On the 20th October, Prabowo Subianto was sworn in as Indonesia’s 8th President. Having won a convincing majority in the presidential election earlier in the year, the transition from now-former president Joko Widodo to Prabowo attests to the apparent strength of the electoral process since Indonesia transitioned to a democracy in the late 90s. But the election of Prabowo – a former general who has been accused of numerous human rights violations – poses a series of questions over the direction of Indonesian democracy, development, and the protection of civic and religious freedoms. As Southeast Asia’s largest economy and most populous nation, these questions hold regional and international significance.
To better understand what Prabowo’s presidency may mean, the LSE has invited a number of academics and experts to provide their insight as part of a blog series examining what Prabowo’s tenure may mean for Indonesia and the world. Here Greg Fealy discusses future approaches for Prabowo’s leadership.
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On 20 October, Prabowo Subianto became Indonesia’s eighth president and just the third to be popularly elected. He won February’s presidential election handsomely, with almost 60% of the vote. His ascent to power has been more closely followed than that of any of his predecessors since Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1998, primarily because there is much uncertainty about what kind of president he will be.
For much of his long career in the military and then politics, he has been regarded as intellectually engaged and worldly, but also volatile, autocratic and often ruthless. Moreover, he has repeatedly disparaged democracy and spoken favourably of his nation returning a more authoritarian system. But over the past five years, he has appeared to change his behaviour, presenting an image of a leader who has mellowed with time, who is capable of working amicably with others, and who will work within Indonesia’s democratic system. Thus observers are now watching to see if Prabowo rules as an autocrat or a democrat.
Prabowo is very much a product of two partially overlapping cultures. The first is that of an elite family with aristocratic origins that had, for several generations, provided prominent leaders. His paternal grandfather was a founder of Indonesia’s first state bank and had also been on the committee that drafted the nation’s 1945 constitution. His father, an economist, served as a minister in the early 1950s and again in the late 1960s. The family went into exile for a decade in 1957, with Prabowo being educated in various countries. Upon return to Indonesia, he pursued a career in the army, which brought him into to his second major cultural influence: Suharto’s New Order regime. He stood out as a gifted and brave officer but also headstrong and fierce. Already rising quickly through the ranks, he secured his place at the centre of the regime by marrying Suharto’s daughter. In the later years of Suharto’s presidency, Prabowo became a trenchant defender of the regime and its authoritarian principles.
Prabowo’s elite origins bestowed on him a sense of destiny, that he would one day build on the contribution of his father and grandfather by leading the nation. His experience in the New Order regime convinced him that the best type of political system for Indonesia was one with a strong, centralised executive government and limits on citizens’ political and legal rights. He regarded liberal democracy as too divisive and chaotic for a nation as diverse as Indonesia.
Prabowo’s military service came to an ignominious end in 1998 when a tribunal discharged from the army for his role in human rights abuses, the first general to be so dismissed. As a civilian, he sought to launch his political career in the early 2000s, becoming a vice-presidential candidate in 2009 and then contesting the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections as Widodo’s sole opponent, losing by a 6% and 10% margin respectively.
During this 2014-2019 period, Prabowo’s style was hortatory, populist, and at times xenophobic. He lashed out at foreign companies for exploiting the country’s wealth and keeping millions of Indonesians poor. He warned of foreign security threats and called for self-reliance and greater strategic assertiveness. Moreover, he spoke nostalgically about the New Order and disapprovingly of democracy, giving the impression that if he took power, Indonesia’s largely successful democratisation would be reversed. In short, he traded on his image as a tough-talking ex-general who knew best what the country needed.
Prabowo’s change of heart and indeed approach came in mid-2019, several months after the election, when he suddenly agreed to join Widodo’s new cabinet as defence minister. Photos of the two men embracing stood in contrast to the vitriol of their campaigns over the previous five years. Upon assuming ministerial responsibilities, Prabowo was deferential to Widodo and collegial towards other cabinet members. His speeches were measured and he performed capably in his portfolio.
Why the change? Seemingly, Prabowo concluded that he would never become president if he continued with his brash style of politics. Time was running out – he was 68 years old in 2019 – he needed to reset his image and reassure voters that he could be a stable leader who would bring prosperity, not confrontation or tumult. Widodo’s own soaring popularity indicated that the electorate rewarded sound economic performance. So will the benign version of Prabowo that has emerged since 2019 continue as president, or will he revert to his earlier, more rumbustious, authoritarian style?
Prabowo’s actions, both in the run-up to the presidential election and since, suggest that he is likely to persist with Indonesia’s current somewhat degraded democratic system but may also gradually erode political rights in order to further concentrate power in his own hands. Departing President Widodo has set the pattern for such democratic regression and Prabowo need only follow his example to achieve a more executive-centric system.
In his inauguration address, Prabowo made clear that he does not favour Western-style democracy. ‘Our democracy has to be unique to Indonesia, suitable for our nation, a democracy that originates from our history and culture.’ Such sentiments have been used often in Indonesia’s past by authoritarian leaders to justify dismantling or enervating democracy.
But there are constraints on Prabowo, should he wish openly to attack democracy. A major source of resistance would likely be the many parties who have joined his large ruling coalition. He understands that all of these parties require a share of power and access to the lucrative resources of state. The fact that his first cabinet has no less than 109 members indicates his desire to accommodate the varied interests of coalition parties. For Prabowo to deliver stable government and achieve high economic growth, he needs a settled coalition and parliament. Any dramatic move against democracy would threaten the interests of government parties and create political turmoil.
It may well be that Prabowo’s preferred system is an authoritarian one, as prevailed during the New Order, but his powerful desire to go down in history as a great president requires him to rule with a certain equability and self-discipline, and to recognise the need to balance competing interests rather than emphatically asserting his own. These imperatives make it unlikely that Prabowo will destroy democracy, but he may well continue the trend of Widodo in continuing to harm its quality.
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*The views expressed in the blog are those of the author alone. They do not reflect the position of the Saw Swee Hock Southeast Asia Centre, nor that of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
*Banner Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash
