Unrest in Balochistan has been on the rise, directed against the Pakistani state. In recent times, as opposition has strengthened, extremist and violent attacks against Chinese nationals and interests — partners in the CPEC project — have grown, an indirect victim of Pakistan’s domestic tensions. Muneeb Salman and Saeeda Usmani discuss this trend, its implications, and what the state can do to alleviate this situation.
Anti-China sentiments are on the surge in Balochistan, creating a complex and compelling ground reality. They threaten ambitious China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, long been crowned as a game-changer for Pakistan’s economy, promising infrastructure development and increased connectivity. But as violence escalates in Pakistan’s largest province, it is important to understand how these dynamics are intertwined and what they may mean for the future of CPEC.
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In October 2024, an attack targeted a convoy of Chinese engineers in Karachi resulting in the death of two Chinese nationals and several injuries. It was the tenth instance of attacks on Chinese interests in Pakistan since 2018, indicating an unabated trend. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a prominent separatist group that has claimed responsibility for most of these attacks, views Chinese investments in Balochistan as exploitation and oppression of the Baloch people. They argue that China is profiting from resource extraction while local communities get pushed further into the swamp of deprivation and impoverishment.
Discontent in Balochistan has been more visible in recent protests. Activists from groups including the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and the Haq Do (Balochistan) Tehreek (HDT) have mobilised large demonstrations against perceived injustices, calling out the government of Pakistan for enforced disappearances. Mahrang Baloch, a prominent leader of the BYC alleged that investments from China are fueling the abuse of rights, which has further inflamed anti-China sentiment in the region.
Incidents of terrorism and public demonstrations targeting the Chinese risk upsetting ongoing investments (under CPEC) and also harm Pakistan’s international image. The recent uptick in armed violence against Chinese interests in Pakistan is a textbook tactic used by terrorist groups, i.e., attacking foreign nationals to weaken international support for the host country and gain wider attention nationally and internationally. Such attacks have been carried out in the past against American, French and other foreign nationals in Pakistan though they had mostly been perpetrated by religiously motivated terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The case of attacks against the Chinese has, however, been different.
Chinese nationals and interests have been attacked by both Islamist and ethno-nationalist groups in Pakistan. Between 2004–2017, the majority of attacks against Chinese interests were carried out by Islamist terrorist groups. This trend changed after 2018 when ethno-nationalist terrorists in Balochistan and Sindh started targeting Chinese interests after the gradual consolidation of CPEC in the region. At the same time, a trend of unclaimed attacks began, including two deadly attacks at Dasu in 2022 and 2024, which the government alleged had been carried out by the TTP. The motivation for the Baloch militants is to label China a colonial usurper of local resources and a collaborator of the oppressive Pakistani government. In contrast, the Islamists cite support for the government as well as the alleged suppression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang as justification for their targeting Chinese interests.
Table 1 shows a timeline of terrorist attacks against Chinese nationals and interests over a 20-year period (2004–2024) distinguishing the type of actors involved, showing how recent years have been marked by ethno-nationalist and unclaimed attacks. The geographical distribution of these incidents is also dispersed over the years; however, most recent attacks are concentrated in the southern part of the country, especially Karachi in Sindh and Hub in Balochistan (see Table 2). The increase in attacks since 2018 is attributed generally to increasing imitation of tactics between ethno-nationalist and Islamist militant groups, continuing safe havens in — and after 2021 — the convenient supply of illicit arms from Afghanistan.
The repeated incidence of terrorism against Chinese interests across vast geographical distances in the north (Dasu) as well as south (Balochistan), and especially in the congested urban setting of Karachi, challenges some conventional assumptions. It is difficult for terrorists to travel long distances from their safe havens to target their victims merely with support from across the border. Local support plays an important role in planning and executing such operations. This underlines increasing social polarisation and radicalisation that has been going on in the country for some time now.
