LSE - Small Logo
LSE - Small Logo

David Spencer

April 17th, 2023

Making technology work for us

0 comments | 11 shares

Estimated reading time: 4 minutes

David Spencer

April 17th, 2023

Making technology work for us

0 comments | 11 shares

Estimated reading time: 4 minutes

The profound impact of technology on the way we work continues to be hotly debated. Some of the consequences – both positive and negative – are already being felt in workplaces. David Spencer explores how policy-makers can shape and regulate new technology so that it enhances our working lives.

There is a marked increase in academic and policy debate about the possible impacts of technology on work. From a research perspective, there is a particular interest in how artificial intelligence and machine learning might destroy jobs. In policy circles, there is concern about how to respond to technological progress – for example, relating to the skills workers need to stay ahead of the latest technology.

This debate, however, can be rather limited. It can accept that technology will be job-destroying when its effects may be felt more through changes in the quality of work. Workers may not be replaced with robots, but instead may find their work turned into a robot-like experience. In contrast, technology may offer a possible route to shorter work hours and reduced drudgery.

Workers may not be replaced with robots, but instead may find their work turned into a robot-like experience.

The focus on measures such as upskilling also ignores the need for reforms aimed at changing who owns and controls technology. Yet, such reforms can be seen as vital in building a future where technology works for all.

In a new paper, I argue that technology poses risks as well as opportunities for well-being. These relate not just to the volume of work but also to the nature of work itself. I argue that technology will only work for the benefit of society if it is subject to greater democratic ownership and control.

This time will be different?

Interest in the scope for technology to replace jobs and reduce the work needed to meet society’s consumption requirements has endured through time. The Luddites, infamously, smashed machines out of fear of losing their jobs. Their fear and resistance were also partly fuelled by a concern that technology would undermine their skills and their ability to gain meaning from work. Luddism has acquired a negative image – it has been associated with blocking new technology and missing the scope for skill development alongside technological progress.

Now there is alarm that digital technologies will lead to mass job losses. The creation of robots with the capabilities to outcompete human skills could mean myriad jobs will disappear in the future. Stark warnings are made that society is heading towards a “world without work”.

These warnings lead to obvious concern. If robots take more and more jobs, then human workers will face mass unemployment. To combat the economic distress caused by unemployment, new forms of income replacement will be needed. Some, for example, call for a universal basic income (UBI) to protect workers against the loss of paid work.

But there is a deeper threat. In society, work represents more than just a source of income. It also shapes who people are and who they are able to become. If robots take more jobs, people will lose not just income but also access to work that means something to them and that they value for non-economic reasons. This highlights the limits of a UBI – the latter only provides income, not work. It ignores people’s needs for work and the benefit of elevating the quality of work via direct reform.

Rethinking the goals of technology

Two goals should guide our approach when it comes to devising policies that shape and regulate the use of technology in the workplace.

The first goal is to reduce the costs of work. Technology should eliminate those aspects of work that are recognised as low quality and a barrier to well-being. This goal means not just combatting the distresses linked to working but also opening up new opportunities for more meaningful work. Beyond automating drudge work, technology should increase the average quality of work.

Technology, in short, should lighten work both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The second goal is to increase our time away from work. A promise of technology has been that it can increase time for ourselves. This promise was emphasised by John Maynard Keynes, among others, though it has proved difficult to realise. Technology, in short, should lighten work both qualitatively and quantitatively, so that people can enjoy work as well as leisure.

Looking forward – why ownership matters

There is no certainty about the future of work. Technology may continue to create jobs. These may include many low-quality jobs. Amazon warehouses, in the present, show starkly how technology can be used to the disadvantage of workers.

But there is scope for change. Evidence from Germany, for example, suggests that strong unions and works councils can help to accommodate technology while supporting workers in decent jobs. This evidence offers lessons for policy. It shows how the strengthening of labour market institutions and more democratic conditions in workplaces can allow technology to be harnessed in progressive ways.

The wider challenge will be to persuade politicians to embrace deeper reforms: ones focused on increasing workplace democracy and ultimately worker ownership. Only by implementing such reforms can technology meet the key societal goals of less and better work.


All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Image credit: Photo by Simon Kadula via Unsplash

About the author

David-Spencer

David Spencer

David Spencer is Professor of Economics and Political Economy at the Leeds University Business School.

Posted In: British and Irish Politics and Policy | Society and Culture
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
This work by British Politics and Policy at LSE is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported.