Afghanistan has been a politically fragile nation in recent decades. How did a region rich in cultural traditions, hard-working people from versatile tribal groups and fierce loyalties, the connecting pathway between other nations and cultures from times immemorial become such an unstable polity? Obaidullah Baheer takes the long view, arguing how Afghanistan was once a very different dream.
I am the King of Afghans and the walls of Akbar’s capital will crumble before me ~ Pir Roshan
What could Afghanistan have been, before it became what it is? This dream revolves around Bayazid Ansari, known to his followers and the world after him as Pir Roshan (lit., ‘Enlightened Saint’).
There are many conflicting historical versions of Pir Roshan but for the sake of this dream, we will go with the ideal version. Born in 1525 in Jalandhar (India), Bayazid came to youth seeing the glory of the Sur Afghan dynasty (1540–56) end at the hands of the Mughals (1526–1857). In time, he would also witness the vengeance the Mughals exacted on the Afghan people as he trod his spiritual path. This cruelty, coupled with the Mughal Emperor Akbar’s (1556–1605) declaration of a new religion — Din-i Ilahi, lit., ‘Divine Religion’ — drove Pir Roshan to declare a holy war against the Mughals. His words
You were a blended nation with an Empire from Kabul to Delhi but now the Mughals have enslaved you. Get up and throw the chain of slavery from your neck
roused the Afghans to arms and turned them into a thorn in the Mughal empire’s side for 75 years. The saint, his son, grandson and great-grandson would all lay their lives for the cause of freedom. Pir Roshan’s rallying cries are said to still flow through the veins of every Afghan warrior who has fought against outside invaders.
*
This dream is important, nay vital, not just for the passion it evokes but for the unique elements that created it. Pir Roshan was a moderate who believed in elevating his people through education; he was someone who believed in the equality of genders. This rare mix of a leader who was a religious scholar, a nationalist and a reformer would not repeat in Afghanistan for the next 500 years. Even so, his nationalist call for freedom and unity led the Mughals to hire clerics to libel him, accusing him of blasphemies he repeatedly denied having committed. His reformist views pushed other religious figures to denounce him as well. This would eventually lay the seed for the clerics to view the nationalist and reformist as one, leading to a fissure between the two sides.
Over 300 years after Pir Roshan’s death in 1585 in Topi (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and close to 150 years after Ahmad Shah Durrani (1722?–72, r. 1747–72) founded what is now the modern state of Afghanistan, a young educated reformist élite would emerge in Afghanistan: the ‘rowshanfikr’ (believed to have no relation to Pir Roshan or his Rowshaniyya Movement but an interesting coincidence nonetheless) remains a term used loosely for intellectuals in modern-day Afghanistan.
The roshanfikrs would push King Habibullah Khan (1872–1919, r. 1901–1919) to establish the first modern school in Afghanistan in 1903; Habibiya School, named after the king, continues to be one of the most famous schools of the country. But in order to placate the concerns of religious groups opposing this new educational system, the king also built religious madrasas in provincial capitals across the country.
Tensions between the roshanfikrs and the religious clergy would boil over when Amanullah Khan (1892–1960, r. 1919–29; son of Habibullah Khan) implemented social reforms upon ascending to the throne. King Amanullah Khan had fought the British and gained back the independence of Afghanistan, making him a national hero. However, the young King was an occidento-phile, keen to replicate the West in his modernisation project. The banning of the traditional garb in the capital city (Kabul), the requirement for men to shave off beards and the introduction of co-education were some of the many reforms he enforced in haste. The final nail in the coffin for him was his declaration that women were not required to wear the veil in Islam. An uproar among the largely conservative rural population incited by the religious clergy would eventually force King Amanullah to abdicate the throne in 1929.
This vacuum would be filled by the bandit Habibullah Kalakani (1891–1929, r. Jan–Oct 1929) who marched into the capital and declared himself the Emir of Afghanistan. Kalakani spent the next nine months reversing Amanullah Khan’s reforms by banning schools for girls, requiring men to grow beards and demanding that women not leave their homes without a male chaperone. For those familiar with the situation in Afghanistan today, it is disheartening that a 100 years later, we have come back to the same place under Taliban rule. Kalakani was overthrown and hanged in less than a year by Mohammad Nadir Shah (1883–1933, r. 1929–33; cousin of Amanullah Khan), who was appointed the new king.
