Nicholas Barr discusses the future of retirement policy in the context of longer, healthier lives.
I tell my students that we all play by the same rules: they have as much freedom to express their views as I do; but, like me, they are accountable for the analytical quality of their argument. There is, however, one exception. The “ageing problem” is an ideologically unsound term whose use is not allowed.
There is not an ageing problem. The great triumph of the twentieth century is that people are living longer lives and healthier lives. This is great good news. It means that many more people reach retirement age and that people live longer in retirement.
But it also means that pensions cost more. The problem, however, is not that people are living too long, but that they are retiring too soon.
When retirement was invented in the nineteenth century, it was intended to get doddering workers off the factory floor, where they lowered the productivity of younger workers. At that time, people who were 65 were very old – already older than the life expectancy of their generation – and often frail, so it made sense that retirement was mandatory and complete.
Since then, two things have changed. People are living longer healthy lives. The top bar of the Figure shows the story of a man who retired in the UK in 1950. He left school at fourteen, worked until the then average retirement age of 67, and then retired with eleven years of remaining life. A man who retired a few years ago left school at sixteen and retired at the then average retirement age of 63, at which point he had 20 years of retirement. Thus it is possible to raise retirement age but at the same time for each generation to be retired for longer than its forebears.
The second change is that societies have become richer, making it possible for people to retire when they are still active. That, however, means that the purpose of retirement has changed – it no longer exists primarily to clear dead wood out of the labour force, but to provide a period of leisure in later life, as part of a civilised society. Given this new purpose, it is bad economics, bad politics and bad social policy to force people to retire completely on a fixed date. They should be given choice over how they move from full-time work to full retirement.
Bottom line: an important part of the response to population ageing is later retirement, on average, but more flexible retirement. This should not be surprising. If we were designing a pension system for a brand new planet whose native life form was living longer and longer we would never consider a fixed retirement age of 65; instead we would suggest a default retirement age that bore some sensible relationship to life expectancy.
As life expectancy continues to rise, any solution that does not contain later and more flexible retirement will fail. That is true of all OECD countries, and more widely. The argument applies to state pensions, to private pensions and to public sector pensions. The pressures will face the next government, whatever its political make-up. As is often the case, the economics is straightforward – it’s the politics that is difficult.
Nicholas Barr is a Professor of Public Economics at the LSE.
An important factor that is being widely overlooked is the possible correlation between life expectancy and retirement age. As we were retiring younger, life expectancy has increased. So there is an argument that increasing the retirement age may lead to a reduction in life expectancy.
Apparently a surgeon retiring at 55 has a life expectancy of only 18 months, and university lecturers with large teaching and administrative loads retiring at 65 seem to enjoy a similar life expectancy post retirement. However retiring at 55 or 60 leads to longer life.
This is not my research field so my data are here-say. However my experience suggests that academics arguing for extending the extension of working life should explore this area. Failure to do so may well increase the savings achieved by people working longer by leading to more deaths in post.
Pensions problems in general, and in the UK public sector
Professor Barr has made a very interesting post on a critical issue, the way in which the alleged “aging problem” tends to be spun as a pretexxt for curtailing state provision.
I would add that a connected and problematic way in which the “ageing problem” tends to be used is that of the alleged “public sector pensions problem” in the UK. A report by Policy Exchange published last year warned about this “problem” saying that the future liabilities of public sector schemes will represent an insurmountable hurdle to UK public finances as the current generation of baby-boomers approaches retirement.
However, recent research by the National Audit Office published last week points out that payments for public pension payments are expected to peak by 2030 at only 1.9% of GDP (rising from form a current level of 1.7%). More pessimistic estimates by the Pensions Policy Institute (PPI) locate the same figure at around 2.1% of GDP, hardly a massive rise over two decades. Meanwhile, the NAO report highlights the median public sector pension is actually only around £6,000 a year. So scare talk about the “public sector pension problem” seems to be as unjustified as it in the more general case.
URL for PPI report is http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/default.asp?p=12&publication=0263&subjectSelector=&yearSelector=&DefinedSearchSubmitted=1&submit=Search&publicationSelector=2&keywords=Enter%20keyword&searchphrase=1&