Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have long been considered the most effective tool to heal wounds after conflict, and close a painful past through an attempt to deliver some justice. In this post, Meena Bhatta discusses how such intentions have failed in Nepal, which aimed to provide justice to victims of the decade-long Maoist conflict.
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Nepal’s post-conflict transitional justice process is a stark example of political interference and lack of institutional independence and accountability on the part of political leaders.
Following the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006, Transitional Justice Commissions were established to address human rights violations committed during the decade-long Maoist conflict (1996–2006), with an initial term of two years. But since their establishment, the Commissions — the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) — have struggled to function effectively and maintain political non-interference, leading to multiple extensions of tenure and reappointment of officials.
Although the Commissions have existed for nearly two decades, they have shown a pattern of inaction through delays, political indifference and interference. To the dismay of victims, in the initial years the Commissions did not do much beyond collecting complaints and conducting investigations in select cases. To date, approximately 63,000 complaints of serious violation of human rights and around 2,500 cases of disappeared persons remain unattended. This protracted delay speaks not of progress but of institutional stagnation resulting in widespread disillusionment and a deficit of trust in the process.
Recently, the Commissions have been revived yet again after remaining paralysed since July 2022 due to the absence of Commissioners and a proper legal framework. New office-bearers have been appointed to the Commissions: Mahesh Thapa, a former judge of the High Court to lead the TRC and Liladevi Gadtaula, a former Chief Secretary as Head of the CIEDP, along with others as members of the Commissions, by the current cabinet. This has offered a glimmer of hope to victims awaiting justice for a long time since the appointments come after nearly a decade of stagnation during which time the tenure and mandate of the TRC and CIEDP were extended multiple times without significant outcomes.
But although the appointments suggest a willingness by the state to breathe life into the completion of the long-stalled peace process, they have been mired in controversy. Victims have voiced strong dissatisfaction with the appointments, denouncing the process as opaque, arbitrary and politically motivated, and have refused to participate in the process, threatening to constitute a parallel Civil Commission. They have also asked their representatives to not engage with the TRC and CIEDP, including by discouraging the submission of new complaints despite a recent call for registration of cases.
Rather than restoring faith in the transitional justice process, the government’s actions have dealt another blow to the hopes of victims of the conflict. As these changes unfold, Nepal’s transitional justice process remains clouded by uncertainty, lacking genuine victim participation, with a sense of exclusion among the victims and doubts about a dignified and sustainable justice process.
The Role of Political Will
The influence of politics on transitional justice cannot be avoided entirely in a post-conflict society; however, ensuring a degree of autonomy and integrity in the functioning of the Commissions is vital for transparency and justice. Political will is a necessary component for the success of any transitional justice mechanism but it becomes problematic when political will manifests itself as political control or capture. Political engagement should be balanced to ensure the independence of the institutions, and should prioritise the rights of victims over partisan interest.
Unfortunately, Nepal’s transitional justice process has not followed this fundamental principle, falling prey instead to political control and capture. Much like in the past, the selection process of office-bearers this time too is being seen as nothing but the result of closed-door power-sharing negotiations among Nepal’s major political parties despite appeals to Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli to refrain from making appointments driven mainly by interests of political parties. The principal reason behind it is that the Committee tasked with recommending candidates to the Commissions was the outcome of the power-sharing dynamics among political parties.
Given this background, it would not be wrong to say that persistent political interference has largely compromised the independence, legitimacy and credibility of the Commissions. Adding to the challenge is the fact that many senior political leaders — now key power-brokers in the government — played significant roles, either directly or indirectly, in the Maoist conflict. For some of them, a fully independent, transparent and effective transitional justice inquiry would not only pose political ricks but legal ones as well. This creates strong ground for them to influence and control the process to protect their interest, thus compromising the fundamental credibility, independence and legitimacy of the TRC and CIEDP.
The Road Ahead
The transitional justice process has long remained a serious bottleneck for the fair conclusion of Nepal’s peace process. The long-term credibility and effectiveness of Nepal’s transitional justice efforts hinges on three pillars — genuine victim participation, political will and institutional independence. Without these, the revived Commissions risk repeating the failures of their predecessors: collecting complaints but not delivering justice; raising hopes but failing to act. It is time they understand that transitional justice is not merely a legal or bureaucratic exercise; it is a moral promise to victims, a political obligation to society and a test of the state’s commitment to human rights.
If the government is serious about completing the peace process and healing the wounds of its own people, it needs to correct the course. This would entail ensuring transparency, guaranteeing political independence and non-interference and, above all, placing victims at the heart of the process. Anything less will not only betray the victims but also weaken the very foundation of democratic accountability and post-conflict recovery in Nepal.
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Banner image © Binaya Photography, ‘Patan Durbar Square, Lalitpur, Nepal’ (Detail), 2019, Unsplash.
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