Some recent suicide bombers in Balochistan are well-educated, middle-class citizens, including women, in both Islamist and ethno-nationalist militant groups. A few are particularly prominent: Noreen Laghari, who attempted to bomb a Church on Easter Day in 2017; Shaari Baloch, who bombed the Confucius Institute in Karachi; a female suicide bomber among those involved in the series of attacks on 26 August 2024; and more recently, the confession of a prospective suicide bomber from Turbat (in Balochistan) in September 2024. The person responsible for the most recent 6 October 2024 bombing was a Business Studies graduate from Lasbela University in Balochistan; in 2020, the killing of two male graduates of Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad during a security operation in Balochistan also made headlines.
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The increasing involvement of educated young individuals in ethno-nationalist militancy point to causes that have to do with more than cross-border and proxy terrorism. Several studies have found that motivation for extreme measures like suicide terrorism are caused by multiple factors, employing terrorism as a tool to seek validation of goals (both individual and collective), involving organisations in a feedback loop where not addressing the root causes can lead to greater frequency of terrorist attacks. In the case of Balochistan, the controlled political process and repression of any expression of dissent by civil society act as primary drivers of the increasing tilt towards violent expression of political agency as a form of seeking collective validation. In September 2024, Muhammad Akhtar Mengal, a veteran politician of the province, resigned citing lack of national political attention towards Balochistan; in October 2024, protests of BYC were met with violence, and Mahrang Baloch was prevented from travelling by government authorities to an event recognising her civil activism in New York by Time magazine.
It is well established that terrorist groups mostly end relinquishing violence in favour of mainstreaming or surrendering (following law enforcement operations) and rarely end with military action alone. The mainstreaming process has to be supported by non-kinetic counter terrorism and deradicalisation campaigns. In Pakistan, risk of radicalisation persists due to the lack of comprehensive non-kinetic campaigns. Even though successive governments in Balochistan have announced amnesty schemes more than once resulting in many militants’ surrender and a deradicalisation program was initiated in 2018, it did not translate into a comprehensively organised mainstreaming with little public knowledge on their outcomes. The first step in this respect must be to organise an amnesty scheme accompanied by a comprehensive deradicalisation programme.
Further, government policy towards social activism and expression of dissent must take these acts as indicators of participation in the political process rather than a call for separatism. Instead of pushing dissenting voices to the margins, allowing them space will facilitate the mainstreaming of detracted extremists. Entrenched narratives against Chinese investments further exacerbate the anti-China sentiments among Baloch nationalists who then view Chinese investments as an extension of Pakistani state oppression. In these circumstances, any military response must be coupled with genuine political engagement that sincerely addresses local concerns.
A number of security and confidence-building measures have also been agreed between China and Pakistan. Despite initial reluctance by the government, media sources claimed that Pakistan has been in discussion to set up a joint private security company (PSC) with China. Pakistan has also agreed to police officers from Gilgit-Baltistan being trained in Xinjiang. In November–December 2024, both countries also participated in ‘Warrior VIII’, a fortnight of counter terrorism exercises that included the armed forces of both countries. A recent press report on the Gwadar port security and surveillance project also indicated that traditionally critical local actors have been adopting favourable opinions, with Maulana Hidayat Ur Rehman (leader of HDT in Gwadar) endorsing the security project. These steps indicate Chinese attempts to not only engage the government of Pakistan for security cooperation but also strengthen bonds with local stakeholders to positively influence public perception in Balochistan.
CPEC is not just an economic opportunity but also a litmus test for political stability and social cohesion in Pakistan. Hence, amid rising tensions and anti-China sentiments in Balochistan, Islamabad and Beijing must devise their strategies intelligently. A purely militaristic approach will not be enough; instead, there must be mutual dialogue and sincere efforts to address local grievances and promotion of equitable development. If they fail to do so, CPEC may become less a symbol of progress and more a flashpoint for conflict. It has the potential to undermine not only bilateral relations but also the potential of CPEC as a regional crossroad. The time for action is now, and it demands a genuine engagement with the people whose lives are most affected by the ongoing developments.
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Banner image © Asad, ‘Sunset CPEC Pakistan’, 2020, Unsplash.
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