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Sahibzada Muhammad Usman

December 30th, 2024

Afghans, NOCs and Pakistan beyond 2024

1 comment | 10 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Sahibzada Muhammad Usman

December 30th, 2024

Afghans, NOCs and Pakistan beyond 2024

1 comment | 10 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Amidst rising tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the last few weeks, in two days from now, as 2024 ends, Afghan nationals living in Islamabad will require ‘No Objection Certificates’ (NOCs) from the government of Pakistan to remain. Sahibzada Muhammad Usman unpicks the issues surrounding this policy decision, and what it means for both countries.

Recently, the Federal Minister for Interior, Mohsin Naqvi, announced said that after 31 December 2024, no Afghan national would be permitted to reside in Islamabad without a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) issued by the government. This decision is part of a larger plan to check the influx of foreigners into the capital city — a sign that the nature of threat to national security in Pakistan is real, and the government is not taking any chances.

The requirement for Afghan nationals to have an NOC to continue living in Islamabad will have extensive ramifications for Pakistan’s approach toward handling foreign residents, especially given the increasing threats to security posed by some Afghans who have been involved in acts intended to destabilise the country.

The trigger for this regulation very likely lies in Pakistan need to empower itself to regulate foreign nationals living in the country, something that has been absent till now. It extends the state’s powers over foreign presence, imposing compliance with legal acts within for foreigners in its territory. For countries like Pakistan that have serious security concerns, this precaution is vital in tackling internal security threats and preventing people with vested interests from engaging in acts of terror or other criminal activities.

One of the main reasons for insisting that Afghan nationals possess an NOC is that this would enable more stringent supervision of their stay in Pakistan. In the recent past, several communities or groups rounded off for terror incidents — the most deadly being the mass shooting at Army Public School in Peshawar in 2014 — and other terror-related incidents involved Afghan citizens or groups with Afghan participants. This has fuelled anxiety about the danger from foreigners, particularly Afghans, in terror-related incidences or other activities that compromise the security and stability of the state.

It also comes against the backdrop of a worrying trend that has seen Afghan nationals associated with political upheaval and violent protests in Pakistan. Particularly prominent are allegations of Afghan nationals fomenting or capitalising on such protests in the country. The requirement of an NOC from the government will allow greater oversight over such activities, and safeguard the country as much as possible against individuals who sponsor or support such activities for the purpose of destabilising the state.

The regulation is also in response to continuing threats from cross-border militancy across the perforated Durand Line (Pakistan–Afghanistan border). Due to this weak border, there has always been easy movement of militants and terrorists across the border posing threats to Pakistan. In deciding to tighten regulations on Afghan refugees, Pakistan is attempting to reduce the chances of these refugees turning into instruments of terrorism or other violent activities.

The NOC obviously benefits the country’s national security; security briefs indicate that several Afghan nationals living in Pakistan engage in some level of organised crime such as trafficking in narcotics, smuggling and affiliating with militant groups. While this is obviously not true of all Afghans in Pakistan, the prevalence of such activities amongst a minority has paved the way for a general feeling that the presence of Afghans in Pakistan may be problematic. The Pakistan government wants to deploy the NOC to add a new layer of scrutiny of Afghan nationals, to help identify those with illicit intentions, to improve law and order and for law enforcement agencies to apprehend and deal with such criminals accordingly whilst also meeting Pakistan’s international obligations to host refugees.

Even though the decision to implement NOCs for all Afghan nationals is likely to be contested by some individuals/organisations, Pakistan’s own security needs to be borne in mind. Afghan refugees have sought asylum in Pakistan at different times through the decades, but the numbers increased dramatically(by the thousands) after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1980.

Now, in light of changing security concerns and problems of dealing with such massive refugee numbers, Pakistan is trying to gain some control over the uncontrolled movement of Afghans within the country.

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To enable the successful enactment of this policy, the government should set down rules and regulations to be followed when issuing NOCs to Afghan nationals. It should be hassle-free to apply with the requirement for Afghan nationals to demonstrate valid reason for their need to reside in Islamabad — humanitarian, educational or otherwise. In addition, authorities should outline the working and housing legalisation timeline for those who are already living in the capital before the December 2024 deadline.

There should also be sufficient public awareness about NOCs for Afghans, as well as the reasons behind these new legal regulations. This will help in avoiding confusion and alerting people about change in policy. Local authorities and embassies should co-operate to offer help to Afghan nationals who may require support with the process of applying/acquiring NOCs.

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The decision by Pakistan to introduce NOCs for Afghans to live in Islamabad after 2024 is a significant step  towards strengthening the state’s sovereignty and national security. It will initiate stricter and more systematic control over the territory, and formalise procedures to deal with foreign individuals or groups who may potentially endanger internal stability. This is crucial in the context of the changing security environment; the effective communication strategy for this policy must follow the same principles as the policy itself —to ensure that the principle of transparency and overall fairness are maintained in relation to both national security and humanitarian objectives.

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The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views of the ‘South Asia @ LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy.

This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail southasia@lse.ac.uk for permission.

Banner image © Syed Bilal Javaid, Faisal Masjid, Islamabad, 2016, Unsplash.

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About the author

Sahibzada Muhammad Usman

Dr Sahibzada Muhammad Usman has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Pisa, and is currently Postdoctoral Fellow at Shandong University, China. His research interests are in economics and strategic affairs, and he is author of ‘Different Approaches on Central Asia: Economic, Security, and Energy’ (2023).

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