In Geopolitics and Democracy, Peter Trubowitz and Brian Burgoon explore the declining support for liberal internationalism in Western democracies since the end of the Cold War. Highlighting how the shift towards partisan and nationalist politics is linked to geopolitical events, Trubowitz and Burgoon’s eloquent, innovative analysis sheds new light on the crisis of liberal internationalism, writes Mohammad Imtiyaz.
The liberal international order that emerged after the post-war era has long been hailed as a cornerstone of Western democracy and prosperity. However, as Peter Trubowitz and Brian Burgoon eloquently argue in their book, Geopolitics and Democracy, the once robust support for liberal internationalism has significantly waned in recent decades, especially since the end of the Cold War. Trubowitz and Burgoon’s central claim is that this shift can be attributed to a fundamental imbalance i.e., Western democracies’ failure to maintain international ends and means in balance or equilibrium. Over time, the authors posit, Western nations’ international aspirations exceeded their populations willingness to provide social welfare support, leading to a rise in anti-globalist sentiment and a decline in the public’s endorsement of liberal internationalism. Consequently, Trubowitz and Burgoon explain, the international ambitions of Western governments have exceeded their national level of support, which has resulted in an upsurge in anti-globalism. They examine the correlation between increasing dependence of Western governments on global markets and international institutions on the one hand, and growing domestic resentment and resistance on the other. Their meticulous research of government policies, party platforms, and voter preferences in 24 Western democracies over 70 years presents a strong case for re-evaluating the history of Western democracy and foreign policy entanglements.
The once robust support for liberal internationalism has significantly waned in recent decades, especially since the end of the Cold War.
The book is structured into five chapters, The first lays out the theoretical framework and the typology that distinguishes between four basic foreign policy strategies around which the entire book revolves. Trubowitz and Burgoon structure this typology into four segments: Globalism (Partnership over Power), Liberal Internationalism (Partnership + Power), Isolationism (Skeptical of Power and Partnership) and Nationalism (Power over Partnership). Subsequent chapters, “The Solvency Gap” and “The Roots of Insolvency”, and “Reaping the Whirlwind” analyse the reasons behind the diminishing appeal of Liberal Internationalism in the Western world. They do this by developing and testing their argument empirically using quantitative data sets aimed at understanding the evolution of the Western system over the past seventy-five years, shedding light on the interconnectedness of geopolitics, political economy, and party politics.
Trubowitz and Burgoon argue that the stability of the liberal world order is closely linked to the functioning of party democracy and electoral supremacy, a connection that is often overlooked by experts in the field of international relations.
Trubowitz and Burgoon argue that the stability of the liberal world order is closely linked to the functioning of party democracy and electoral supremacy, a connection that is often overlooked by experts in the field of international relations. They contend that the rise of populism and nationalism in Western democracies is intricately connected to geopolitical events, a connection that current models of comparative party politics fail to fully recognise. Trubowitz and Burgoon corroborate this argument by demonstrating a change in the political landscape of Western democracies that is influenced by geopolitics. Referring to the consensus reached amid the Cold War (87), they assert that political groups with roots in Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Conservatives came together under the ideology of liberal internationalism, which left little room for partisan politics. Trubowitz and Burgoon show that between 1950 and 1991, mainstream parties won 75-85 per cent of Western votes in Europe, where communist parties competed. Their dominance almost assured broad and constant domestic support for western foreign policy to curb soviet ambition and strengthen economic relations between western nations.
Following the conclusion of the Cold War, the previously established consensus that served as a bulwark against populism and nationalism began to crumble. For nearly a half century, the prevalent concerns regarding Soviet communism and the potential for nuclear warfare led to the adoption of liberal internationalism as the preferred strategy among Western political elites and public opinion without much discontent (124,134). But, with the end of the Cold War came a significant reduction in external pressures on domestic politics, leading to a corresponding decrease in voters’ security concerns (98). This newfound sense of security afforded greater flexibility to political leaders and policymakers in the West, enabling them to more freely determine global priorities.
With the end of the Cold War came a significant reduction in external pressures on domestic politics, leading to a corresponding decrease in voters’ security concerns
The reconfiguration of political dynamics was evident across the ideological spectrum, with both extreme left and extreme right parties experiencing greater latitude for manoeuvring within Western democracies as Cold War tensions abated. Thus, various concerns related to nationalist ideology, including immigration, law and order, and social conservatism, played a significant role in rallying voters. Trubowitz and Burgoon have shown that efforts to attract working-class voters who prioritise job security and express concerns about “the loss of national control” have started to have an impact during elections, raising questions about the belief in liberal internationalism, such as the rise of far-right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 1990s and its appeal in the working-class voters.
After the Cold War, especially since 2010, there was a significant shift from bipartisan politics which was accommodative towards partisan politics resulting in hostility becoming evident and marking a decline in liberal internationalism. Trubowitz and Burgoon support this argument by showing the shift in electoral behaviour in different countries throughout the empirical chapters but what serves as the exemplary in the book is the UK’s 2014 referendum on EU membership, championed by Nigel Farage, played a significant role in the “Brexit” outcome. And, in that same year, using “Brexiteers” anti-globalist rhetoric Donald Trump struck a chord with the American public, leading to the ascent of right-wing populist government (67).
Trubowitz and Burgoon underscore the urgency of addressing the ‘Lippmann Gap,’ which signifies the precarious imbalance between international and domestic commitments facing Western democracies.
While summing up the book in the chapter “Bridging the Gap,” Trubowitz and Burgoon underscore the urgency of addressing the “Lippmann Gap,” which signifies the precarious imbalance between international and domestic commitments facing Western democracies. They propose three crucial methods to overcome this challenge. Firstly, they advocate for strategic retrenchment, arguing that scaling back international commitments outside will align expectations with domestic politics. Secondly, they propose the “Cold War 2.0” approach, which entails leveraging confrontation with China and Russia to reignite Western solidarity and bolster support for liberal internationalism. Finally, they underline the concept of domestic renewal, emphasising the need to invest in economic revitalisation to fortify the West in anticipation of geopolitical shifts.
The book is indispensable for scholars, policymakers, diplomats, and students who are eager to deepen their understanding of the crisis of liberal internationalism in the post-war period.
Geopolitics and Democracy offers a valuable and innovative academic perspective that takes into account the causes, reasons, and methods of addressing the challenges facing the liberal world order. However, there are shortcomings in Trubowitz and Burgoon’s discussion with respect to their solutions in bridging the gap between international and domestic issues in order to revive liberal Internationalism. The viability of achieving ideological support and managing party politics at home, by recourse to narratives like Cold War 2.0, is seriously questionable. This pertains to misinformation campaigns in western democracies and the associated rise of populist campaigns having capitalised on these misinformation campaigns. Further, the effectiveness of strategic retrenchment is uncertain where the interests of the west are inevitably drawing them into spatially diverse geopolitical engagements. That said, the book is indispensable for scholars, policymakers, diplomats, and students who are eager to deepen their understanding of the crisis of liberal internationalism in the post-war period.
- This review first appeared at LSE Review of Books.
- Image credit: M. W. Hunt on Shutterstock
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- Note: This article gives the views of the reviewer, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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