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Dharminder Singh Kaleka

November 18th, 2024

Walking a Tightrope: India and the Palestine Question

1 comment | 11 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Dharminder Singh Kaleka

November 18th, 2024

Walking a Tightrope: India and the Palestine Question

1 comment | 11 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

For the longest time, India had supported Palestine and its right to exist, but from the 1990s, her foreign policy — and engagement with the region — changed, with the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel. As conflict rages between Israel and Gaza/Palestine, Dharminder Singh Kaleka traces the changing history of diplomacy and international relations.

 

In the sprawling theatre of international diplomacy, where nations waltz to the ever-changing rhythms of power and principle, India’s stance on Palestine in 2024 emerges as a tale of delicate balance — between history and pragmatism, the ideals of a bygone era and the strategic imperatives of a new world order. Once a staunch champion of the Palestinian cause, India’s position has become more measured and its policies more nuanced as it navigates the complex corridors of global geopolitics. This evolution reflects the dual nature of India’s post-colonial journey where the path of solidarity with the oppressed intersects with the rising currents of ethnonationalism, creating a complex tapestry of foreign policy that mirrors the contradictions within India itself.

India’s Post-colonial Journey

India’s relationship with Palestine is deeply rooted in its own struggle for freedom. The voices of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru rang with conviction against the Zionist imposition in Palestine. Gandhi’s words, ‘It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs’, echoed the moral clarity of a nation that had itself fought against imperialism. Nehru, a stalwart of anti-colonial solidarity who visited the Gaza Strip in 1960, opposed the UN Resolution 181 (partition of Palestine) in 1947, viewing it as an extension of British imperialism — a prelude to the bloodshed that had marked the partition of India and Pakistan.

Later, in 1974, India became the first non-Arab country to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; and in 1988, India was among the first countries to recognise the State of Palestine, further cementing its support for Palestinian self-determination.

The Pragmatic Shift

India’s foreign policy began to take a more pragmatic turn in the 1990s, particularly after its economic liberalisation in 1991. As India opened up its economy, it also expanded its diplomatic horizons, including establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao. This decision — rooted in India’s need for economic growth and strategic autonomy — marked a significant shift from its earlier pro-Palestinian stance, reflecting the new priorities of the time.

Economic reforms not only reshaped India’s economy but also catalysed a broader strategic realignment. India moved from a strict policy of Non-Alignment to one of strategic autonomy, balancing relationships with multiple global powers (like the United States and Israel) while maintaining its long-standing ties with the Arab world, continuing to express solidarity with the Palestinian cause: the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 symbolised this pragmatic shift.

This dual approach has defined India’s foreign policy in the region ever since, with successive governments carefully managing relations with both Israel and Palestine. Despite these shifts, India’s ties with Palestine remained cordial, with frequent state visits of Palestinian leadership till as recently as 2017.

The Ethnonationalist Shift

The anti-colonial struggle that had fuelled India’s solidarity with Palestine also sowed the seeds for the ethnonationalist, majoritarian politics that is influencing India’s foreign policy today. The partition of India and Pakistan, rooted in religious majorities, led to a homogenisation of populations and abetted the rise of the idea of a Hindu nation. While Nehru and Ambedkar envisioned a secular state, nationalist leaders like Vinayak Savarkar promoted the concept of a Hindu Rashtra (nation), a vision that has gained prominence in contemporary Indian politics and aligns unsettlingly with Zionist demands for a Jewish state at the expense of Palestinians.

The rise and consolidation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India since 2014 has paved the way to a further shift in the dynamic; Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel in 2017 when military defence agreements worth over US$ 2bn were signed between the two nations, with a reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu to India in 2018. In 2019, India voted in favour of Tel Aviv’s resolution to deny observer status to Shahed (a Palestinian non-governmental organisation) at the UN Economic and Social Council, a shift from the previous stance of either supporting or abstaining on the issue of Palestine.

These dual legacies — of global solidarity and ethnonationalism — have left India at a crossroads. On one hand, India was a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement, which united newly independent states against colonialism and racialism, with a resolute stance on Palestinian rights. On the other hand, the rise of ethnonationalist politics has driven India closer to Israel, and a shift in its strategic priorities.

The West Asia Landscape

The sands of West Asia have shifted dramatically in recent years, and India has adapted its stance to the new realities. The Abraham Accords, which saw several Arab states normalise relations with Israel, have not gone unnoticed in New Delhi. These developments have provided India with both opportunities and challenges as it seeks to balance its ties with the Gulf Arab states — its Energy lifelines — and its historical commitment to the Palestinian cause. Beyond energy security, India’s strategic interests in West Asia encompass security cooperation, defence procurement and counter-terrorism efforts. The burgeoning defence relationship with Israel is a key element of this strategy, complementing India’s economic ties with the Arab states. This delicate balancing act allows India to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape of West Asia without alienating any of its key partners.

