One year since Labour got into power with an electoral landslide, things have not been easy. The successful strategy that Starmer used to gain support and get into power has proven less successful in retaining support while in power. Simon Griffiths writes that Labour needs to switch gears from the “politics of support” to the “politics of power” if the Party is going to stay in government beyond 2029.

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Labour’s election victory on 4 July 2024 was seismic. The party won 411 of the 650 seats; the Conservatives won just 121 – the lowest figure they had ever achieved. Keir Starmer’s majority was just short of Tony Blair’s historic landslide in 1997, though Starmer made the ground up from a far worse position. Yet, one year on, popular support for Labour has drifted away. In 2024, the party won 34 per cent of the popular vote, the Conservatives 24 per cent and Reform 14 per cent. Last month, polls put Labour on 23 per cent, the Conservatives on 17 per cent and Reform on 30 per cent.

The strategies that worked so well in opposition and helped Labour win support have proven inadequate for Labour in power, and are unlikely to be successful in 2029.

The politics of support

In democratic states “political practice has two main aims: to carry on the government and to win the right to office in a competitive election”. This claim draws an important distinction  between the “politics of power” and the “politics of support”. The politics of electoral support is shaped by the “rules of the game” set by the voting system. In the UK, a general election is won under “first past the post” by gaining a plurality of the vote (and no more) in a majority of seats in the Commons. Labour’s strategy in 2024 focused ruthlessly on gaining support in those seats they needed to “flip” in order to gain power and worked brilliantly in the context of Conservative decline. Building on earlier work, I argue that this strategy involved two key elements: “decontamination” and “caution”.

The strategy of decontamination

Starmer was reported as saying that to win he needed to “decontaminate the Labour brand”. David Cameron’s Conservatives had adopted a similar strategy after 2005. Both parties were unpopular with the parts of the electorate they needed. The Conservatives were associated with scandal, economic crisis, and division (particularly over Europe). Theresa May noted that they were seen as “the nasty party”. To signify change, Cameron offered public apologies for previous failings – over the “poll tax”, the refusal to sanction apartheid-era South Africa, and rail privatization. Cameron’s contrition symbolised a break with the party’s past.

After 2020, Starmer adopted a similar approach. He sought to restore the party’s public perception in key policy areas. In particular, Starmer committed to boost defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP, and re-emphasised support for Trident. A photo of the Labour leader in military fatigues in the snow on a NATO training exercise was a conscious effort to purge the party’s reputation as anti-military. It mirrored Cameron’s 2005 photo, with a team of huskies on a Norwegian glacier, which emphasised the Conservatives’ new “green” credentials.

Starmer followed a strategy of “quietism”, downplaying the importance of ideas to project a message that does not appear to be “ideological”.

Starmer also distanced himself from his predecessor, Jeremy Corbyn. He apologised for the way in which the party dealt with antisemitism under Corbyn and suspended him when he questioned the findings of the EHRC report on the issue. Starmer also became increasingly critical of Corbyn’s leadership. At the Party Conference in 2023, he challenged a protestor who had covered him in glitter, with the words: “Protest or power? that’s why we’ve changed”. A year later, he rejected the economic costings in the Conservative manifesto as “Jeremy Corbyn-style”. The break with the party’s immediate past was complete.

Caution and quietism

Labour also won the election through caution over ideology and policy. Calls to set out a clear ideological position went unheeded, despite demands from academics (with various sources of inspiration suggested, from Wilson, to Kinnock and Corbyn). Instead, Starmer followed a strategy of “ideological quietism”, downplaying the importance of ideas to project a message that does not appear to be “ideological”. According to some, this approach was adopted to win the support of socially conservative voters in swing constituencies at the expense of younger, university-educated, urban, activist support.

In policy terms too, there was a cautious approach. Specific pledges were limited where spending was involved (with a small number of exceptions that supported the decontamination strategy). Radical policies were dropped – notably on green investment. In general, Starmer seemed to draw upon Roy Jenkins’ much quoted metaphor and approached the election in the manner of a man carrying a Ming vase across a highly polished floor.

Such caution may not have worked in different circumstances, but Labour’s strategic plans were well suited to a context of Conservative failure. “Partygate” and the “Truss budget” had destroyed the Conservative’s reputation for trustworthiness and competence. Labour were also aided by an inept Conservative campaign (featuring a sodden launch and illegal betting) and by Nigel Farage’s return a month before polling day (with Reform splitting the vote in many Conservative constituencies).

The politics of power

One year into office, things have not been easy. The tension between the politics of support and of power began to show. The “politics of power” involves grappling with challenges and constraints imposed by markets, interests and international relations, none of which have to be faced by parties in the same way while in opposition.

One year into office, things have not been easy.

For Labour, there are serious challenges to building a new politics of support, two of which are particularly pressing. The economic challenge is clear. Since the 2008 crash, the UK economy has more or less flatlined. Economic growth is one of Labour’s central missions for obvious reasons: “Growth will fund our public services, enable investment in our hospitals and schools, and … raise living standards for everyone.” There seems no electorally viable way for the current government to offer social democracy without the economic growth to fund it.

A second challenge comes from a much broader crisis in traditional, Westminster politics. In part, this involves a lack of enthusiasm for mainstream parties. Labour’s landslide was won on an overall turnout of under 60 per cent (a fraction of a percentage above Blair’s 2001 “apathetic landslide”). As such, Labour’s huge majority was gained with the support of around only 1 in 5 eligible voters. Millions of former Labour voters disappeared. Corbyn failed electorally but received 12.9 million votes in 2017. Labour received just 9.7 million in 2024. Many citizens have abnegated their involvement from electoral politics, believing it no longer works for them.

The “politics of support” which worked for Labour in 2024 will not keep them in power after 2029.

The crisis in traditional, Westminster politics is also seen in the rise of populism. The root causes of Reform’s popularity are much debated, but they come from wider structural changes: stagnating wages, growing inequality, “neoliberal” and supranational policies, and the new media landscape. Unless Labour can address these economic and political challenges, it is unclear how long “first past the post” will keep populism out of power in the UK.

From power to a new politics of support?

The “politics of support” which worked for Labour in 2024 will not keep them in power after 2029. A strategy of decontamination and caution does not provide voters with a deeper reason to support the party after the removal of an unpopular incumbent. Labour is struggling – forced into recent U-turns on winter fuel payments, sexual abuse inquiries and welfare. Yet being in government also provides new opportunities: the politics of power can build new support.

Labour still has time to build this support – although the challenges it faces are significant. The party needs to confront the reasons for the disillusion with traditional politics and demonstrate that politics can be a solution to many of our problems. It needs to reawaken the optimism that the future can be better than the past. The June spending review, with its focus on homes, health and infrastructure investment, could be one step towards a new politics of support.

The 2024 foundations of Labour’s victory were wide and shallow. They are already crumbling. Whether Labour can deepen this support through a successful politics of power will be seen through the decisions Starmer makes over the next four years and which can still define his government.

All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Image credit: Shuterstock

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