The dramatic ouster of Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 has drawn attention once again to political instability in South Asia, and the struggle of countries in the region as they get embroiled in a newly-emerging multipolar global order, with China and Russia pushing back on US presence in the region. Bharat Singh looks at the complex issues confronting South Asia in this new Cold War.
Sheikh Hasina, the recently-ousted Prime Minister of Bangladesh, made severe accusations in her resignation speech (though she could not get enough time to address the nation) against the United States that has sparked a new discussion. The speech — later leaked to media houses — reported (as by India’s NDTV), that Hasina claimed that:
I resigned so that I did not have to see the procession of dead bodies. They wanted to come to power over the dead bodies of students, but I did not allow it. I resigned from premiership. I could have remained in power if I had surrendered the sovereignty of Saint Martin’s Island and allowed America to hold sway over the Bay of Bengal. I beseech to the people of my land, please do not be manipulated by radicals.
This detail revives the notion of a ‘foreign hand’ in the change of regime in South Asia. Other political upheavals in South Asian countries, such as the removal of Imran Khan as Prime Minister in Pakistan in 2022, have led to similar claims of involvement of foreign intelligence forces (i.e., United States-led conspiracy).
The now-weakened Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had safeguarded, at some level, sovereignty and independent foreign policy in South Asia during the Cold War. It also calmed tensions between the erstwhile superpowers and helped prevent World War Three. Despite its many shortcomings, NAM gave marginalised nations a collective identity and voice without having to align with any power blocs. South Asia is now on the threshold of a new cold war between China, the United States, and their respective allies, putting pressure on countries to choose sides, threatening the harmony and stability of the region.
Several South Asian nations are grappling with political upheaval and economic turmoil. Political instability has been more common in the region, from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and most recently, Bangladesh. Like in the Cold War era, overthrowing unfriendly governments and installing puppet leaders has become a strategic instrument for powerful nations to shape regional politics and safeguard their interests. In the post-Cold War period, the dynamics of regime change have evolved to include more covert and sophisticated tactics. These tactics often involve several direct and indirect methods, including cyber warfare, economic sanctions and disinformation campaigns to achieve the desired outcome.
Mapping the South Asian Cold War
China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a game-changer in South Asia. China’s economic footprint in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and recently in the Maldives, have reshaped the region’s geopolitical landscape. It is now contesting the region’s status as an zone of India’s influence. Pakistan, a strong ally of the United States during the Cold War and later during the ‘War on Terror’, has become a key partner in China’s BRI project, which is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The USA’s withdrawal from Afghanistan encouraged Pakistan to switch sides. At Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, China has established a military and strategic post. The recent withdrawal of Indian troops from the Maldives and a new military pact between Beijing and Malé are also of concern for India and the USA. In Nepal, China’s presence expanded rapidly after India’s economic blockade (of Nepal) in 2015.
The United States of America, a post-Cold War global hegemon, dominated the world until a multipolar world order emerged more recently. The US is facing various challenges from other powers, especially Russia and China. In South Asia, China has become the biggest threat to India and the USA. The US has adopted a multilateral and bilateral approach to counter China in the region: with India, it is part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) alliance to counter Chinese maritime expansion in the Indo-Pacific, and the Malabar Exercise (with India, Japan and Australia) seeks to strengthen naval power in the Indian Ocean.
The USA is trying to counter China’s narrative of BRI, financial investment and infrastructure loans as ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy. For instance, China views the US’s Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in Nepal as a counter to its BRI investments. Different initiatives were made to tackle the Chinese foothold, such as the ‘Blue Dot Network’ and the G-7’s US-led ‘Build Back Better World’ (B3W) Initiative.
What should South Asia Do?
Weaker nations always suffer in the rivalry of great powers. These countries often have problems of overpopulation, poverty, unequal development, and unemployment. Alignment with either bloc can only bring war, political-social instability and economic depression. India’s approach to aligning with the US to counter China was ineffective and adversely affected its interests. As its neighbouring countries and their people express a desire to distance themselves from the West and its agenda, India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy is becoming increasingly ineffective: Nepal, a historically friendly neighbour, is a prime example of this. This new-fashioned Cold War has also halted the activities of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for close to a decade. There is a breakdown in communication, mutual trust and camaraderie among South Asian nations. Making the region a battleground for big powers will fuel more regional disorder.
One solution lies in the revival of SAARC and another multilateral platforms to boost communication, as Bangladesh’s interim government chief Muhammad Yunus suggested recently. South Asian nations must oppose any interference in any country’s domestic affairs by external powers. In its new form, India should take on its historic role of once again leading a Non-Aligned Movement in the region.
*
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views of the ‘South Asia @ LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy.
This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail southasia@lse.ac.uk for permission.
Banner image © Marek Studzinski, 2024, Unsplash.
*
