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Yuyang Chen

December 12th, 2024

Struggle and Adaptation: Identity Shifts of Chinese ‘Returnees’ from Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s

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Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Yuyang Chen

December 12th, 2024

Struggle and Adaptation: Identity Shifts of Chinese ‘Returnees’ from Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s

0 comments | 1 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

When the returnees arrived in China, they found themselves in the midst of socialist transformation, which paradoxically intensified their sense of alienation. Being predominantly merchants, the Indonesian returnees struggled to grasp the logic of socialist policies such as the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes, writes Yuyang Chen.

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In 1959, Indonesian President Sukarno issued Presidential Decree No. 10, which prohibited foreign nationals from conducting commercial activities in rural areas of the country. This regulation, primarily targeting the ethnic Chinese community, mandated that foreign business owners either transfer their ownership or relocate. It resulted in many Chinese leaving Indonesia. Historian Siauw Giok Tjhan estimated that at least 300,000 ethnic Chinese were forcibly removed from their homes. In response, Beijing began officially encouraging the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to return to China from December 1959. By the end of the crisis, the repatriation had involved over 102,000 ethnic Chinese back to the PRC. By putting out the question ‘How and why did returned overseas Chinese from Indonesia reconstruct their identity during this period?,’ my research investigates the identity transformations of Indonesian returnees during the 1950s and 1960s.  A potential argument is that the Chinese government’s pragmatic approach to the returnees determined both policy shifts and the development of their identities at various stages. To demonstrate this argument, I primarily relied on the archival documents from Shanghai Municipal Archives and Shanghai Library and analyzed how the government’s assessment of Indonesian returnees’ usefulness varied over time and how these evaluations prompted changes in policy.

 

Disillusion of Fantasy, the 1950s

Before their return to China, most returnees identified themselves as ethnic Chinese and supported Communist China. Since the establishment of the PRC and Kuomintang’s retreat to Taiwan, the Indonesian Chinese diaspora was divided into three groups: those who leaned towards the new China, those who favored the Kuomintang regime, and the opportunistic middle faction. Most returnees perceived the pro-CCP group as the overwhelming majority. Zeng Yuhua, a returnee from Jinan, provided a perspective on these dynamics by stating, ‘The majority of the Chinese diaspora was influenced by mainland China, with at least eighty percent of us deciding to return to the mainland. Only about twenty percent were more inclined to go to Taiwan.’

At the time, the usefulness of returnees was determined by the Chinese government in terms of three criteria. With the rise of communism, China was increasingly criticized for using the Chinese diaspora to spread the influence of the CCP, with Southeast Asian overseas Chinese perceived as the ‘fifth column’. Their return could mitigate such criticisms. China also wanted to utilize overseas Chinese influence and capital assets. Overseas Chinese were a great power for propaganda. Their assets accumulated overseas were essential to China’s construction during the socialist reform.

The disillusionment began during their journey to the country. Most of them ‘seemingly underwent a fearful, panic-stricken, and passive repatriation process.’ And the economic decline brought about by the Great Leap Forward starkly contradicted the thriving image of a new China that many Indonesian Chinese previously had in their minds. The reality versus the imagined China was hard for them to digest. Many returnees cried upon their arrival.

 

Alienation in Socialism, 1959-1965

The period from 1959 to 1965 marked a strategic shift in China’s approach towards overseas Chinese returnees. During this period, the government reduced the special treatments previously afforded to them. It adopted a policy of ‘equal treatment,’ integrating these returnees into the class struggle and socialist construction. This was mainly because China’s evaluation of the usefulness of overseas Chinese decreased compared to returnees in previous years. In the early to mid-1950s, the government sought to utilize ‘overseas Chinese capital,’ which primarily manifested in economic contributions. Returnees who came back in the late 1950s, however, were mostly petty merchants, and customs officials restricted the amount of money and goods they could bring back when they left Indonesia. They returned as refugees without any significant assets to utilize. Their contact with overseas relatives was also less frequent than that of earlier overseas Chinese, largely because the returnees from Indonesia, prompted by anti-Chinese policies, often returned as whole families.

When the returnees arrived in China, they found themselves in the midst of socialist transformation, which paradoxically intensified their sense of alienation. Being predominantly merchants, the Indonesian returnees struggled to grasp the logic of socialist policies such as the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes. They experienced difficulty in integrating into local society from their initial reintegration (unified arrangements, offering relative privilege, and labelling), the collective resettlement (state-operated overseas Chinese farms), and socialist transformation.

Once marginalized as a minority within Indonesian society, returnees subsequently found themselves on the fringes of mainstream Chinese society. During the process of agricultural work, collective living, and socialist transformation, they became increasingly alienated from the mainstream.

 

To escape or to integrate, beyond 1965

By 1965, during the second wave of large-scale anti-Chinese mobilization in Indonesia, the government’s assessment of the usefulness of returnees changed. By the mid-1960s, China had accomplished several significant socialist construction projects. Under the prevailing ‘left-wing’ ideological guidance domestically, the government viewed returnees as heavily influenced by capitalism and unhelpful to domestic construction. Conflicts between the local populace and the returnees in the early 1960s had arisen from the reception of Indonesian returnees, which threatened to become less welcoming after 1965. Therefore, the government encouraged overseas Chinese to ‘strive for long-term survival in their local communities.’

Domestically, the biggest identity crisis faced by returnees after 1965 was the Cultural Revolution. Some returnees became primary targets for persecution due to their ‘capitalist assets’ and overseas connections. Meanwhile, the boundaries between the overseas Chinese farms[1] and the general populace faded. On one hand, farms were running chaotically and unable to maintain their original functions. On the other hand, during the Revolution, population movement (for example, Shangshan Xiaxiang) in and out of the overseas Chinese farms was greater than before.

Overseas Chinese were not only marginalized and persecuted due to their perceived capitalist tendencies but also faced intense scrutiny. While some were able to engage actively in revolutionary activities, aligning themselves with the new societal structures and participating in movements such as the Red Guards, there remains skepticism about the depth and degree of their integration. For many, the participation may have been more of a survival strategy than a true acceptance into mainstream society.

In summary, the evolution of the overseas Chinese identity from valued economic assets to suspected political liabilities illustrates the volatile interplay between state policies and individual identities in China over the 1960s.

 

 

[1] Overseas Chinese farms, through accepting returnees, served as a channel for the centralized distribution of resources. It contained administrative, judicial, armed, family planning, public security, environmental protection, urban construction, education, health care, transport, and telecommunications departments that linked with local governments. All aspects of the returnees’ productive and recreational life could be completed within the farms.

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*Banner photo by CHUTTERSNAP on Unsplash

*About the research: This blog is based on the Author’s dissertation for his LSE-PKU Double Masters in International Affairs , for which the Author was awarded SEAC’s Dissertation Fieldwork Grant.

*The views expressed in the blog are those of the authors alone. They do not reflect the position of the Saw Swee Hock Southeast Asia Centre, nor that of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

About the author

Yuyang Chen

Yuyang Chen received his BA in International Politics from Zhejiang University and is currently an MSc candidate in the LSE-PKU Double Masters in International Affairs Programme. He is a recipient of a SEAC Dissertation Fieldwork Grant. His interests focus on immigration and refugee issues, particularly in Southeast Asia. He is now completing his degree at the School of International Studies at Peking University.

Posted In: Graduate Student Research

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