On the 20th October, Prabowo Subianto was sworn in as Indonesia’s 8th President. Having won a convincing majority in the presidential election earlier in the year, the transition from now-former president Joko Widodo to Prabowo attests to the apparent strength of the electoral process since Indonesia transitioned to a democracy in the late 90s. But the election of Prabowo – a former general who has been accused of numerous human rights violations – poses a series of questions over the direction of Indonesian democracy, development, and the protection of civic and religious freedoms. As Southeast Asia’s largest economy and most populous nation, these questions hold regional and international significance.

To better understand what Prabowo’s presidency may mean, the LSE has invited a number of academics and experts to provide their insight as part of a blog series examining what Prabowo’s tenure may mean for Indonesia and the world. Here Nava Nuraniyah discusses Islamist groups’ relations with Prabowo and what this means for his presidency.

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On 4 August 2024, president elect Prabowo Subianto sent his two most-trusted lieutenants in the Gerindra Party, Sufmi Dasco and Habiburrokhman, to visit Rizieq Shihab, leader of  the now-banned Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). Many viewed the meeting as part of Prabowo’s attempt to forge a broad coalition, bringing together various political parties and civil society groups across the ideological spectrum. However, his connections with conservative Islamist groups run deeper and darker than his recent political alliances. As Prabowo begins his presidency, it is important to consider his longstanding ties to Islamists and how he might leverage these relationships moving forward.

Historical Ties

In January 1998, to salvage his father-in-law’s faltering dictatorship, Prabowo invited thousands of Islamist hardliners to the Army Special Forces (Kopassus) headquarters, which he headed at the time. Prabowo provided Islamist groups, which had grown since the 1980s, with additional resources. This included a sophisticated anti-Chinese-Christian narrative linking the economic crisis to an international conspiracy involving Western and Jewish capitalists and local Catholic-Jesuit activists aiming to destabilize the Muslim-majority country by overthrowing Suharto.[1] Islamist groups immediately mobilized protests at a prominent think tank allegedly linked to the Chinese-Catholic group. The military further employed Islamist militias to counter student demonstrations, although Islamists also exploited the partnership to strengthen their own power.

Prabowo once again engaged Islamist hardliners as he faced popular newcomer Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in the 2014 presidential race. His conservative supporters perpetrated a smear campaign framing Jokowi as a secret Communist agent intent on transforming Indonesia into an atheist state and exploiting its natural resources for China’s benefit. In 2019, Prabowo strengthened his alliance with Islamist groups, building on their success in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. In late 2016 and early 2017, Islamists –backed by Gerindra– orchestrated a massive mobilization that resulted in the defeat of the Chinese-Christian candidate, Ahok. However, Prabowo’s alignment with Islamists has not been without complications. His electoral defeats in 2014 and 2019 demonstrated that the support of Islamist groups, though significant, was not enough to secure victory.

Islamists’ Current Stance on Prabowo

Today, the relationship between Prabowo and Islamists is more ambiguous. In the February 2024 election, Islamist groups including FPI endorsed Prabowo’s rival Anies Baswedan, whose rise to Jakarta governorship in 2017 was aided by Islamists. Many conservative Muslim voters felt betrayed by Prabowo’s shift to Jokowi, particularly his partnership with Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka. Hence, Dasco and Habiburokhman’s recent visit to FPI leader was aimed at building a bridge with Islamist constituencies.

Early indications suggest that FPI and the 212 Alumni Brotherhood–organizers of the 2016 Islamist anti-Ahok mobilization in Jakarta—are divided between Prabowo and Anies. Some factions favour Prabowo due to his prior contributions, including in defending Islamist leaders from criminalization. Following the meeting in August, Gerindra politicians reportedly donated large sums to FPI and promised to relax the repressive measures that had intensified under Jokowi. This commitment could attract other Islamist groups which have faced restrictions since 2017.

However, many grassroots Islamists have remained loyal to Anies whom they regard as a capable and pious leader similar to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In his speech on 15 September, Rizieq Shihab, while not explicitly endorsing Prabowo, encouraged his followers to trust the Islamist party PKS as their representative within Prabowo’s governing coalition.[2] He said that rather than fighting one another, Muslims should focus on their common enemy, namely the “communist-leaning” PDIP.

For now, it seems that Rizieq Shihab will steer his followers away from undermining Prabowo’s power. Instead, he may redirect their energies elsewhere, i.e. targeting alleged communists and deviant sects.

Future Scenarios

Looking ahead, there are some possible scenarios for how Prabowo’s relations with Islamists could unfold. First, Prabowo might continue to cultivate his connections with Rizieq Shihab and other conservative leaders behind the scenes. By keeping these ties intact, Prabowo would ensure that he can draw on their influence when necessary, particularly if confronted with mass resistance from progressive civil society groups.

Alternatively, Prabowo could more overtly embrace Islamist groups to consolidate support and counterbalance potential challenges from political rivals who appeal to moderate or progressive voters. This might eventuate if tensions between Prabowo and Jokowi –or perhaps PDIP—escalate at some point, and especially if his political rivals leverage the influence of the moderate Nahdlatul Ulama.

Whether and how Islamists serve as a political asset for Prabowo will depend on Indonesia’s evolving political dynamics, as well as the Islamists’ own agenda. What is clear from Prabowo’s track record is that he is not averse to making unsavoury alliances when it serves his ambitions.

[1] Madinier R. From ‘mystic synthesis’ to ‘Jesuit plot’: The Society of Jesus and the making of religious policy in Indonesia. Modern Asian Studies. 2023;57(2):409-434. doi:10.1017/S0026749X21000731

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f00XeK4gO64

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*The views expressed in the blog are those of the author alone. They do not reflect the position of the Saw Swee Hock Southeast Asia Centre, nor that of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

*Banner Photo by Sangga Rima Roman Selia on Unsplash