India conducts the world’s largest national and local elections; in 2024, its national elections were spread over 2 months. Would it be more efficient to have just one election, all on the same day at the same time, in the world’s most populous and vibrant democracy? Eesha Shrotriya and Shantanu Pachauri draw attention to the possible impact this may have on other important constitutional provisions for a healthy democracy, like anti-Defection regulations.

The proposal for simultaneous elections in India (i.e., elections held on the same day across the country; currently, national elections in India are held in a staggered schedule over several weeks) aims to enhance administrative efficiency and reduce costs. But changes in the electoral system will affect anti-Defection laws which were established to prevent political instability by restricting party-switching among legislators.

Reforms suggested as part of this change include fixed-term legislatures, constructive votes of no-confidence and potential changes to the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India (which deals with the anti-Defection law) to allow for greater flexibility in government formation. However, relaxing anti-Defection laws could undermine their original intent, reduce political accountability and favour larger parties capable of leveraging resources to secure power. While simultaneous elections could streamline electoral processes, they might also lead to unstable and ideologically inconsistent coalitions, posing significant risks to democratic governance and accountability.

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The April–June 2024 elections to the National Legislature (Lok Sabha) in India, the most populous democracy in the world, were the largest democratic exercise anywhere in the world. Each election cycle mobilised millions of officials, security personnel and resources, showcasing the robust democratic machinery, with approximately 968 million people registered to vote. Cost was estimated at around ₹1,350 billion, making it the most expensive electoral event in the world.

Apart from the Lok Sabha elections, 28 states, two union territories and local municipal bodies also conduct elections at regular intervals. This frequent occurrence of elections at national, state and local levels leads to significant administrative disruptions, diverting attention and resources from governance and a seemingly continuous election campaign mode, impacting the stability and efficacy of policy-making at all levels.

The current government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has been arguing consistently for simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies of all states and union territories (state assemblies), justifying it by saying that it will enhance administrative efficiency and streamline electoral management, reducing the repetitive logistical and financial burdens imposed by frequent elections.

This promise — of ‘One Nation, One Election’ — appears in the BJP’s 2024 election manifesto. In March 2023, a high-level committee constituted by the government submitted a report on the feasibility of holding simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha, state assemblies and local bodies. Earlier proposals by the National Institution for Transforming India Aayog (NITI Aayog), Law Commission of India (LCI), Election Commission of India (‘ECI’), and the Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC) recommended the introduction of simultaneous elections by using mechanisms like constructive vote of no-confidence and fixed-term legislatures.

The issue of simultaneous elections intersects intriguingly with current anti-Defection laws. These laws, designed to prevent political instability by prohibiting elected members from switching parties, could face new challenges under a simultaneous electoral framework.

Proposed Electoral Reforms

Government institutions including NITI Aayog suggested significant changes to the current system to implement simultaneous elections, including:

• Extension or curtailment of tenures: For the introduction of simultaneous elections, the NITI Aayog suggested a phase-wise synchronisation which involves extension or curtailment of the terms of some state assemblies.
• Constructive vote of no confidence: To achieve a stable cycle of simultaneous elections, the mechanism of constructive vote has been recommended to avoid premature dissolution of legislatures. As opposed to ‘destructive’ vote in which the legislature is dissolved without forming a stable government, ‘constructive’ vote ensures that the motion for dissolution is coupled with a motion for confidence in an alternative. Such a vote comes into effect only when a majority suggests an alternative by expressing confidence in a named individual.
• Fixed-term legislature: The NITI Aayog recommended fixed terms of the Lok Sabha and the state assemblies to maintain electoral cycles. The PSC suggested that early election to the Lok Sabha or the state assemblies should only be held prior to the expiration of their tenure if a motion for an early election is agreed either by at least two-thirds of the whole House or if a motion of No Confidence is passed and no alternative government is confirmed by the House within 14 days.
• President’s Rule in case of Dissolution of the Lok Sabha or the State Assembly: The NITI Aayog proposed that in case of dissolution of the Lok Sabha or state assembly, if the remainder of the term is not long then the administration should be continued by the President or Governor, which is similar to President’s Rule. (President’s Rule can also be imposed in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the state, where the governance of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.)
• Amendments in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution: The LCI proposed that certain exceptions need to be introduced in the Tenth Schedule for the smooth sustenance of simultaneous elections in case of a Hung Assembly (when no single political party or alliance secures a clear majority to form a government). To avoid premature dissolution and to advance the idea of simultaneous elections, the House may sit and decide on the leader of the House who can form a government. It has been proposed that in such a case, members should be allowed to seek support from other political parties to form a government for which they may need to go against party whip.

Anti-Defection Law in India

Introduced in 1985, the primary purpose of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution was to curb the then-rising trend whereby legislators were lured away from their political parties to topple existing governments and form new ones. The circumstances which necessitated such a law were quite grave. Between 1967–72, there were nearly 2,000 cases of defection and counter-defection. For a brief duration, an average of more than one legislator defected each day and almost one state government fell each month due to changing party affiliations leading to political instability during the period.

These issues persist even today. Recent data shows that political leaders change their alliances swiftly and easily. In April 2024, former Vice-President M. Venkaiah Naidu, while addressing the disturbing trend of party-hopping, emphasised the need to strengthen anti-Defection laws; the Speaker of the Lok Sabha Om Birla constituted a committee to review the anti-Defection law.

The movement of politicians between parties with contrasting ideologies is evidence of the fact that political ambition has become more important than allegiance to ideologies. Individuals have found ways to circumvent the anti-Defection law which has proved to be ineffective in numerous instances.

Proposed Reforms and the Anti-Defection Law

In times when there is a need to make anti-Defection laws more stringent, the government’s push to introduce simultaneous elections in the country seems counter-productive.

If the rigour of the Tenth Schedule is relaxed, it would defeat the purpose for which anti-Defection laws were introduced. It would also amount to achieving the end goal of forming the government through all possible means, a convenient way to achieve results instead of a more cumbersome but democratic way of conducting by-elections. Dilution of laws will also decrease the accountability politicians hold towards the electorate. If elected leaders pledge their support to enable another party (possibly with a contrasting ideology) to form the government, it would be a subversion of the will of the people. This would ultimately benefit the larger, richer and more powerful political parties as they would be in a better position to trade attractive resources, political favours and power in exchange for support for the formation of the government.

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The Report of the Committee constituted to give recommendations on this issue did not recommend any changes to the Tenth Schedule. If the anti-Defection law is not relaxed, ideologically incompatible parties might be forced to form unlikely coalitions for the formation of government. Since political leaders cannot extend their support to other parties to enable the formation of government, parties are only left with the option of forming coalitions. This possibility would arise because the formation of government will be difficult because of rigid mechanisms like a constructive vote of No-Confidence and fixed-term legislatures which were proposed by the NITI Aayog, LCI and PSC to introduce and sustain simultaneous elections. This too has significant accountability costs. The formation of such coalitions, only for the sake of the formation of governments, makes a mockery of the ideological commitments of parties and of the people who vote on the basis of respective ideologies. Such governments, if formed, are likely to have confused policies and suffer from the threat of instability and collapse. The combination of simultaneous elections, fixed terms and constructive vote would lead to huge accountability costs regardless of any amendments in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.

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The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the ‘South Asia @ LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy.

See also Eesha Shrotriya and Shantanu Pachauri, ‘Simultaneous Elections and Flexible Legislative Terms: A Constitutionally Preferable Approach‘, Indian Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2021 for further discussion on the proposal of simultaneous elections in India.

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Banner image © Nina Luong, Stepwells in Rajasthan, 2019, Unsplash.

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