Decades after King Nadir Shah assassination in November 1933 and during the rule of his son and successor King Mohammad Zahir Shah (1914–2007, r. 1933–73) another turmoil brewed in the same modern schools and universities that the monarchy had built in hopes that they would serve as catalysts for social reform. The increasing influence of the Soviet Union was driving young students towards communism, leading eventually to the formation of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965. Meanwhile, the more religious-minded students would find their inspiration in the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, leading to the establishment of the Muslim Youth Organisation in 1969.
After years of prosecution and extra-judicial killings, the remaining leaders of the Muslim Youth Organisation would create the Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan) and attempt a failed armed revolt against the government in 1975–76, the failure attributed to the lack of popular participation in their campaign. This would change after the communist coup (known as the Saur Revolution) in Afghanistan staged by the PDPA in 1978.
The population would soon be disenchanted with the communist regime as the Red Army marched into the country in 1979. The Muslim Youth Organisation would become known to the world as the ‘Mujahideen’ and would go on to defeat the Soviets as the nation rallied behind them. However, the PDPA, with the use of the state-apparatus and media, managed to present themselves as the nationalist–reformists fighting foreign-funded religious extremists. Even though the Mujahideen were fortunate to find nationalist intellectuals who chose to align with them in their fight against the Soviets, such individuals were often killed in mysterious and unclaimed attacks. The choice of Pashtun nationalist movements in Pakistan to align themselves with the PDPA would further widen the gap between Islamist and nationalist currents.
Despite winning the war, the Mujahideen did not have a common cause between them beyond that of the common enemy they fought. This led to a standoff between the different groups as they attempted to capture Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal. The resulting conflict over the capital led to thousands of Kabul’s citizens being killed. This bloody struggle and the vast human rights abuses pushed the students of religious madrasas in the south of Afghanistan to pick up arms. Much like the appointment of Afghan rulers before them, this group would convene a small jirga (council/assembly) in which they would appoint a young Mullah, Muhammad Omar (?-2013), as their leader as they marched under the banner of the Talib-an (lit., ‘religious students’) towards Kabul. The Taliban’s main aim was to end the anarchy and establish an Islamic government in the country, which they succeeded in doing in 1996. An invasion by the United States in 2001, following the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, failed in nation-building even after 20 years of being present, and the Taliban are back in power since 2021.
The Taliban missed an opportunity in their 20 years of freedom struggle to label it as ‘nationalist’. This was perhaps due to the officials of the Afghan Republic claiming that title or their belief that nationalism was anti-Islamic. While there may be some among the Taliban who have nationalist tendencies, their actions since seizing power in 2021 seem to suggest otherwise. The lowering of the national flag (the flag of King Amanullah Khan) from the highest hilltop of Kabul and replacing it with their flag on their first day in power, and the desecration of portraits of King Amanullah Khan, can only be viewed as anti-nationalist. A recent abduction of an Afghan lecturer, Jawed Momand, who posted a photo on his social media account wearing the hat of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (a Pashtun non-violent nationalist movement in Pakistan) is just the latest in a series of examples in which the Taliban portray themselves as anti-nationalist. Most of the Taliban’s policies are meant to ensure incongruity between the state and nation, straying them further apart; hopes of reform are also dwindling by the day.
*
Pir Roshan is being forgotten as dreams often are as soon as one awakens. The Afghan Library in Kabul, AKSOS, lists his book Khayr-ul Bayan (‘Best of Expositions’, AD 1651) but does not hold a copy. Afghanistan today, under the Taliban, is not even allowed to dare to have that dream again.
*
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views of the ‘South Asia @ LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy.
This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail southasia@lse.ac.uk for permission.
Banner image © Detail from Bayazid Ansari (Pir Roshan), Khayr-ul Bayan (‘Best of Expositions’), AD 1651, Afghanistan Center Archives, Kabul University.
*
