, is thin on detail, despite its announcement of the annual summit. (In contrast, as one former Irish diplomat noted to this author,  the UK-France Joint Statement in Blenheim was far more detailed).

The Harris-Starmer Statement did not set out an intergovernmental agenda, but instead was vague and implied it would be decided on foot of the new summit. Its vagueness is understandable. Afterall a joint statement is not a policy document and unlike the France-UK relationship, Northern Ireland’s post-conflict status creates particular sensitivities.

However, it is unclear why the Statement did not refer in any detail to the Agreement. In particular, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (B-IIGC) in Strand Three of the Agreement represents both governments, and is meant to  provide for the governments’ guardianship role that proved so successful in the 1990s. The B-IIGC is particularly important in preventing post-conflict volatility. It met in 2018, following a hiatus of eleven years, and later the governments agreed to convene it four times a year. Yet, there was no reference to it at all in the Statement, and no mention about whether it would be meeting in September. The bilateral summit, by providing Executive leadership, might provide impetus to Strand Three and to the Agreement itself. However, this positive scenario cannot be taken for granted yet. Duplication of institutions outside the 1998 Agreement’s structures should occur with caution, if at all, lest it makes the Agreement’s carefully constructed interdependent structures atrophy.

Another potential issue is that although the current Irish government is not prioritising the aim of a referendum on a united Ireland, it is not inevitable that that approach will continue indefinitely.

Second, after the King’s Speech, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Micheál Martin reiterated the Taoiseach’s earlier comment that the government would not drop its legal case against the Legacy Act yet – that it was a step by step process. The exact outcome of the UK government’s consultation cannot be certain at this stage, so there could be tensions later. However, it is likely that the UK government’s commitment in the King’s Speech to consultation with the Irish government and parties in Northern Ireland, will help build a consensus.

Another potential issue is that although the current Irish government is not prioritising the aim of a referendum on a united Ireland, it is not inevitable that that approach will continue indefinitely. Sinn Féin, if in government, could be more assertive. It immediately called for a referendum on a united Ireland after the election on July 4, following its own electoral success in the Westminster elections. Starmer and Benn have made clear that a referendum is not on the horizon. There are various views within Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil and some members favour a more assertive approach than their leaders’ approach. Party policies could change at a later date, potentially creating tensions and any temptation to adopt populist rhetoric should be avoided.

A fourth possible issue is that Keir Starmer’s speech after the election, referred to the mandate he received from the “four nations of the UK”. The reference caused some raised eyebrows because the Labour Party does not organise in Northern Ireland. Moreover, for nationalists, the UK government’s obligation under the Agreement to “rigorous impartiality” and to be an honest broker implies that it should not use the term “nation” at all, with respect to Northern Ireland.

Fifth, the UK is no longer in the EU, or the Single Market. There will be further economic divergence and possible conflicts of interest. If there are EU-UK conflicts, the Irish government will be wary of being seen as the UK’s ally by the EU, but the UK government might seek Irish support. The benefits of the EU as a forum for British-Irish informal talks and networking have also been lost. Finally, the Windsor Framework continues to cause unionist disquiet because there are still some checks on goods entering Northern Ireland from Britain.

The Good Friday Agreement should be at the helm of the intergovernmental relationship and of relationships on the islands in the years ahead.

For unionists the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland agreed by the EU and the UK created a trade border between Northern Ireland and Britain and therefore they perceived it to weaken Northern Ireland’s constitutional status in the Union. The Windsor Framework sought to improve the situation, but it has not altered the core fact that customs checks exist. Currently the Northern Ireland Executive led by Michelle O’Neill of Sinn Féin and Emma Little -Pengelly of the DUP, is working well, but the issue can be easily politicised at election-time. However, it is highly unlikely that the UK government would  renege on the Framework, especially as under Rishi Sunak, the Conservative government did not do so.

All the above issues are best managed through the Agreement’s complex and interlocking institutions. The Agreement should be at the helm of the intergovernmental relationship and of relationships on the islands in the years ahead.

However, despite the above caveats, July 4 2024 was a welcome landmark in British-Irish relations. The new UK government has made many statements committing to the Agreement and its behaviour is consensual and diplomatic. There are bound to be conflicting interpretations and interests between the governments, but by acting in good faith they can resolve their differences diplomatically and minimise instability in Northern Ireland. No wonder officials in Dublin are deeply relieved.

All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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