In this new landscape, India’s engagement with Palestine remains significant but is now framed within the context of its broader strategic interests. The days of unequivocal support are tempered by the demands of a multipolar world where India must navigate its relationships with different actors while maintaining its long-held values of justice and equity.

Domestically, India’s stance on Palestine continues to resonate with a large segment of its population. The country’s significant Muslim minority (as well as its historical ties to the Arab world) exert a subtle but persistent influence on its foreign policy. Public opinion, shaped by decades of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, ensures that any shift in policy is carefully measured.

The Dilemma

As the world watches, India’s stance on Palestine in 2024 unfolds like an unfinished symphony — its notes a blend of history and hope, of pragmatism and principle. India seeks not only to maintain its own strategic autonomy but also to contribute to the broader quest for peace in a region long marred by conflict. Compared to other emerging powers like China and Brazil, India’s stance on Palestine is unique due to its historical commitment to non-alignment and its more recent strategic partnerships. While China’s approach is largely influenced by its economic interests, India’s policy is deeply rooted in its ideological background and the need to balance multiple relationships simultaneously.

On 26 January 2024, amidst ongoing global protests against Israel’s siege of Gaza, the International Court of Justice ordered that Israel must ‘take all possible measures’ to prevent genocide against Palestinian people living in the Gaza Strip. Justice Dalveer Bhandari, the only Indian Justice among the 15 judges who oversaw the case, concurred with the ruling, noting the widespread destruction in Gaza and the loss of life that the population has endured. Soon after, on 21 February 2024, the Water Transport Workers Federation (representing 14,000 workers, including 3,500 stationed at 11 of India’s 12 major ports) declared they would refuse to handle weaponry destined for Israel. The Indian port workers explained their action as an act of solidarity, condemning a war in which ‘women and children have been blown to pieces’.

These striking examples of solidarity — an Indian Justice at an international court and Indian union workers — might confuse foreign policy experts following India’s current BJP government. India has increasingly put in place ethnonationalist policies that are exclusionary to its religious minorities, especially Muslims. For example, on 14 March 2024, the government operationalised the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which expedites citizenship for non-Muslim religious minorities from neighbouring countries, critically excluding Muslim communities.

Simultaneously, India has become one of the strongest policy partners for right-wing coalitions within the Israeli government. Historically, India has been a strong supporter of Palestine, serving as one of the first countries to recognise the State of Palestine in 1988. However, since 2014 (when the BJP has been in political power) and particularly 2017, India has signed numerous arms deals with Israel, becoming its largest arms purchaser. These seeming contradictions are best understood by returning to India’s post-colonial history, a time when both global solidarity and ethnonationalism sprung to life concurrently.

Crossroads and Future Paths

India continues to witness the clash of these paths: one founded on an anti-colonial struggle leading to solidarity with the oppressed, and another leading towards homogenising its population. This history should remind us of what is at stake: India’s domestic politics will have a critical bearing on its foreign policy, including on the question of Palestine.

The change in India’s stance on Palestine can be better understood through the lens of its internal and external security challenges. These challenges, coupled with domestic political pressures, have significantly influenced India’s foreign policy decisions, resulting in a nuanced and often contradictory approach to international issues. India continues to affirm its support for a two-state solution, echoing the calls for Palestinian statehood that have long been part of its diplomatic lexicon. High-level visits and statements of solidarity with Palestinian leaders persist, like familiar refrains in a well-loved melody. Yet, these gestures are now accompanied by a deepening partnership with Israel — a relationship that has blossomed in the realms of defence, technology and innovation.

As India looks to the future, its domestic politics will undoubtedly shape its foreign policy. The rise of Hindu nationalism, a force that has grown considerably in recent decades, is pushing India towards a more assertive stance on the global stage. However, this assertiveness is creating tensions within India’s traditionally secular framework, potentially influencing future policy shifts regarding Palestine and broader foreign policy objectives.

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India’s foreign policy is a mirror reflecting the tensions and contradictions within its society. The country’s relationship with Palestine, once a symbol of its commitment to anti-colonial solidarity, has become a barometer of its broader strategic orientation. As India seeks to navigate a rapidly changing world, it must grapple with the legacies of its past while forging a path that aligns with its aspirations for the future.

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The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views of the ‘South Asia @ LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy.

This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail southasia@lse.ac.uk for permission.

Banner image © Hammam Fuad, Palestine, 2023, Unsplash.

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About the author

Dharminder Singh Kaleka

Dharminder Singh Kaleka is studying for a Masters in Social and Public Policy at LSE; he is Co-founder of MovDek Politico LLP, a political risk and public affairs strategy consulting firm based in India.

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