As civic resistance to the military coup in Myanmar continues with the junta losing more and more territory to Resistance groups, changes in geopolitics closer home (China) and farther afield (United States) bring new dynamics into play. Khin Zaw Win discusses increasing foreign interest in Myanmar, and what impact it may (or may not) have on Myanmar’s internal realities.
Myanmar’s civil war is in its fourth year, following the coup in February 2021.Resistance units began forming in May and fighting ensued. Several foreign governments have since become involved, some to broker an elusive peace, others to push their own interests.
Assessing superpower rivalry between China and the United States in Myanmar must span 4–5 periods and contexts; here, I will focus on just the present. Very recently, the two chose their ‘proxies’, and the arena and context are nothing less than the ongoing civil war. However, several Myanmar players have not chosen sides, and this aspect should not be ignored. Overall, the stakes have never been higher, and each side in Myanmar is going all-out to win. Since the two powers will not engage with each other directly, it is going to be a matter of applying pressure, pulling levers and providing key equipment and supplies.
Many people in Myanmar feel that their country should not be caught up in this rivalry ‘game’. Countries in Asia have become quite adept at hedging and playing one power against the other. However, these avenues are not available to Myanmar, due mainly to the incapacity of the political élite. And now it must be admitted that there is no single Myanmar any more.
The common perception of superpowers is that they are strong and powerful. But in the case of Myanmar, both China and the US are actually weak in key areas, ignorant and befuddled. Therefore the outcomes of their policies and initiatives can never be regarded as certain. The country and its would-be mentors are at a particularly dangerous moment.
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When China started tilting towards the State Administration Council (SAC) earlier this year, it was expected that a lot would follow. Among the Resistance there is a certain amount of anxiety. Furthermore, the motivation behind China’s flip-flop stance gave rise to a lot of discussions within the country, including protests in downtown Yangon.
The most recent revelations about the possible formation of a joint security company puts more flesh on the shape of things to come. When the idea was floated at the Fourth Myanmar–China Think Tank Forum in Mangshi, Yunnan in November 2023, I was the only person to oppose it. But it has finally emerged now, and the form is something of a compromise.
One junta-backed think tank, the Thayninga Institute, made a short remark that Chinese security personnel will only protect Chinese projects and will not operate in conflict areas, a distinction that is hard to make in the present situation. The arrangement is likely to cover a wide spectrum of activities. At its minimum, it allows for a string of military mini-bases scattered across the country.
The Letpadaung Copper Mine, Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and the Salween Bridge at Kunlong are the natural top locations. The Myitsone Dam is less likely because it is in Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) territory now; one could say overall it is a means to re-install — under China’s protection — SAC troops in positions they have been pushed out from.
The first battles against this foreign military takeover shall be in the legal and public opinion arenas. Since the National Unity Government (NUG) assumes that it is the legitimate government of Myanmar, the responsibility to initiate legal proceedings falls to it. This must be done, or else NUG deserves the mantle of a government even less.
A retired senior provincial official in Yunnan said recently that public sentiment over the attack on the Chinese consulate in Mandalay was running high. Well then, what about Myanmar public sentiment over this joint security company on which they were never consulted? The Chinese people still feel badly about the ‘TreatyPorts’ imposed upon China by western powers in the 19th and 20th centuries (part of the ‘century of humiliation’). Well, the security bastions attached to the many Chinese projects in Myanmar can be argued within reason to be smaller versions of those Ports.
The outcome of this is wide open and can go several ways. But one thing is certain: China’s present action will stick like a bone in Myanmar throats for a long time to come. China may or may not realise the full extent of its actions now.
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About a couple of months ago, a table comparing the interests of the US and China vis-à-vis Myanmar was prepared by a group of analysts (Table 1). Looking back at it, a lot of things still hold true, but the US is on the way to a second Trump presidency and China has made a sharp turn towards the Myanmar junta.
Trump has not been sworn in as president, but the shape of things to come can be discerned. Generally, Myanmar slips even further down the interest/priority rankings. At least the Biden/Blinken team gave lip service if not (niggardly) funding.
Now items like funds earmarked for foreign scholarships (including for Myanmar students) are being dropped — by Elon Musk, who seems to regard himself as the second president. Funds for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) are also being cut; this had been a major funder and lifeline for the Myanmar media abroad. It is being estimated that 100–150Myanmar journalists will lose their jobs by the middle of next year.
In an exchange with the Deputy Minister for Natural Resources (NUG) before the US elections, I had politely chided him not to rely overly on the US (it is believed he lives there). He replied that they were not relying so much as finding common cause in democracy. Well, it will be apparent soon (if not already) how much democracy actually prevails in the US. Having observed US politics over recent decades, one has learned to keep a safe distance. So there is no disappointment whomsoever is in power.
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Perhaps China sensed a change in leadership in the US and decided to plunk down an actual armed foothold in Myanmar. It need not have worried about the US. Yes, China chose a vulnerable time for Myanmar, but this could change quickly if the Resistance finds common ground against both the junta and China. This is going to be Myanmar’s very own show, without any senior partner lending a ‘guiding hand’. China perhaps thinks the Resistance is going to be a pushover, but it is in for a surprise. In Table 1 above, one of China’s weaknesses had been put down as ‘incomprehension of plural/ethnic politics’.
The Ta-ang National Liberation Army’s (one of the stronger ethnic armies) recent willingness to talk with the junta maybe construed as giving in. But the wiliness of the Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations is just beginning to be seen. The talks do not have much chance of success, but the TNLA shall go through the motions nonetheless. Several foreign scholars have chosen this time to agree that Myanmar is being ushered into a new age, with new players and terms of engagement. If a power is unable or unwilling to recognise this, it is already at a disadvantage. Many people including this writer do not pin hope in either ‘super’ power. Their rivalry is their own business, not Myanmar’s.
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Banner image © bckfwd, ‘Sunrise in Bagan with Balloons in the Sky’, Bagan, Myanmar, 2019, Unsplash.
